Victor van Pelt

Victor van Pelt

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Victor van Pelt

WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management Vallendar Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 October 2023 in Issues in Accounting Education
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DWDavid A. Wood
David A. Wood
MAMuskan P. Achhpilia
Muskan P. Achhpilia
MAMollie T. Adams
Mollie T. Adams
SASanaz Aghazadeh
Sanaz Aghazadeh
KAKazeem Akinyele
Kazeem Akinyele
EZEmily Zoet
Emily Zoet
ChatGPT, a language-learning model chatbot, has garnered considerable attention for its ability to respond to users’ questions. Using data from 14 countries and 186 institutions, we compare ChatGPT and student performance for 28,085 questions from accounting assessments and textbook test banks. As of January 2023, ChatGPT provides correct answers for 56.5 percent of questions and partially correct answers for an additional 9.4 percent of questions. When considering point values for questions, students significantly outperform ChatGPT with a 76.7 percent average on assessments compared to 47.5 percent for ChatGPT if no partial credit is awarded and 56.5 percent if partial credit is awarded. Still, ChatGPT performs better than the student average for 15.8 percent of assessments when we include partial credit. We provide evidence of how ChatGPT performs on different question types, accounting topics, class levels, open/closed assessments, and test bank questions. We also discuss implications for accounting education and research.

1 September 2021 in Management Accounting Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BDBart Dierynck
Bart Dierynck
VPVictor van Pelt
Victor van Pelt

21 August 2025 in Contemporary Accounting Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RRRainer Michael Rilke
Rainer Michael Rilke
VPVictor van Pelt
Victor van Pelt
SLSebastian Lehnen
Sebastian Lehnen
CGChristina Guenther
Christina Guenther
A significant challenge firms face is providing performance feedback that effectively motivates low‐performing employees. In our field experiment, we examine the impact of an often‐overlooked form of relative performance feedback (RPF) that emphasizes comparing employees based on their inputs. Our results indicate that input‐based RPF enhances the input performance of low performers without adversely affecting high performers. Furthermore, our field experiment demonstrates that selecting the right input—specifically, actions that employees can control and that are linked to outputs—can significantly boost low performers' contributions to a firm's overall output. Together, our findings support our prediction that input‐based RPF provides a viable strategy for low performers to narrow the performance gap with high performers by guiding them toward the crucial inputs that high performers use to generate output. Our study adds an important refinement to our understanding of how RPF promotes upward social comparison and facilitates social learning, offering insights for firms aiming to motivate low performers in their workforce.

12 June 2017 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Preprint
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VPVictor van Pelt
Victor van Pelt
ECEddy Cardinaels
Eddy Cardinaels
BDBart Dierynck
Bart Dierynck
Distortion in performance measurement systems can hamper the pursuit and achievement of strategic objectives. In this paper, we examine whether business unit (BU) managers, who often possess more information about improving performance measurement systems, recommend valuable improvements. Conventional economic reasoning suggests that BU managers refrain from recommending valuable improvements because firms typically use those performance measurement systems to evaluate them on operational decisions. We examine this tension in a laboratory experiment, where BU managers can either pursue implicit rewards by recommending valuable improvements to performance measurement systems or extract rents from distorted performance measure realizations. Our primary results reveal that improvement recommendations are more valuable when BU managers rotate across business units because managerial rotation lowers the value of BU managers’ information advantage making rent extraction less attractive. We also find that organizational identification may be an effective alternative to managerial rotation because it has similar benefits only when BU managers do not rotate across business units. Our results are robust to alternating the distortion that BU managers uncover and varying the importance of their improvement recommendations on the welfare of firms. Our study extends accounting research by considering the involvement of BU managers and manager rotation as an information revelation mechanisms in improving performance measurement systems.

24 November 2020 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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BDBart Dierynck
Bart Dierynck
JGJesse van der Geest
Jesse van der Geest
VPVictor van Pelt
Victor van Pelt
To improve the quality of performance evaluation and compensation decisions, managers can undertake costly searches for additional information about employees' contributions to performance. Prior accounting research suggests that managers are generally willing to undertake these costly information searches because they have a preference for fairness. However, our experimental results show that managers are significantly less willing to undertake costly information searches when the situation allows them to avoid negative inferences when acting selfishly. Our findings are consistent with predictions rooted in behavioral economics and psychology that even self-interested people behave fairly in some situations because they have concerns about appearing selfish, either to themselves or others. We conclude that increasing managers' concerns about appearing selfish may prompt them to make fairer and thus more informed performance evaluation and compensation decisions.

1 January 2022 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ARAnna Ressi
Anna Ressi
DSDaniel Schaupp
Daniel Schaupp
VPVictor van Pelt
Victor van Pelt
In autonomous teams, formal responsibility for tasks and decisions is shared among different team members, creating uncertainty about how much influence each team member effectively has . We use a modified participative budgeting game to ex-amine how team members of autonomous teams deal with this uncertainty in the context of cost reporting decisions. Our results show that team misreporting be-comes more pronounced the darker the team members’ personality and that communication within the team fulfills a crucial role. We find that communication does not discipline dishonest team members with a darker personality but, instead, assists them in infecting honest team members with a less dark personality. We further show that this dishonesty shift among honest team members occurs because they revise their social norm perceptions. These findings are consistent with predictions based on social norm theory and the Dark Triad literature.