8 August 2011 in Criminology & Criminal Justice
Payment by results allows the government to pay a provider of services on the basis of the outcomes their service achieves rather than the inputs or outputs the provider delivers. Social impact bonds (SIBs) are a form of payment by results which allow the financing of social outcomes via private investment. It is suggested that payment by results and SIBs will drive greater efficiency, innovation and impact in tackling social problems through focusing reward on outcomes and providing minimal prescription as to how these outcomes should be achieved. It is suggested that this may be achieved while also reducing risk for government. Here we set out the challenges likely to arise in developing payment by results models and SIBs in the criminal justice system of England and Wales. These include the uncertainty arising from defining outcomes, estimating the potential impact of interventions, measuring and attributing change, valuing benefits, demonstrating a fiscal return and getting interventions to scale. We conclude that, to a government trying to deliver ‘more for less’, payment by results may offer an attractive solution in some parts of the public sector. However, the case for this approach in the criminal justice sector, where the evidence base is contested and potential savings difficult to quantify and realize, is not yet proven.
7 February 2019 in Journal of Economic Policy Reform
We review the state of evaluation within outcome-based commissioning in the United Kingdom. This is the first review to include empirical evaluations of both PbR and SIB programmes. We find a paucity of evaluation and that the quality of evaluations is not high. Moreover, studies tend to conflate the outcomes-based commissioning mechanism with the intervention or services that are funded, and are unable to assess the contribution of these separate elements to impact. Our review also highlights the challenges faced by evaluators in measuring social outcomes. We suggest ways to address these challenges.
10 December 2012 in Probation Journal
In recent years the UK government has emphasized evidence-based policy, as a part of which the Payment by Results (PbR) approach has increasingly been promoted. Payment by Results allows the government to pay a provider of services on the basis of specified outcomes achieved rather than the inputs or outputs delivered. Linked to PbR is the innovative source of funding social interventions know as Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). We discuss the potential benefits of PbR and survey its use across the UK public sector. Then, concentrating in particular on the Criminal Justice System (CJS) we outline three methodological challenges to the implementation of PbR: gaming, measuring outcomes and identifying fiscal benefits. We then identify a number of challenges to the implementation of PbR. We conclude that PbR has a place in commissioning services, but that its role in the CJS is likely to be limited and unlikely to succeed as a socially efficient means of attracting new sources of funding. We finish by considering two alternatives to PbR: justice reinvestment and personalization.
12 February 2020 in Nonprofit Policy Forum
Governments in some of the world’s richest nations appear to be caught in a double challenge of declining social budgets even as social needs are increasing. In this context, Outcomes Based Commissioning (OBC), has been suggested as one way in which ‘more’ social services can be provided for ‘less’ public resources. This form of commissioning is often linked with a new financing tool for social services, referred to in the US as ‘Pay for Success and Payment by Results in the UK or as a ‘Social Impact Bond’ (SIB). However, to date, this approach is under-theorised and this is a limiting factor both for shaping a research and evaluation agenda around SIBs and in understanding how such instruments might develop in future. Without a theoretical rationale for SIBs, it is not straightforward to assess whether, and how well, they have achieved their goals, and how they might be developed further. In this paper we consider two broad approaches to theorising SIBs. One draws on public administration theories, the other on innovation theories. To date, SIBs have often been theorised as the logical next step in the New Public Management (NPM). But NPM itself is a contested theory and recent theoretical innovations in public administration, particularly the concept of New Public Governance might provide a more useful theoretical framework. A second broad approach through which to understand SIBs is their potential to improve the rate and dissemination of innovation. There are many different innovation models that might be applied to better understanding of SIBs. We look first at the concept of Open Innovation with its focus on distributed innovation processes in which knowledge flows across organisational boundaries and more recent articulations – Open Innovation 2.0 – which place greater emphasis on mixed economy collabarations involving: industry; government; universities; and communities and users (the so-called ‘quadruple helix’) to solve societal challenges. We go on to consider social innovation, with its clearer focus on using social means to deliver social outcomes and whether SIBs can be theorised through this lens. No one model is entirely satisfactory as an explanatory framework for SIBs and we conclude by suggesting that a supporting theory combining NPG with elements of Open Innovation 2.0 and social innovation might be a productive approach for shaping future research and, in addition, might suggest some future directions for the next generation of SIBs.
10 January 2019 in Probation Journal
This paper considers criminal justice policy in England and Wales since the Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) agenda implemented in 2013. TR rested on the proposition that probation services are best provided in a market context. Motivated by profit and extrinsic rewards, private sector consortia, and their employees, theoretically act efficiently to deter and rehabilitate offenders from crime. However, there is evidence that marketisation itself undermines the prospects of efficient social policy. Over-reliance on markets may undermine pro-social norms through emphasising individualism and extrinsic returns. Outsourcing is also associated with increasing inequality, which may also undermine pro-social norms. Further, the emphasis placed on self-interest in framing market-based incentive structures is associated with declining public welfare support for the economically marginalised and increased use of relatively expensive incarceration. In application, TR proved unsustainable. The innovation involves increasing reliance on the para-state sector, in which private profits rely on public payment. However, the profits expected under TR fell short of expectations, in part due to changes in wider society. The early cancellation of TR contracts highlights the inflexible nature of such public sector procurement. On the basis of theory and practice, we suggest a reconsideration of the government’s position on probation and set out reasonable steps to address shortcomings in the current system.