Seungsoo Lee

Seungsoo Lee

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Seungsoo Lee

Incheon National University, Incheon, Republic of Korea

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
22 September 2022 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JNJaehyun Nam
Jaehyun Nam
SLSeungsoo Lee
Seungsoo Lee
PPPhillip Porras
Phillip Porras
VYVinod Yegneswaran
Vinod Yegneswaran
SSSeungwon Shin
Seungwon Shin
While the use of containerization technologies for virtual application deployment has grown at an astonishing rate, the question of the robustness of container networking has not been well scrutinized from a security perspective, even though inter-container networking is indispensable for microservices. Thus, this paper first analyzes container networks from a security perspective, discussing the implications based on their architectural limitations. Then, it presents, a secure inter-container communication bridge. introduces ( $i$ ) a network security enforcement stack that provides fine-grained control per container application and securely isolates inter-container traffic in a point-to-point manner. also supports ( $ii$ ) selective security function chaining, enabling various security functions to be chained between containers for further security inspections (e.g., deep packet inspection) according to the container’s network context. incorporates ( $iii$ ) a security policy assistant that helps an administrator discover inter-container networking dependencies correctly. Our evaluation demonstrates how can effectively mitigate several adversarial attacks in container networks while improving the overall performance up to 25.4% within single-host containers and 17.7% for cross-host container communications.

30 August 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSeungsoo Lee
Seungsoo Lee
JNJaehyun Nam
Jaehyun Nam
Containerization has gained significant popularity in cloud-native applications, offering lightweight and portable capabilities, with container orchestration platforms such as Kubernetes, simplifying deployment and management. However, the presence of human errors, especially misconfigurations, continues to pose substantial security risks to containers. One specific challenge lies in generating effective network security policies, given the intricate nature of label-based container management and the dynamic characteristics of container deployments. This paper introduces KUNERVA, an innovative and automated solution specifically designed to tackle the critical security challenge in container environments. KUNERVA focuses on policy discovery utilizing network logs to generate a minimum set of network security policies to achieve maximum network traffic coverage while ensuring the security isolation between containers. To enhance the reliability of the generated policies, KUNERVA seamlessly integrates with a policy enforcement system, Gatekeeper, for accurate policy verification. Consequently, KUNERVA ensures the discovery of an efficient and effective network policy set, blocking the enforcement of malicious network policies.

20 February 2025 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BKBom Kim
Bom Kim
JKJinwoo Kim
Jinwoo Kim
SLSeungsoo Lee
Seungsoo Lee
Container Network Interfaces (CNIs) are critical for securing containerized environments, yet their various security features and performance remain under-analyzed. This study presents an in-depth analysis of major CNI plugins (Cilium, Calico, WeaveNet, Kube-router, and Antrea) in Kubernetes environments. We first analyze their architectural characteristics and basic security features (encryption, multi-tenancy, etc.), and then perform a detailed examination of their network policy enforcement mechanisms. To understand the performance implications of policy enforcement, we evaluate Layer 3/4 policy processing, policy complexity scaling, pod scalability, and Layer 7 policy processing. Our results show clear patterns: eBPF-based Cilium maintains 8.9K Mbps throughput under complex L3/4 policies, but drops to 94 Mbps with L7 processing, while Antrea achieves 6.6K Mbps at L7 through HTTP filtering, although performance degrades as policy complexity increases. Under high concurrent pod loads, iptables-based CNIs show a 60-70% reduction in throughput, while Cilium maintains performance within 10% of baseline. These results highlight the trade-offs between architectural choices and security capabilities, and provide actionable insights for optimizing CNI selection based on cloud-native use cases.

2 September 2025 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJin Her
Jin Her
JKJongseop Kim
Jongseop Kim
JKJinwoo Kim
Jinwoo Kim
SLSeungsoo Lee
Seungsoo Lee
Kubernetes-based microservice architectures are central to modern cloud-native environments, offering flexibility, scalability, and diverse use cases. Given their large-scale and complex deployments, auditing is crucial for detecting potential threats. To address this need, various eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter)-based security tools (ESSTs) have been developed, leveraging eBPF to monitor process and network activities in Kubernetes environments, log suspicious events, and enforce security policies. However, administrators often face challenges in selecting the most suitable ESST due to a lack of comprehensive comparative analyses. In this paper, we conduct an in-depth evaluation of four widely used ESSTs—KubeArmor, Falco, Tetragon, and Tracee—focusing on their internal architectures, auditing capabilities, overall performance, and real-world case studies in practice. Based on our findings, we provide key insights to guide administrators in selecting the appropriate ESST for their specific needs. We believe our research enhances the understanding of ESSTs, contributing to the development of more secure and high-performance cloud-native environments.

20 September 2022 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MYMyoungsung You
Myoungsung You
YKYeonkeun Kim
Yeonkeun Kim
JKJaehan Kim
Jaehan Kim
MSMinjae Seo
Minjae Seo
SSSooel Son
Sooel Son
SLSeungsoo Lee
Seungsoo Lee
As Internet of Things (IoT) devices have rooted themselves in the daily life of billions of people, security threats targeting IoT devices are emerging rapidly. Thus, IoT vendors have employed security testing frameworks to examine IoT devices before releasing them. However, existing frameworks have difficulty providing automated testing, as they require a lot of manual effort to support new devices due to the lack of information about the input formats of the new devices. To address this challenge, we introduce FuzzDocs, a document-based black-box IoT testing framework designed to automatically analyze publicly accessible API documents about target IoT devices and extract information, including valid inputs used to call each functionality of the target devices. Based on the extracted information, it generates valid-enough test inputs that are not easily rejected by target devices but can trigger vulnerabilities deep inside them. This document-based input generation allows FuzzDocs to support new devices without manual work, as well as provide effective security testing. To prove its feasibility, we evaluated FuzzDocs in a real-world IoT environment, and the results showed that FuzzDocs extracted input formats with 93% accuracy from hundreds of pages of documents. Also, it outperformed the existing frameworks in testing coverage and found 35 potential vulnerabilities, including two unexpected system failures in five popular IoT devices.

14 January 2022 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SLSeungsoo Lee
Seungsoo Lee
SWSeungwon Woo
Seungwon Woo
JKJinwoo Kim
Jinwoo Kim
JNJaehyun Nam
Jaehyun Nam
VYVinod Yegneswaran
Vinod Yegneswaran
SSSeungwon Shin
Seungwon Shin
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has aggressively grown in data center networks, telecommunication providers, and enterprises by virtue of its programmable and extensible control plane. Also, there have been many kinds of research on the security of SDN components along with the growth of SDN. Some of them have inspected network policy inconsistency problems that can severely cause network reliability and security issues in SDN. However, they do not consider whether a single network policy itself is corrupted during processing inside and between SDN components. In this paper, we thus focus on the question of how to automatically identify cases in which the SDN stack fails to prevent policy inconsistencies from arising among those components. We then present AudiSDN, an automated fuzz-testing framework designed to formulate test cases in which policy inconsistencies can arise in OpenFlow networks, the most prevalent SDN protocol. To prove its feasibility, we applied AudiSDN to two widely used SDN controllers, Floodlight and ONOS, and uncovered three separate CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) that cause the network policy inconsistencies among SDN components. Furthermore, we investigate the design flaws that cause the inconsistencies in modern SDN components, suggesting specific validations to address such a serious but understudied pragmatic concern.