23 September 2012 in European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience
There is a glaring gap in the psychiatric literature concerning the nature of psychiatric symptoms and signs, and a corresponding lack of epistemological discussion of psycho-diagnostic interviewing. Contemporary clinical neuroscience heavily relies on the use of fully structured interviews that are historically rooted in logical positivism and behaviorism. These theoretical approaches marked decisively the so-called “operational revolution in psychiatry” leading to the creation of DSM-III. This paper attempts to examine the theoretical assumptions that underlie the use of a fully structured psychiatric interview. We address the ontological status of pathological experience, the notions of symptom, sign, prototype and Gestalt, and the necessary second-person processes which are involved in converting the patient’s experience (originally lived in the first-person perspective) into an “objective” (third person), actionable format, used for classification, treatment, and research. Our central thesis is that psychiatry targets the phenomena of consciousness, which, unlike somatic symptoms and signs, cannot be grasped on the analogy with material thing-like objects. We claim that in order to perform faithful distinctions in this particular domain, we need a more adequate approach, that is, an approach that is guided by phenomenologically informed considerations. Our theoretical discussion draws upon clinical examples derived from structured and semi-structured interviews. We conclude that fully structured interview is neither theoretically adequate nor practically valid in obtaining psycho-diagnostic information. Failure to address these basic issues may have contributed to the current state of malaise in the study of psychopathology.
29 January 2014 in Schizophrenia Bulletin
Introduction: Self-disorders (SD) have been described as a core feature of schizophrenia both in classical and recent psychopathological literature. However, the specificity of SD for the schizophrenia spectrum disorders has never been demonstrated in a diagnostically heterogeneous sample, nor has the concurrent validity of SD been examined. Aim: (1) To examine the specificity of Examination of Anomalous Self-Experiences (EASE) measured SD to the schizophrenia spectrum disorder in first contact inpatients, (2) to explore the internal consistency and factorial structure of the EASE, (3) to assess the concurrent validity of SD by exploring correlations between SD and the canonical psychopathological dimensions of schizophrenia, (4) to explore relations of SD to intelligence, sociodemographic, and extrinsic illness characteristics. Methods: A total of 100 consecutive first admission patients underwent a comprehensive psychopathological examination and an assessment of SD with the EASE scale. The diagnostic distribution of the EASE scores was tested with ANOVA, whereas the relations between the EASE scores and other symptomatic dimensions of schizophrenia were tested with Spearman’s rho. A potential factorial structure and the internal consistency of the EASE scale were also examined. Results: SD aggregated significantly in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders, with no differences between schizophrenia and schizotypal disorders. EASE scores correlated moderately with canonical psychopathological dimensions of schizophrenia. Factor analysis of the EASE disclosed only one factor and the internal consistency of the EASE was excellent. Conclusions: SD aggregate selectively in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders, with similar levels in schizophrenia and schizotypy. The study lends validity to the view of SD as an experiential vulnerability phenotype of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders.
22 June 2017 in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Genetics constitute a crucial risk factor to schizophrenia. In the last decade, molecular genetic research has produced novel findings, infusing optimism about discovering the biological roots of schizophrenia. However, the complexity of the object of inquiry makes it almost impossible for non-specialists in genetics (e.g., many clinicians and researchers) to get a proper understanding and appreciation of the genetic findings and their limitations. This study aims at facilitating such an understanding by providing a brief overview of some of the central methods and findings in schizophrenia genetics, from its historical origins to its current status, and also by addressing some limitations and challenges that confront this field of research. In short, the genetic architecture of schizophrenia has proven to be highly complex, heterogeneous, and polygenic. The disease risk is constituted by numerous common genetic variants of only very small individual effect and by rare, highly penetrant genetic variants of larger effects. In spite of recent advances in molecular genetics, our knowledge of the etiopathogenesis of schizophrenia and the genotype-environment interactions remain limited.
27 October 2007 in Schizophrenia Bulletin
In the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision(ICD-10) and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, Third and Fourth Edition(DSM-III-IV), the presence of one of Schneider "first-rank symptoms" (FRS) is symptomatically sufficient for the schizophrenia diagnosis. Yet, it has been claimed that FRS may also be found in the nonschizophrenic conditions, and therefore, they are not specific or diagnostic for schizophrenia. This review was made to clarify the issue of diagnostic specificity. (1) A critical review of FRS studies published in English between 1970 and 2005. (2) A highlight of the 5 most frequently cited studies identified in the Web of Science. (3) Theoretical implications of the epistemological issues of FRS. The reviewed studies do not allow for either a reconfirmation or a rejection of Schneider's claims about FRS. The sources of disagreement between the studies are (1) including or excluding acute patients with potential degradation of consciousness; (2) assessing or not the phenomenological context; (3) assessing patients in different stages of their illness evolution; and (4) differential emphasis on mood symptoms and history of psychiatric symptoms. Both DSM-IV and ICD-10 emphasize FRS to a degree that is not supported by the empirical evidence. Until the status of FRS is clarified in depth, we suggest that the FRS, as these are currently defined, should be de-emphasized in the next revisions of our diagnostic systems. Future studies aiming at validation of FRS as diagnostic features need to apply a phenomenological perspective and include a homogenous group of patients across a wide spectrum of diagnoses.
1 October 2012 in World Psychiatry
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23 January 2021 in Schizophrenia Bulletin
Schizophrenia (SCZ) can be characterized as a basic self-disorder that is featured by abnormal temporal integration on phenomenological (experience) and psychological (information processing) levels. Temporal integration on the neuronal level can be measured by the brain’s intrinsic neural timescale using the autocorrelation window (ACW) and power-law exponent (PLE). Our goal was to relate intrinsic neural timescales (ACW, PLE), as a proxy of temporal integration on the neuronal level, to temporal integration related to self-disorder on psychological (Enfacement illusion task in electroencephalography) and phenomenological (Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience [EASE]) levels. SCZ participants exhibited prolonged ACW and higher PLE during the self-referential task (Enfacement illusion), but not during the non-self-referential task (auditory oddball). The degree of ACW/PLE change during task relative to rest was significantly reduced in self-referential task in SCZ. A moderation model showed that low and high ACW/PLE exerted differential impact on the relationship of self-disorder (EASE) and negative symptoms (PANSS). In sum, we demonstrate abnormal prolongation in intrinsic neural timescale during self-reference in SCZ including its relation to basic self-disorder and negative symptoms. Our results point to abnormal relation of self and temporal integration at the core of SCZ constituting a “common currency” of neuronal, psychological, and phenomenological levels.