Yaakov Kareev

Yaakov Kareev

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Yaakov Kareev

The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality and School of Education, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2016 in Decision
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EHEinav Hart
Einav Hart
YKYaakov Kareev
Yaakov Kareev
JAJudith Avrahami
Judith Avrahami

16 December 2018 in PsyArXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
DMDouglas Benjamin Markant
Douglas Benjamin Markant
NPNathaniel Phillips
Nathaniel Phillips
YKYaakov Kareev
Yaakov Kareev
JAJudith Avrahami
Judith Avrahami
RHRalph Hertwig
Ralph Hertwig
Competitive pressure affects a wide spectrum of decisions under uncertainty. It forces the individual to balance the value of gathering more information about the quality of potential choice alternatives against the risk that competitors will act first and claim the best options. Although this tradeoff between competition and exploration has long been recognized, little is known about how people adapt their exploration of uncertain options when facing competitive pressure. We examined how competitive pressure affects exploration in the “rivals-in-the-dark” game. Two players simultaneously learn about a set of choice options and compete to claim the best one. Across three studies, we show that people adapt their exploration in response to the structure of the choice environment (including the option set size and the relative number of gains and losses) and in response to repeated competition with the same opponent. Furthermore, we present a model-based analysis showing that their behavior is best described by a compensatory strategy under which the value of further exploration is weighed against the cost of being beaten to the punch by an opponent. The results point to a process of local adaptation whereby people learn to “act fast” based on their experience in a novel competitive environment.

1 April 2020 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YKYaakov Kareev
Yaakov Kareev
JAJudith Avrahami
Judith Avrahami
AGAyelet Goldzweig
Ayelet Goldzweig
DHDaniel Hadar
Daniel Hadar
SKShira Klein
Shira Klein
Foraging for a scarce resource takes place when fewer resource-units than agents are distributed among several locations and agents choose at which location to look for the resource. But how do foragers distribute themselves over the different locations? Optimal foraging theory postulates that the distribution of agents should match the distribution of resource units (ideal free distribution [IFD]), but research with animals and humans has revealed undermatching at the location at which the resource is most abundant. For the IFD to be reached, full information about other foragers' choices and outcomes is required, information that is usually not available. We conducted a theoretical analysis of the implications of relying on different levels of information: on the incomplete, but still valid information usually available in foraging scenarios and on full information. The analysis demonstrates that myopic reactivity to disappointment, or to regret, which are likely to arise in the wake of incomplete information, leads to undermatching, with either affect leading to different degrees of undermatching. Importantly, these analyses indicate that behavior would be sensitive not only to resource distribution (as in IFD), but also to its overall abundance. Three experiments employing incentivized repeated choices were conducted. The information provided to participants, the number of locations, and resource abundance were manipulated to test the predictions of the models. Analyses of aggregate choice probabilities and trial-to-trial choice dynamics indicate that myopic reactivity to regret provides the best explanation for the observed data. With more information available, behavior matches more closely the IFD predictions.

1 October 2023 in Decision
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ALAlonit Lahat-Rania
Alonit Lahat-Rania
YKYaakov Kareev
Yaakov Kareev

16 April 2022 in Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JAJudith Avrahami
Judith Avrahami
WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth
YKYaakov Kareev
Yaakov Kareev
MPMatteo Ploner
Matteo Ploner
The experiment lets investors interact in portfolio choices involving different risky assets, one for each state of the world. Probabilities of random states are commonly known. All assets pay the same dividend when their state is realized and becomes worthless otherwise. Whereas evolutionary stability and equilibrium behavior predict equal expected profits across assets, impulse balancing (Selten and Buchta, Games and human behavior: essays in the Honor of Amnon Rapoport, 1999) equalizes the expected regret. Thus, impulse balancing seems to capture tendencies of cyclical direction learning. In addition to analyzing whether and when behavior converges to impulse balancing or to equilibrium portfolios, we categorize portfolio adaptation by path dependence and sensitivity to state-specific probabilities. We show that portfolio choices are driven mainly by probability matching, but the effect becomes weaker over time. Furthermore, most portfolio adjustments are not compatible with directional learning.

4 January 2025 in Water Economics and Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JAJudith Avrahami
Judith Avrahami
DBDavid V. Budescu
David V. Budescu
YKYaakov Kareev
Yaakov Kareev