Jonas B. Sandbrink

Jonas B. Sandbrink

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Jonas B. Sandbrink

Nuffield Department of Medicine University of Oxford Oxford United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 December 2020 in Frontiers in Immunology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JSJonas B. Sandbrink
Jonas B. Sandbrink
RSRobin J. Shattock
Robin J. Shattock
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the ongoing threat of pandemics caused by novel, previously unrecognized, or mutated pathogens with high transmissibility. Currently, vaccine development is too slow for vaccines to be used in the control of emerging pandemics. RNA-based vaccines might be suitable to meet this challenge. The use of an RNA-based delivery mechanism promises fast vaccine development, clinical approval, and production. The simplicity of in vitro transcription of mRNA suggests potential for fast, scalable, and low-cost manufacture. RNA vaccines are safe in theory and have shown acceptable tolerability in first clinical trials. Immunogenicity of SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccines in phase 1 trials looks promising, however induction of cellular immunity needs to be confirmed and optimized. Further optimization of RNA vaccine modification and formulation to this end is needed, which may also enable single injection regimens to be achievable. Self-amplifying RNA vaccines, which show high immunogenicity at low doses, might help to improve potency while keeping manufacturing costs low and speed high. With theoretical properties of RNA vaccines looking promising, their clinical efficacy is the key remaining question with regard to their suitability for tackling emerging pandemics. This question might be answered by ongoing efficacy trials of SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccines.

14 April 2022 in PLOS Biology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JSJames Smith
James Smith
JSJonas B. Sandbrink
Jonas B. Sandbrink
The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

11 February 2021 in npj Vaccines
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JMJoshua T. Monrad
Joshua T. Monrad
JSJonas B. Sandbrink
Jonas B. Sandbrink
NCNeil G. Cherian
Neil G. Cherian
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the importance of rapid and versatile development of emergency medical countermeasures such as vaccines. We discuss the role of platform vaccines and prototype pathogen research in modern vaccine development, and outline how previous pathogen-specific funding approaches can be improved to adequately promote vaccine R&D for emerging pandemics. We present a more comprehensive approach to financing vaccine R&D, which maximises biomedical pandemic preparedness by promoting flexible vaccine platforms and translatable research into prototype pathogens. As the numerous platform-based SARS-CoV-2 vaccines show, funders can accelerate pandemic vaccine development by proactively investing in versatile platform technologies. For certain emerging infectious diseases, where vaccine research can translate to other related pathogens with pandemic potential, investment decisions should reflect the full social value of increasing overall preparedness, rather than just the value of bringing a vaccine to market for individual pathogens.

26 October 2021 in mBio
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SMSriharshita Musunuri
Sriharshita Musunuri
JSJonas B. Sandbrink
Jonas B. Sandbrink
JMJoshua Teperowski Monrad
Joshua Teperowski Monrad
MPMegan J. Palmer
Megan J. Palmer
GKGregory D. Koblentz
Gregory D. Koblentz
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world’s vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed.

1 April 2022 in Vaccine
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JSJonas B. Sandbrink
Jonas B. Sandbrink
GKGregory D. Koblentz
Gregory D. Koblentz
Vaccine platforms have been critical for accelerating the timeline of COVID-19 vaccine development. Faster vaccine timelines demand further development of these technologies. Currently investigated platform approaches include virally vectored and RNA-based vaccines, as well as DNA vaccines and recombinant protein expression system platforms, each featuring different advantages and challenges. Viral vector-based and DNA vaccines in particular have received a large share of research funding to date. Platform vaccine technologies may feature dual-use potential through informing or enabling pathogen engineering, which may raise the risk for the occurrence of deliberate, anthropogenic biological events. Research on virally vectored vaccines exhibits relatively high dual-use potential for two reasons. First, development of virally vectored vaccines may generate insights of particular dual-use concern such as techniques for circumventing pre-existing anti-vector immunity. Second, while the amount of work on viral vectors for gene therapy exceeds that for vaccine research, work on virally vectored vaccines may increase the number of individuals capable of engineering viruses of particular concern, such as ones closely related to smallpox. Other platform vaccine approaches, such as RNA vaccines, feature relatively little dual-use potential. The biosecurity risk associated with platform advancement may be minimised by focusing preferentially on circumventing anti-vector immunity with non-genetic rather than genetic modifications, using vectors that are not based on viruses pathogenic to humans, or preferential investment into promising RNA-based vaccine approaches. To reduce the risk of anthropogenic pandemics, structures for the governance of biotechnology and life science research with dual-use potential need to be reworked. Scientists outside of the pathogen research community, for instance those who work on viral vectors or oncolytic viruses, need to become more aware of the dual-use risks associated with their research. Both public and private research-funding bodies need to prioritise the evaluation and reduction of biosecurity risks.

10 March 2022 in Gene Therapy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JSJonas B. Sandbrink
Jonas B. Sandbrink
EAEthan C. Alley
Ethan C. Alley
MWMatthew C. Watson
Matthew C. Watson
GKGregory D. Koblentz
Gregory D. Koblentz
KEKevin M. Esvelt
Kevin M. Esvelt
Optimizing viral vectors and their properties will be important for improving the effectiveness and safety of clinical gene therapy. However, such research may generate dual-use insights relevant to the enhancement of pandemic pathogens. In particular, reliable and generalizable methods of immune evasion could increase viral fitness sufficient to cause a new pandemic. High potential for misuse is associated with (1) the development of universal genetic elements for immune modulation, (2) specific insights on capsid engineering for antibody evasion applicable to viruses with pandemic potential, and (3) the development of computational methods to inform capsid engineering. These risks may be mitigated by prioritizing non-viral delivery systems, pharmacological immune modulation methods, non-genetic vector surface modifications, and engineering methods specific to AAV and other viruses incapable of unassisted human-to-human transmission. We recommend that computational vector engineering and the publication of associated code and data be limited to AAV until a technical solution for preventing malicious access to viral engineering tools has been established.