Christoph Hauert

Christoph Hauert

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Christoph Hauert

Department of Mathematics, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

28Years (1999-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 May 2006 in Nature
Verified
Journal Article
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HOHisashi Ohtsuki
Hisashi Ohtsuki
CHChristoph Hauert
Christoph Hauert
ELErez Lieberman
Erez Lieberman
MNMartin A. Nowak
Martin A. Nowak
The evolution and maintenance of cooperative behaviour take some explaining. Cooperative groups can be undermined by ‘cheaters’ who selfishly exploit common resources, and a large body of theory predicts that cheats will usually displace cooperators. But a possible explanation of why cheats don't always prosper emerges from competition experiments between strains of yeast that act as cooperators and cheaters, competing for glucose and utilizing it either efficiently or ‘selfishly’. The results show that both strategies can coexist, because both are associated with costs and benefits. There is a cost to cheating; in this instance the production of fewer offspring than the opposition. A graphic — really — demonstration that natural selection can favour cooperation comes in a study by Ohtsuki et al. of the evolutionary dynamics of structured ‘virtual’ populations formed of points on a graph. Cooperation is favoured if the benefit of the altruistic act divided by the cost exceeds the average number of neighbours. So cooperation can evolve as a consequence of this ‘social viscosity’ even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity. Natural selection generally favours cooperation if the benefit of the altruistic act divided by the cost exceeds the average number of neighbours, indicating that cooperation can evolve as a consequence of ‘social viscosity’, even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity. A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals1,2,3,4. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation5,6,7. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks18,19,20,21,22,23,24. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks25,26: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of ‘social viscosity’ even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.

1 April 2004 in Nature
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CHChristoph Hauert
Christoph Hauert
MDMichael Doebeli
Michael Doebeli

1 January 2005 in Nature
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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ELErez Lieberman
Erez Lieberman
CHChristoph Hauert
Christoph Hauert
MNMartin A. Nowak
Martin A. Nowak

10 May 2002 in Science
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Journal Article
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CHChristoph Hauert
Christoph Hauert
SMSilvia De Monte
Silvia De Monte
JHJosef Hofbauer
Josef Hofbauer
KSKarl Sigmund
Karl Sigmund
The evolution of cooperation among nonrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences. Reciprocal altruism fails to provide a solution if interactions are not repeated often enough or groups are too large. Punishment and reward can be very effective but require that defectors can be traced and identified. Here we present a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity. Optional participation can foil exploiters and overcome the social dilemma. In voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist. We show that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms, leading usually not to an equilibrium but to an unending cycle of adjustments (a Red Queen type of evolution). Thus, voluntary participation offers an escape hatch out of some social traps. Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random.

1 June 2005 in Ecology Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MDMichael Doebeli
Michael Doebeli
CHChristoph Hauert
Christoph Hauert

29 June 2007 in Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
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CHChristoph Hauert
Christoph Hauert
ATArne Traulsen
Arne Traulsen
HBHannelore Brandt
Hannelore Brandt
MNMartin A. Nowak
Martin A. Nowak
KSKarl Sigmund
Karl Sigmund
In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of such institutions, individuals are willing to punish defectors, even at a cost to themselves. Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of uncooperative behavior are stable—once established, they prevent dissident minorities from spreading. But how can such costly punishing behavior gain a foothold in the population? A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the joint endeavor, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behavior based on the punishment of defectors. Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation.