George P. Ball

George P. Ball

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George P. Ball

Indiana University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2021 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KWKaitlin D. Wowak
Kaitlin D. Wowak
GBGeorge P. Ball
George P. Ball
CPCorinne Post
Corinne Post
DKDavid J. Ketchen
David J. Ketchen
Problem definition: The influence of female directors on firm decision-making and performance is a frequently studied research topic but has received limited attention in operations management. We investigate if adding female directors to a firm’s board of directors changes whether and how quickly the firm recalls defective products. Academic/practical relevance: By demonstrating a relationship between an increase in female directors and more rule-conscious, customer-focused recall decisions, we highlight that adding female directors may enable more societally beneficial operational decisions. Methodology: We analyze 4,271 medical product recalls from 2002 to 2013 across 92 publicly traded firms regulated by the Food and Drug Administration using negative binomial and ordinary least squares fixed effect regression models. In robustness checks, we include an instrumental variable analysis, propensity score matching models, and reverse causality regression models. Results: As boards add female directors, recall decisions change. Firms initiate more medical product recalls that are low in severity and hence easier for firms to avoid initiating, highlighting the increased rule-following brought to bear by adding female directors. Firms also make faster recall decisions for the most serious defects that are high in severity and dangerous for customers, highlighting the increased stakeholder responsiveness resulting from adding female directors. Managerial implications: Firms may more closely align recall decisions with regulatory rules and become more sensitized to customer health and safety by adding female directors. Further, at least two female directors may be required to speed up recall decisions for the most serious, life-threatening defects.

1 October 2017 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GBGeorge Ball
George Ball
ESEnno Siemsen
Enno Siemsen
RSRachna Shah
Rachna Shah
Plant inspections enable firms to manage their quality risk in global supply chains. However, surprisingly little research examines the relationship between such inspections and future product quality. In this paper, we study how well plant inspection outcomes predict the hazard of a future recall and analyze how investigator experience affects this predictive relationship. Using secondary data spanning a seven-year period in the medical device industry and a recurrent-event Cox proportional hazard model, our analysis shows that inspection outcomes reliably predict future product recalls. However, inspection outcomes become an unreliable predictor of recalls with an increase in site-specific investigator experience. Through post hoc analysis, we also show that the hazard of a recall at a plant increases with site-specific experience, independent of the inspection outcome. Compared to the first visit by an investigator, the recall hazard increases by 21% the second time the investigator visits a specific plant, and by 57% on the third visit. We propose investigator rotation and investigator sequencing as two policies to help mitigate this increased recall risk. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0661 .

1 January 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
UMUjjal K. Mukherjee
Ujjal K. Mukherjee
GBGeorge P. Ball
George P. Ball
KWKaitlin D. Wowak
Kaitlin D. Wowak
KNKarthik V. Natarajan
Karthik V. Natarajan
JMJason Miller
Jason Miller
Problem definition: Product recalls have serious consequences for firms and consumers. Little is known, however, about how firms manage the timing of recalls and how this timing influences the financial consequences of recalls. In this study, we provide evidence for a previously unknown phenomenon: recall clustering, a collection of recalls within close temporal proximity in which a leading recall (the first recall in a cluster) excites following recalls (subsequent recalls in a cluster). We also investigate how the stock market penalizes firms differently depending upon their position within the recall cluster. Academic/practical relevance: By demonstrating that auto firms cluster their recalls and that the market penalizes firms differently based on the position of a recall within a cluster, we contribute to the literature that investigates recall timing and stock market event studies and provide guidance for regulators who oversee auto recalls and managers who make recall decisions. Methodology: We first develop analytical predictions using a dynamic game theoretic model to motivate our hypotheses. We then examine empirical support for our hypotheses by analyzing 3,117 auto recalls across 48 years using a Hawkes process model. Hawkes process models are designed to examine self-excitation of events across time and can be used to investigate recall clustering, while categorizing recalls as leading or following within a cluster. Finally, we use the leading and following recall designations obtained from the Hawkes process model in an event study to examine how the stock market effects of a recall vary depending on its position within a cluster. Results: We find that 73% of recalls occur in clusters, and they form after a 16-day gap in recall announcements. On average, clusters last for 34 days and are comprised of 7.6 following recalls announced after the leading recall. Leading recalls are associated with as high as a 67% larger stock market penalty than following recalls. Further, we find that the stock market benefit realized by a following recall weakens as the time since the leading recall increases and that the stock market penalty faced by a leading recall grows as the time since the end of the last cluster increases. Managerial Implications: Our findings lead to a key implication for regulators who oversee auto recalls by demonstrating evidence of recall clustering and the underlying stock market effects that are attributable to it. We provide a cost-neutral policy recommendation for the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration that should limit recall clustering.

