We use meta-analytical techniques to address three central debates in institutional theory: Is organizational behavior the product of social structure or organizational agency? Does conformity to institutional norms enhance or diminish organizational performance? Can organizational field-level factors explain differences in the pull of isomorphic forces across organizational fields? We find that the influence of social structure is weak. Also, the adoption of isomorphic templates improves both symbolic and substantive performance. Finally, we identify several field-level factors that moderate isomorphic processes. We discuss the implications of these findings for institutional theory research.
Resource dependence theory (RDT) has long been a premier framework for understanding organization-environmental relations, but an empirical synthesis of its predictions is still lacking. Using meta-analysis, we consolidate 157 tests of RDT and corroborate its main predictions: organizations respond to resource dependencies by forming interorganizational arrangements like interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, in-sourcing arrangements, and mergers and acquisitions. In turn, these arrangements make them more autonomous and more legitimate. We also extend RDT in three ways. First, we “unpack” the theory by showing that the mechanisms linking arrangement formation to organizational autonomy and legitimacy differ across arrangements. Second, we address the question whether RDT is also a theory of organizational performance. We find that whereas autonomy positively mediates the relationship between arrangement formation and performance, legitimacy does not. This suggests that RDT can also explain organizational actions that have societal acceptance rather than economic performance as an ulterior motive. Third, we assess whether competition law is a boundary condition to RDT’s prescriptions. Specifically, we show that the adoption of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the U.S. has caused organizations to “flee” from mergers to less regulated arrangements like alliances and joint ventures, and has hurt the profitability of the remaining mergers.
Research on business groups—legally independent firms tied together in various formal and informal ways—is accelerating. Through meta-analytical techniques employed on a database of 141 studies covering 28 different countries, we synthesize this research and extend it by testing several new hypotheses. We find that affiliation diminishes firm performance in general, but also that affiliates are comparatively better off in contexts with underdeveloped financial and labor market institutions. We also trace reduced affiliate performance to specific strategic actions taken at the firm and group levels. Overall, our results indicate that affiliate performance reflects complex processes and motivations.
We present a meta-analysis of the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm financial performance in Asia. At the cross-national level of analysis, we find a small but significant positive association between both variables. This finding suggests that in regions with less than perfect legal protection of minority shareholders, ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance strategy. Yet, a focus on this aggregate effect alone conceals the existence of true heterogeneity in the effect size distribution. We purposefully model this heterogeneity by exploring moderating effects at the levels of owner identity and national institutions. Regarding owner identity, we find that our focal relationship is stronger for foreign than for domestic owners, and that pure “market” investors outperform “stable” or “inside” owners whom are multiply tied to the firm. Regarding institutions, we find that a certain threshold level of institutional development is necessary to make concentrated ownership an effective corporate governance strategy. Yet we also find that strong legal protection of shareholders makes ownership concentration inconsequential and therefore redundant. Finally, in jurisdictions where owners can easily extract private benefits from the corporations they control, the focal relationship becomes weaker, presumably due to minority shareholder expropriation.