1 October 2022 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
16 August 2021 in IEEE Access
Advanced electronic units inside modern vehicles have enhanced the driving experience, but also introduced a myriad of security problems due to the inherent limitations of the internal communication protocol. In the last two decades, a number of security threats have been identified and accordingly, security measures have been proposed. While a large body of research on the vehicular security domain is focused on exposing vulnerabilities and proposing counter measures, there is an apparent paucity of research aimed at reviewing existing works on automotive security and at extracting insights. This paper provides a systematic review of security threats and countermeasures for the ubiquitous CAN bus communication protocol. It further exposes the limitations of the existing security measures, and discusses a seemingly-overlooked, simple, cost-effective and incrementally deployable solution which can provide a reasonable defense against a major class of packet injection attacks and many denial of service attacks.
10 February 2024 in Neural Networks
13 November 2023 in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
Information leakage is usually defined as the logarithmic increment in the adversary’s probability of correctly guessing the legitimate user’s private data or some arbitrary function of the private data when presented with the legitimate user’s publicly disclosed information. However, this definition of information leakage implicitly assumes that both the privacy mechanism and the prior probability of the original data are entirely known to the attacker. In reality, the assumption of complete knowledge of the privacy mechanism for an attacker is often impractical. The attacker can usually have access to only an approximate version of the correct privacy mechanism, computed from a limited set of the disclosed data, for which they can access the corresponding un-distorted data. In this scenario, the conventional definition of leakage no longer has an operational meaning. To address this problem, in this article, we propose novel meaningful information-theoretic metrics for information leakage when the attacker has incomplete information about the privacy mechanism—we call them average subjective leakage , average confidence boost , and average objective leakage , respectively. For the simplest, binary scenario, we demonstrate how to find an optimized privacy mechanism that minimizes the worst-case value of either of these leakages.
24 July 2023 in IEEE Journal of Emerging and Selected Topics in Power Electronics
This paper develops a self-protective algorithm for inverters by integrating an analytical risk factor into a neural network framework to detect malicious setpoints. Inverters play an important role in distributed energy generation in the energy infrastructure, where a supervisory control structure is required for energy management and economic dispatch. In a centralized supervisory control structure, the inverters need to be in contact with aggregators, other energy generation units, or the utility operating center. The communication capability makes a grid-interactive inverter a cyber-physical device. However, the connection of inverters to a communication network exposes the inverters to active attackers who can interfere with the control infrastructure and send malicious setpoints to the local controller. Such malicious setpoints can have harmful consequences, such as uncontrolled power oscillations, voltage sags and swells, equipment damage, and blackouts. This paper presents a new method to secure grid-interactive inverters against manipulated setpoints. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can significantly enhance the security of inverters by examining power setpoints using the hybrid model prior to engaging the setpoint to the local controller. The findings of this work are experimentally verified using a small-scale 208-V, 5-kVA inverter connected to a 12-kW NHR 9410 power grid emulator.
8 November 2023 in IEEE Access
Stealthy zero-dynamics attacks are a subset of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) that are especially dangerous, as they are designed to be undetectable by any intrusion detection mechanisms. This paper shows that stealthy attacks can be more destructive on power electronic dominated grids (PEDGs) than traditional power systems, by taking advantage of the low inertia property of PEDGs. The low inertia of these power grids causes the system to be prone to frequency instability when disturbances occur, meaning that an attacker can cause more harm to a system in a shorter amount of time. Another advantage to the attacker is an increased amount of telecommunication devices in PEDGs which provides the attacker with a larger attack surface. It is thus critical that we strive to design PEDGs in such a manner that we minimize their susceptibility to stealthy attacks. We provide a small signal model for a PEDG system, along with the the state space representation of the low-inertia part of the system, and we show that even without the state-space model of the whole system, a stealthy zero-dynamics attack can be constructed and can be successful on a PEDG. Results are also provided to show that strategically choosing model parameters in the design phase of the system can prevent the existence of stealthy zero-dynamics attacks.