20 September 2021 in Production and Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
KMKevin Mayo
Kevin Mayo
GBGeorge Ball
George Ball
AMAlex Mills
Alex Mills

1 May 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
VAVivek Astvansh
Vivek Astvansh
GBGeorge P. Ball
George P. Ball
MJMatthew Josefy
Matthew Josefy
Problem definition: There is a concerted effort across multiple academic disciplines to understand the recall decision-making process. Specifically, what steps does a manufacturer take following a product defect discovery and resulting in the product recall decision? This effort has often been limited to case studies within a particular manufacturer, largely due to the absence of consistent and comparable data across firms. Methodology/results: This data paper provides a foundation for future research on recall decisions by processing and coding textual disclosures on 2,120 recalls initiated in the United States by 27 automobile manufacturers from 2009 to 2018. For each recall, the data set provides the time the firm took to make the recall decision by comparing the defect awareness date to the recall decision date, whether the recall was associated with a supplier, the number of events in the recall decision-making process, and the date and description of each event. Managerial implications: Not only can these data enhance product recall research by providing key recall decision-making variables unavailable in related research, but an additional indication of the value of our data set also comes from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the automobile regulator in the United States. We held discussions with a senior leader at the NHTSA’s Recall Management Division related to this data set. This discussion revealed that the NHTSA does not have these data in an analyzable form and that they might be interested in using our data set for their reports, such as the NHTSA’s biennial reports to the U.S. Congress. This signal suggests that regulators, as well as researchers, practitioners, and other safety advocates, may find our data set useful.

1 September 2023 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JDJessica L. Darby
Jessica L. Darby
DKDavid J. Ketchen
David J. Ketchen
GBGeorge P. Ball
George P. Ball
UMUjjal Mukherjee
Ujjal Mukherjee
Problem definition: Firms often delay the decision to recall faulty medical devices long after they become aware of a defect, thereby putting public safety at heightened risk. However, the factors contributing to these delays are not well-understood. To help address this gap, we examine whether and how CEO stock ownership influences the speed with which faulty medical devices are recalled and whether this influence varies with recall severity. We then examine whether the stock market penalizes firms differently based on recall decision-making speed and whether this penalty also varies with recall severity. Methodology/results: We collect data on 2,144 medical device recalls across 50 public medical device firms from 2002 to 2015. We use accelerated failure time models to test the effects of CEO stock ownership on the time-to-recall and event study methodology to examine how the time-to-recall influences stock market returns. Supplementary analyses shed further light on underlying mechanisms. Robustness checks demonstrate consistent results, including coarsened exact matching, reverse causality tests, Cox proportional hazard models, generalized linear regression models, and a mediation analysis. Firms whose CEOs possess greater ownership stakes recall medical devices more slowly, and this recall-slowing effect is accentuated for high-severity recalls. Delaying recalls magnifies the stock market penalty attributable to the recall, particularly for high-severity recalls. Managerial implications: Our study highlights an ownership characteristic of firms that are more likely to delay recalling faulty medical devices. Boards of directors can use insights from our study as they oversee product-quality decisions and determine the level and form of CEO compensation, and the FDA can use our findings to identify firms that might warrant extra scrutiny and better allocate its limited monitoring resources.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0175 .