Alison Johnston

Alison Johnston

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Alison Johnston

Oregon State University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 July 2015 in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
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Journal Article
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AJAlison Johnston
Alison Johnston
ARAidan Regan
Aidan Regan

18 February 2019 in West European Politics
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Journal Article
Open access
GFGregory W. Fuller
Gregory W. Fuller
AJAlison Johnston
Alison Johnston
ARAidan Regan
Aidan Regan
Comparative political economy (CPE) has robustly examined the political and institutional determinants of income inequality. However, the study of wealth, which is more unequally distributed than income, has been largely understudied within CPE. Using new data from the World Income Database (WID), this article examines how economic, political and institutional dynamics shape wealth-to-income ratios within Western European and OECD countries. It is found that the political and institutional determinants that affect income inequality have no short- or long-run effects on the wealth-to-income ratio. Rather, the rise in wealth-to-income ratios is driven by rising housing prices, as well as price changes in other financial assets, not home ownership or national saving rates. The article concludes by examining how the changing dynamics of housing prices and wealth inequality will increasingly shape intergenerational – and associated class-based – political conflict in Western Europe.

21 January 2014 in Comparative Political Studies
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Journal Article
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AJAlison Johnston
Alison Johnston
BHBob Hancké
Bob Hancké
SPSuman Pant
Suman Pant
Excessive fiscal spending is commonly cited as a root of the current European debt crisis. This article suggests, like others, that the rise of competitiveness imbalances contributing to national imbalances in total borrowing is a better explanation for systemic differences toward Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries’ exposure to market speculation. We identify one driver of this divergence: a country’s capacity to limit sheltered sector wage growth, relative to wage growth in the manufacturing sector. Corporatist institutions that linked sectoral wage developments together in the surplus countries provided those with a comparative wage advantage vis-à-vis EMU’s debtor nations, which helps explain why the EMU core has emerged relatively unscathed from market speculation during the crisis despite the poor fiscal performance of some of the core countries during EMU’s early years. Using a panel regression analysis, we demonstrate that rising differentials between public and manufacturing sector wage growth, and wage-governance institutions that weakly coordinate exposed and sheltered sectors, are significantly correlated with export decline. We also find that weak-governance institutions are significantly associated with more prominent export decline inside as opposed to outside a monetary union.

3 April 2020 in Review of International Political Economy
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Journal Article
Open access
AJAlison Johnston
Alison Johnston
GFGregory W. Fuller
Gregory W. Fuller
ARAidan Regan
Aidan Regan
Household mortgage debt unleashed devastating consequences for the global economy in 2007–2008. Despite the growing importance of household debt in financial markets, international political economy and comparative political economy have not theorized why it varies so much across Europe. We argue that variation in household debt can be explained by the intersection of two domestic institutions: labor market institutions (and by extension the welfare state) that enable households to withstand negative employment/income shocks, and mortgage finance institutions that govern households’ credit access. We empirically demonstrate via a panel analysis of 17 advanced capitalist democracies that the impact of these institutions on household debt is co-dependent. Strong collective bargaining institutions (and generous welfare states), which protect borrowers from income and employment insecurity, are associated with higher household indebtedness, but only if housing finance institutions that encourage mortgage lending are present (i.e. in Scandinavia and the Netherlands). In contrast, liberal (financialized) economies have comparatively lower household indebtedness because their labor market institutions inhibit income security for borrowers. As household debt becomes more central to comparative political economy, our findings suggest that scholars who study financialization need to integrate labor market (and welfare state) institutions into their analysis to understand how domestic financial systems function.

14 May 2012 in European Union Politics
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AJAlison Johnston
Alison Johnston
Public sector unions push for unmerited wage increases, exacerbating inflation and deficits. Despite this conventional wisdom, governments in several European countries successfully limited public sector wage growth during the 1980s and 1990s. This article argues that the recent rise in public sector wage inflation in the eurozone is an unintended consequence of the shift towards Economic and Monetary Union. I argue that monetary union’s predecessors, the European Monetary System and Maastricht, imposed an institutional constraint on governments, which enhanced their ability to impose moderation: national-level, inflation-averse central banks that could punish rent-seeking sectoral wage-setters via monetary contraction. Monetary union’s alteration of this constraint weakened governments’ capabilities to deny inflationary settlements.

18 April 2017 in Politics & Society
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Journal Article
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AJAlison Johnston
Alison Johnston
ARAidan Regan
Aidan Regan
International political economy identifies declining nominal interest rates, securitization, and financial liberalization as drivers of rising housing prices. Despite witnessing these common credit shocks, however, developed economies experienced divergent trends in housing inflation since the 1980s. We offer a comparative political economy explanation of variation in house prices, arguing that by restraining household incomes, wage-setting institutions can blunt financial liberalization’s inflationary impact on housing markets. Employing quantitative analysis and a comparative study of Ireland and the Netherlands, we uncover two findings. First, countries where political coalitions in the export sector held veto powers over those in the nontraded sector in national wage setting realized lower housing inflation. Second, the impact of sectoral coalitions on housing prices in OECD countries is similar to that of financial variables. Our results suggest that the organization of labor politics continues to play an important role in mitigating the destabilizing effects of global finance on developed economies.