Anna Lysyanskaya

Anna Lysyanskaya

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Anna Lysyanskaya

Brown University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
OMOmid Mir
Omid Mir
BBBalthazar Bauer
Balthazar Bauer
SGScott Griffy
Scott Griffy
ALAnna Lysyanskaya
Anna Lysyanskaya
DSDaniel Slamanig
Daniel Slamanig
Anonymous credentials (AC) offer privacy in user-centric identity management. They enable users to authenticate anonymously, revealing only necessary attributes. With the rise of decentralized systems like self-sovereign identity, the demand for efficient AC systems in a decentralized setting has grown. Relying on conventional AC systems, however, require users to present independent credentials when obtaining them from different issuers, leading to increased complexity. AC systems should ideally support being multi-authority for efficient presentation of multiple credentials from various issuers. Another vital property is issuer hiding, ensuring that the issuer's identity remains concealed, revealing only compliance with the verifier's policy. This prevents unique identification based on the sole combination of credential issuers. To date, there exists no AC scheme satisfying both properties simultaneously. This paper introduces Issuer-Hiding Multi-Authority Anonymous Credentials (IhMA), utilizing two novel signature primitives: Aggregate Signatures with Randomizable Tags and Public Keys and Aggregate Mercurial Signatures. We provide two constructions of IhMA with different trade-offs based on these primitives and believe that they will have applications beyond IhMA. Besides defining the notations and rigorous security definitions for our primitives, we provide provably secure and efficient constructions, and present benchmarks to showcase practical efficiency.

1 July 2014
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MCMelissa Chase
Melissa Chase
MKMarkulf Kohlweiss
Markulf Kohlweiss
ALAnna Lysyanskaya
Anna Lysyanskaya
SMSarah Meiklejohn
Sarah Meiklejohn
A signature scheme is malleable if, on input a message and a signature, it is possible to efficiently compute a signature on a related message, for a transformation that is allowed with respect to this signature scheme. In this paper, we first provide new definitions for malleable signatures that allow us to capture a broader range of transformations than was previously possible. We then give a generic construction based on malleable zero-knowledge proofs that allows us to construct malleable signatures for a wide range of transformation classes, with security properties that are stronger than those that have been achieved previously. Finally, we construct delegatable anonymous credentials from signatures that are malleable with respect to an appropriate class of transformations (that we show our malleable signature supports). The resulting instantiation satisfies a stronger security notion than previous schemes while also scaling linearly with the number of delegations.

12 October 2022
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Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
RCRutchathon Chairattana-Apirom
Rutchathon Chairattana-Apirom
LHLucjan Hanzlik
Lucjan Hanzlik
JLJulian Loss
Julian Loss
ALAnna Lysyanskaya
Anna Lysyanskaya
BWBenedikt Wagner
Benedikt Wagner


23 July 2021 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ECElizabeth C. Crites
Elizabeth C. Crites
ALAnna Lysyanskaya
Anna Lysyanskaya
Mercurial signatures are a useful building block for privacy-preserving schemes, such as anonymous credentials, delegatable anonymous credentials, and related applications. They allow a signature σ on a message m under a public key pk to be transformed into a signature σ′ on an equivalent message m′ under an equivalent public key pk′ for an appropriate notion of equivalence. For example, pk and pk′ may be unlinkable pseudonyms of the same user, and m and m′ may be unlinkable pseudonyms of a user to whom some capability is delegated. The only previously known construction of mercurial signatures suffers a severe limitation: in order to sign messages of length ℓ, the signer’s public key must also be of length ℓ. In this paper, we eliminate this restriction and provide an interactive signing protocol that admits messages of any length. We prove our scheme existentially unforgeable under chosen open message attacks (EUF-CoMA) under a variant of the asymmetric bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (ABDDH).

2 May 2023
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
ALAnna Lysyanskaya
Anna Lysyanskaya