The universal composability paradigm allows for the modular design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. It has been widely and successfully used in cryptography. However, devising a coherent yet simple and expressive model for universal composability is, as the history of such models shows, highly non-trivial. For example, several partly severe problems have been pointed out in the literature for the UC model. In this work, we propose a coherent model for universal composability, called the IITM model (“Inexhaustible Interactive Turing Machine”). A main feature of the model is that it is stated without a priori fixing irrelevant details, such as a specific way of addressing of machines by session and party identifiers, a specific modeling of corruption, or a specific protocol hierarchy. In addition, we employ a very general notion of runtime. All reasonable protocols and ideal functionalities should be expressible based on this notion in a direct and natural way, and without tweaks, such as (artificial) padding of messages or (artificially) adding extra messages. Not least because of these features, the model is simple and expressive. Also the general results that we prove, such as composition theorems, hold independently of how such details are fixed for concrete applications. Being inspired by other models for universal composability, in particular the UC model and because of the flexibility and expressivity of the IITM model, conceptually, results formulated in these models directly carry over to the IITM model.
Latest gaze estimation methods require large-scale training data but their collection and exchange pose significant privacy risks. We propose PrivatEyes - the first privacy-enhancing training approach for appearance-based gaze estimation based on federated learning (FL) and secure multi-party computation (MPC). PrivatEyes enables training gaze estimators on multiple local datasets across different users and server-based secure aggregation of the individual estimators' updates. PrivatEyes guarantees that individual gaze data remains private even if a majority of the aggregating servers is malicious. We also introduce a new data leakage attack DualView that shows that PrivatEyes limits the leakage of private training data more effectively than previous approaches. Evaluations on the MPIIGaze, MPIIFaceGaze, GazeCapture, and NVGaze datasets further show that the improved privacy does not lead to a lower gaze estimation accuracy or substantially higher computational costs - both of which are on par with its non-secure counterparts.
29 August 2008 in ACM Transactions on Computational Logic
We show that the insecurity problem for protocols with modular exponentiation and arbitrary products allowed in exponents is NP-complete. This result is based on a protocol and intruder model which is powerful enough to uncover known attacks on the Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman (A-GDH.2) protocol suite. To prove our results, we develop a general framework in which the Dolev-Yao intruder is extended by generic intruder rules. This framework is also applied to obtain complexity results for protocols with commuting public key encryption.
26 October 2007 in International Journal of Information Security