Yifan Dou

Yifan Dou

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Yifan Dou

Fudan University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
29 April 2023 in Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HCHailiang Chen
Hailiang Chen
YDYifan Dou
Yifan Dou
YXYongbo Xiao
Yongbo Xiao

1 September 2021 in Information Systems Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YDYifan Dou
Yifan Dou
DWD. J. Wu
D. J. Wu
A repeated challenge in launching a two-sided market platform is how to ignite the cross-side network effects to jump-start adoption. This research note studies “piggybacking”—expanding the focal market to recruit exclusive users from external networks—as a new and nonpricing control to launch platforms in conjunction with pricing controls. We first consider consumer-side piggybacking. Our results provide a rich set of novel insights into strategies that platforms use to monetize exclusive access to external users with nontrivial characterizations of the interplay among piggybacking, cross-side network effects, and price competition. We identify conditions when piggybacking is profit improving and when it leads to a prisoner’s dilemma, depending on the piggybacking cost and strengths of cross-side network effects. Among others, we show that piggybacking may intensify rather than ease price competition. We then consider provider-side piggybacking, and we show that the insights are qualitatively the same as consumer-side piggybacking except that the prisoner’s dilemma disappears if piggybacking providers multihome.

1 September 2017 in Information Systems Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YDYifan Dou
Yifan Dou
YHYu Jeffrey Hu
Yu Jeffrey Hu
DWD. J. Wu
D. J. Wu
Should a monopolistic vendor adopt the selling model or the leasing model for information goods or services? We study this question in the context of consumer valuation depreciation. Using a two-period game-theoretic model, we consider two types of consumer valuation depreciation for information goods or services: vintage depreciation and individual depreciation. Vintage depreciation assumes that a good or service loses some of its appeal to consumers as it becomes dated, and this effect persists independent of usage. Individual depreciation instead assumes that valuation depreciation happens only for consumers who have consumed or experienced the good or service. We identify conditions under which each pricing model is preferred. For vintage depreciation information goods, the leasing model dominates the selling model in vendor profit. For individual depreciation information goods, the selling model dominates the leasing model as long as the magnitude of individual depreciation exceeds a certain threshold; otherwise, leasing dominates selling. We consider several model extensions such as when network effects are present. Furthermore, we show a negative interaction effect between vintage depreciation and network effects in vendor profit. By contrast, the interaction effect between individual depreciation and network effects can be either negative or positive, depending on the magnitude of individual depreciation. Managerial implications are also discussed.

1 May 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WZWei Zhang
Wei Zhang
YDYifan Dou
Yifan Dou
Problem definition: We study how the government should design the subsidy policy to promote electric vehicle (EV) adoptions effectively and efficiently when there might be a spatial mismatch between the supply and demand of charging piles. Academic/practical relevance: EV charging infrastructures are often built by third-party service providers (SPs). However, profit-maximizing SPs might prefer to locate the charging piles in the suburbs versus downtown because of lower costs although most EV drivers prefer to charge their EVs downtown given their commuting patterns and the convenience of charging in downtown areas. This conflict of spatial preferences between SPs and EV drivers results in high overall costs for EV charging and weak EV adoptions. Methodology: We use a stylized game-theoretic model and compare three types of subsidy policies: (i) subsidizing EV purchases, (ii) subsidizing SPs based on pile usage, and (iii) subsidizing SPs based on pile numbers. Results: Subsidizing EV purchases is effective in promoting EV adoptions but not in alleviating the spatial mismatch. In contrast, subsidizing SPs can be more effective in addressing the spatial mismatch and promoting EV adoptions, but uniformly subsidizing pile installation can exacerbate the spatial mismatch and backfire. In different situations, each policy can emerge as the best, and the rule to determine which side (SPs versus EV buyers) to subsidize largely depends on cost factors in the charging market rather than the EV price or the environmental benefits. Managerial implications: A “jigsaw-piece rule” is recommended to guide policy design: subsidizing SPs is preferred if charging is too costly or time consuming, and subsidizing EV purchases is preferred if charging is sufficiently fast and easy. Given charging costs that are neither too low nor too high, subsidizing SPs is preferred only if pile building downtown is moderately more expensive than pile building in the suburbs.

1 December 2019 in Information Systems Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JZJinyang Zheng
Jinyang Zheng
ZQZhengling Qi
Zhengling Qi
YDYifan Dou
Yifan Dou
Yong TanYong Tan
Yong Tan
WeChat, an instant messaging app, is considered a mega app because of its dominance in terms of use among Chinese smartphone users. A major concern for such an app is whether its increasing usage would crowd out the usage of other apps in the broader app market. This study estimates the spillover effects of WeChat on the other top 50 most frequently used apps in China, using users’ weekly app usage data. Given the challenge of determining causal inference from observational data, this study borrows a machine-learning method and integrates it with econometrics. We find that WeChat does not crowd out the other apps’ use. In fact, only two other apps, Tencent News and Taobao, are affected by WeChat usage causally, and interestingly, both receive positive spillover effects as a result of the complementary effects. This finding alleviates concerns about the threat by WeChat and indicates that WeChat’s success is not in exchange for squeezing out the use of other major apps. Instead, WeChat might contribute to the platform by transforming users’ nonmobile activities to the mobile setting and by exhibiting some positive spillovers. In addition, this study shows the strength of graphical models in identifying causal relationships from observational data.

26 November 2020 in Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
QTQifeng Tang
Qifeng Tang
ZSZhiqing Shao
Zhiqing Shao
LHLihua Huang
Lihua Huang
WYWenyi Yin
Wenyi Yin
YDYifan Dou
Yifan Dou