Instead of marching from one crisply defined technology node to the next with an uncertain timeline, industry is transitioning toward annual technology updates driven by a schedule, but with an uncertain transistor density increase. Full node updates are expected every other year, with "half-node" updates in between. Pitch scaling began slowing after the 10nm node and is expected to practically cease by the 1nm node. Despite that, transistor density is expected to continue increasing at a similar pace of 45% density increase per node (or 20% per year) through the 1nm node, fueled by increasingly sophisticated Design-Technology Co-Optimization (DTCO) and Electronic Design Automation (EDA) advances.
The evaluation of logic locking methods has long been predicated on an implicit assumption that only the correct key can unveil the true functionality of a protected circuit. Consequently, a locking technique is deemed secure if it resists a good array of attacks aimed at finding this correct key. This paper challenges this one-key premise by introducing a more efficient attack methodology, focused not on identifying that one correct key, but on finding multiple, potentially incorrect keys that can collectively produce correct functionality from the protected circuit. The tasks of finding these keys can be parallelized, which is well suited for multi-core computing environments. Empirical results show our attack achieves a runtime reduction of up to 99.6% compared to the conventional attack that tries to find a single correct key.