6 June 2011 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
We assess the impact of institutions on Chinese firms’ corporate investment in an investment Euler equation framework. We allow the variables measuring institutions to affect the rate at which firm managers discount future investment payoffs. Applying generalized method of moments estimators to large samples of Chinese firms, we estimate the stochastic discount rates derived from actual investment and examine how they vary across institutional variables. We document robust evidence that ownership is the primary institutional factor affecting corporate investment in China. The derived discount rate for a nonstate firm is approximately 10 percentage points higher than that of an otherwise equal state firm. State firms tend to use higher discount rates to invest after they are partially privatized. We also find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance use higher discount rates to make investment.
1 December 2021 in Management Science
We use a novel panel with detailed transaction records of more than one million de-identified individuals to study the effect of a large-scale Chinese government-issued digital coupon program on consumer spending. Exploiting a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the digital coupon is highly effective in stimulating consumption. An effective government subsidy of RMB 1 can drive excess spending of RMB 3.4 to RMB 5.8, and the effect persists across multiple coupon issuance waves. In explaining the results, we find that a behavioral model with mental accounting and loss aversion can match the empirical evidence from the field. Our analysis, by illustrating the importance of embedding behavioral factors into the design and implementation of public policy, informs the current debate about cost-effective policy tools to recover the economy. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.
1 August 2003 in SSRN Electronic Journal
This paper hypothesizes that earnings management in China's listed companies is mainly induced by controlling owners' tunneling activity. We conduct our analyses in two stages. In the first stage, we relate our analyses to prior research on Chinese listed companies which has documented their strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds. We identify tunneling evidence in two scenarios where such practice has been most conspicuous. In the second stage, we examine systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999-2001. We provide cross-sectional and time-series evidence showing that firms with higher corporate governance levels tend to have less earnings management. Our empirical findings although not being able to completely exclude other theories, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors are the main stimuli of earnings management in China's listed companies.
1 January 2002 in SSRN Electronic Journal
This paper hypothesizes that the threat of losing listing status in China's distressed ST (special treatment) firms initiates a corporate control market that do
30 December 2015 in SSRN Electronic Journal
We exploit exogenous variation in turnovers of China’s municipal political leaders to study how political incentives affect firms’ strategic tax avoidance behavior. We document robust cycles in corporate tax compliance corresponding with the timing of political turnovers. Specifically, we find that firms avoid less tax in the early period of local politicians’ terms, but more in the remaining terms. The magnitude of the political cycles varies across municipal city, politician, and firm characteristics. Entirely different from channels such as the political uncertainty, the political connection, and the potential collusions between local politicians and firm in their jurisdictions, our further analyses suggest local politicians’ timing tax enforcement efforts to achieve their preferred policy outcomes is an important channel through which political process affects tax avoidance outcomes.
1 May 2022 in Fundamental Research
We propose a new international monetary system based on carbon currency (the carbon standard) to tackle two pressing externalities in today's global economic and political context: the dangerous and irreversible effects caused by unconstrained green-house gas emissions and the cost to the rest of the world as a result of the U.S. dollar being the dominated global currency and the U.S. Federal Reserve increasingly implementing monetary policies not aligned with the global common interest. We define carbon currency as standardized carbon-related securities backed up by the right of one unit of carbon emissions. It can be used as a new global reserve currency and functions as an international unit of account. Through the trading of carbon currency, efficient carbon prices are established. By incorporating the cost of carbon emissions into decision making, carbon pricing provides incentives for countries to pursue low-carbon growth, which helps achieve the net zero emissions global goal set under the 2015 Paris Agreement. Under the carbon standard, the external shocks to the international financial system would come from variations of carbon emissions rather than the U.S. monetary policies. As such, monetary authorities’ commitment to maintaining stable exchange rates comes together with monetary policies aiming at pursuing low-carbon growth. The new system potentially poses a plausible solution to the classical Mundellian Trilemma because the objectives of maintaining fixed exchange rate and implementing monetary policy become one. Although several hurdles are constraining the launch of carbon currency immediately, the carbon standard poses a feasible international monetary system as the world-wide campaign to achieve carbon neutrality progresses.