In Song Kim

In Song Kim

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In Song Kim

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 November 2020 in Political Analysis
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KIKosuke Imai
Kosuke Imai
IKIn Song Kim
In Song Kim
The two-way linear fixed effects regression (2FE) has become a default method for estimating causal effects from panel data. Many applied researchers use the 2FE estimator to adjust for unobserved unit-specific and time-specific confounders at the same time. Unfortunately, we demonstrate that the ability of the 2FE model to simultaneously adjust for these two types of unobserved confounders critically relies upon the assumption of linear additive effects. Another common justification for the use of the 2FE estimator is based on its equivalence to the difference-in-differences estimator under the simplest setting with two groups and two time periods. We show that this equivalence does not hold under more general settings commonly encountered in applied research. Instead, we prove that the multi-period difference-in-differences estimator is equivalent to the weighted 2FE estimator with some observations having negative weights. These analytical results imply that in contrast to the popular belief, the 2FE estimator does not represent a design-based, nonparametric estimation strategy for causal inference. Instead, its validity fundamentally rests on the modeling assumptions.

11 December 2021 in American Journal of Political Science
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KIKosuke Imai
Kosuke Imai
IKIn Song Kim
In Song Kim
EWErik H. Wang
Erik H. Wang

24 February 2017 in American Political Science Review
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IKIn Song Kim
In Song Kim
Existing political economy models explain the politics of trade policy using inter-industry differences. However, this article finds that much of the variation in U.S. applied tariff rates in fact arises within industry. I offer a theory of trade liberalization that explains how product differentiation in economic markets leads to firm-level lobbying in political markets. High levels of product differentiation eliminates the collective action problem faced by exporting firms while import-competing firms need not fear product substitution. To test this argument, I construct a new dataset on lobbying by all publicly traded manufacturing firms from reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. I find that productive exporting firms are more likely to lobby to reduce tariffs, especially when their products are sufficiently differentiated. I also find that highly differentiated products have lower tariff rates. The results challenge the common focus on industry-level lobbying for protection.

1 January 2017 in The Journal of Politics
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Journal Article
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IOIain Osgood
Iain Osgood
DTDustin Tingley
Dustin Tingley
TBThomas Bernauer
Thomas Bernauer
IKIn Song Kim
In Song Kim
HMHelen V. Milner
Helen V. Milner
GSGabriele Spilker
Gabriele Spilker
What factors determine firms’ attitudes toward trade policy? This paper considers producers’ policy preferences and political behavior in light of two key patterns in modern international trade: industries that face import competition often have many exporters, and foreign sales are concentrated in the hands of a small number of “superstar” exporters. Using a new survey of Costa Rican firms matched to systematic firm-level data on export behavior, we find that firm features are generally more important predictors of attitudes toward trade liberalization than industry-wide comparative advantage. We also show that export intensity is strongly associated with interest and lobbying activity on trade policy. The largest exporters, who are the strongest supporters of global integration, dominate trade politics.

18 January 2019 in International Studies Quarterly
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IKIn Song Kim
In Song Kim
HMHelen V Milner
Helen V Milner
TBThomas Bernauer
Thomas Bernauer
IOIain Osgood
Iain Osgood
GSGabriele Spilker
Gabriele Spilker
DTDustin Tingley
Dustin Tingley
Trade policy has become increasingly multidimensional. Current trade agreements not only address market access but also encompass rules and provisions related to flexibility of commitment, investment protection, and dispute settlement mechanisms. Yet, rigorous evidence about how interest groups evaluate each of these in relation to the others remains scarce. We develop a firm-level theoretical framework to explain how firms’ international operations affect their preferences on different trade policy measures. We experimentally evaluate preferences over multiple policy dimensions using a conjoint analysis on firms in Costa Rica. Notably, for many types of firms, the standard trade policy measures of yesteryear—tariffs and subsidies—are no longer their most important concerns. Instead, the degree of firms’ involvement in global value chains shapes their preferences. Multinational corporations care most about protection of their foreign investments. Those exporters who are not central to global supply networks most value strong dispute settlement procedures. Finally, we find that preferences over these policy dimensions are more likely to vary by firm than by industry, which calls into question the existing literature's focus on interindustry distinctions.

1 April 2018 in Political Analysis
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IKIn Song Kim
In Song Kim
JLJohn Londregan
John Londregan
MRMarc Ratkovic
Marc Ratkovic
We introduce a model that extends the standard vote choice model to encompass text. In our model, votes and speech are generated from a common set of underlying preference parameters. We estimate the parameters with a sparse Gaussian copula factor model that estimates the number of latent dimensions, is robust to outliers, and accounts for zero inflation in the data. To illustrate its workings, we apply our estimator to roll call votes and floor speech from recent sessions of the US Senate. We uncover two stable dimensions: one ideological and the other reflecting to Senators’ leadership roles. We then show how the method can leverage common speech in order to impute missing data, recovering reliable preference estimates for rank-and-file Senators given only leadership votes.