Bettina Klaus

Bettina Klaus

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Bettina Klaus

Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

30Years (1997-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2005 in Journal of Economic Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BKBettina Klaus
Bettina Klaus
FKFlip Klijn
Flip Klijn

1 October 2003 in Social Choice and Welfare
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
LELars Ehlers
Lars Ehlers
BKBettina Klaus
Bettina Klaus

1 July 2009 in Journal of Mathematical Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BKBettina Klaus
Bettina Klaus
MMarkus Walzl
Markus Walzl

1 January 2007 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BKBettina Klaus
Bettina Klaus
FKFlip Klijn
Flip Klijn
Trabajo publicado como artículo en Games and Economic Behavior 58(1): 154-171 (2007).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.002We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching

1 March 2002 in International Journal of Game Theory
Verified
Journal Article
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BKBettina Klaus
Bettina Klaus
EMEiichi Miyagawa
Eiichi Miyagawa

1 February 2006 in Economic Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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BKBettina Klaus
Bettina Klaus
FKFlip Klijn
Flip Klijn
Summary. We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al. , 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and “endstate” fairness.