Andrea Höller

Andrea Höller

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Andrea Höller

Infineon Technologies Austria AG

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 December 2015
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
GMGeorg Macher
Georg Macher
AHAndrea Höller
Andrea Höller
HSHarald Sporer
Harald Sporer
EAEric Armengaud
Eric Armengaud
CKChristian Kreiner
Christian Kreiner

1 August 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
AHAndrea Holler
Andrea Holler
AKArmin Krieg
Armin Krieg
TRTobias Rauter
Tobias Rauter
JIJohannes Iber
Johannes Iber
CKChristian Kreiner
Christian Kreiner
Physical attacks, such as fault attacks, pose a decisive threat for the security of devices in the Internet of Things. An important class of countermeasures for fault attacks is fault tolerant software that is applicable for systems based on COTS hardware. In order to evaluate software countermeasures against fault attacks, fault injection is needed. However, established fault injection approaches require manufactured products or hardware details (e.g. netlists, RTL models), which are not available when using COTS hardware. In this paper, we present a QEMU-based fault injection platform that supports commercial COTS processors that are widely-used in the embedded domain. This framework allows a system-level analysis of software countermeasures by featuring the simulation of high-level hardware faults targeting, for example, memory cells, register cells, or the correct execution of instructions. The framework supports the generation of realistic fault attack scenarios. We illustrate the practicability of the approach by presenting two exemplary use cases.

1 July 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
GMGeorg Macher
Georg Macher
AHAndrea Holler
Andrea Holler
EAEric Armengaud
Eric Armengaud
CKChristian Kreiner
Christian Kreiner
The introduction of multi-core computing platforms aims at providing more computing resources and additional interfaces to answer the needs of new automotive control strategies with respect to computing performances and connectivity (e.g. connected vehicle, hybrid powertrains). At the same time, the parallel execution and resulting resources and timing conflicts require a paradigm change for the embedded software. Consequently, efficient migration of legacy software on multi-core platform, while guaranteeing at least the same level of integrity and performance as for single cores, is a significant challenge. The contributions of this paper are (1) to provide a state-of-practice survey on multi-core CPUs and operating systems for the automotive domain, and (2) based on this survey to provide guidelines for the migration of legacy SW. Finally the related challenges and opportunities for the development of high-integrity control systems on multi-cores, as platform for dependable systems are discussed.

9 November 2018 in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MAMartin R. Albrecht
Martin R. Albrecht
CHChristian Hanser
Christian Hanser
AHAndrea Hoeller
Andrea Hoeller
TPThomas Pöppelmann
Thomas Pöppelmann
FVFernando Virdia
Fernando Virdia
AWAndreas Wallner
Andreas Wallner
We repurpose existing RSA/ECC co-processors for (ideal) lattice-based cryptography by exploiting the availability of fast long integer multiplication. Such co-processors are deployed in smart cards in passports and identity cards, secured microcontrollers and hardware security modules (HSM). In particular, we demonstrate an implementation of a variant of the Module-LWE-based Kyber Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) that is tailored for high performance on a commercially available smart card chip (SLE 78). To benefit from the RSA/ECC co-processor we use Kronecker substitution in combination with schoolbook and Karatsuba polynomial multiplication. Moreover, we speed-up symmetric operations in our Kyber variant using the AES co-processor to implement a PRNG and a SHA-256 co-processor to realise hash functions. This allows us to execute CCA-secure Kyber768 key generation in 79.6 ms, encapsulation in 102.4 ms and decapsulation in 132.7 ms.

1 June 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
AHAndrea Holler
Andrea Holler
GMGeorg Macher
Georg Macher
TRTobias Rauter
Tobias Rauter
JIJohannes Iber
Johannes Iber
CKChristian Kreiner
Christian Kreiner
Ever more dependable embedded systems are built with commercial off-the-shelf hardware components that are not intended for highly reliable applications. Consequently, software-based fault tolerance techniques have to maintain a safe operation despite underlying hardware faults. In order to efficiently develop fault tolerant software, fault injection is needed in early development stages. However, common fault injection approaches require manufactured products or detailed hardware models. Thus, these techniques are typically not applicable if software and hardware providers are separate vendors. Additionally, the rise of third-party OTS software components limits the means to inject faults. In this paper, we present a virtual fault injection framework that simulates safety-standard aligned fault models and supports OTS software components as well as widely-used embedded processors such as ARM cores. Additionally, we show how to integrate the framework into various software development stages. Finally, we illustrate the practicability of the approach by exemplifying the integration of the framework in the development of an industrial safety-critical system.

1 April 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
AHAndrea Hoeller
Andrea Hoeller
RTRonald Toegl
Ronald Toegl
Cyber physical systems are the key innovation driver for many domains such as automotive, avionics, industrial process control, and factory automation. However, their interconnection potentially provides adversaries easy access to sensitive data, code, and configurations. If attackers gain control, material damage or even harm to people must be expected. To counteract data theft, system manipulation and cyber-attacks, security mechanisms must be embedded in the cyber physical system. Adding hardware security in the form of the standardized Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a promising approach. At the same time, traditional dependability features such as safety, availability, and reliability have to be maintained. To determine the right balance between security and dependability it is essential to understand their interferences. This paper supports developers in identifying the implications of using TPMs on the dependability of their system.We highlight potential consequences of adding TPMs to cyber-physical systems by considering the resulting safety, reliability, and availability. Furthermore, we discuss the potential of enhancing the dependability of TPM services by applying traditional redundancy techniques.