The burgeoning digital-platforms literature across multiple business disciplines has primarily characterized the platform as a market or network. Although the organizing role of platform owners is well recognized, the literature lacks a coherent approach to understanding organizational governance in the platform context. Drawing on classic organizational governance theories, this paper views digital platforms as a distinct organizational form where the mechanisms of incentive and control routinely take center stage. We systematically review research on digital platforms, categorize specific governance mechanisms related to incentive and control, and map a multitude of idiosyncratic design features studied in prior research onto these mechanisms. We further develop an integrative framework to synthesize the review and to offer novel insights into the interrelations among three building blocks: value, governance, and design. Using this framework as a guide, we discuss specific directions for future research and offer a number of illustrative questions to help advance our knowledge about digital platforms’ governance mechanisms and design features.
15 August 2019 in Journal of International Business Studies
Recent advances in digitalization and increasing integration of international markets are paving the way for a new generation of firms to use non-traditional entry modes that are largely marginalized in previous entry mode studies. While extant research revolves around the level of resource commitment and control in foreign activities, non-traditional modes are encapsulated by the extent of embeddedness required for exploring new and/or exploiting existing resources. In particular, we draw attention to four such categories of non-traditional entry modes the literature has touched on, i.e., capital access, innovation outposts, virtual presence, and the managed ecosystem. We explore the key attributes, antecedents, and strategic implications of these modes. Our paper highlights the need for enriching current entry mode research by considering a broader range of entry mode activities available to firms as well as employing new theoretical perspectives to understand the complex phenomena of internationalization.
Extant platform research focuses on how platform owners’ governance behaviors directly affect complementors. This study explicates the multilateral interdependence among different groups of producers within a platform ecosystem. We theorize about how platform owners’ governance design may create frictions between platform providers and complementors. While open governance grants greater autonomy to platform providers, it also cultivates a more complex ecosystem for complementors. Since ecosystem complexity raises the cost of product customization, complementors will be less willing to port an existing complement to a more complex ecosystem, that is, less likely to multihome. The negative effect is weakened as the complementor has greater experience with the destination ecosystem or when the complement exhibits a greater level of modularity. Our analysis of newly launched apps in Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android smartphone ecosystems finds supportive evidence. We discuss implications for the burgeoning literature on platform ecosystems and complementors.
20 November 2017 in Journal of International Business Studies