10 October 2023 in PRX Quantum
Discrete-modulated (DM) continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocols are promising candidates for commercial implementations of quantum communication networks due to their experimental simplicity. While tight security analyses in the asymptotic limit exist, proofs in the finite-size regime are still subject to active research. We present a composable finite-size security proof against independently and identically distributed collective attacks for a general DM CV-QKD protocol. We introduce a new energy testing theorem to bound the effective dimension of Bob’s system and rigorously prove security within Renner’s -security framework and address the issue of acceptance sets in protocols and their security proof. We want to highlight that our method also allows for nonunique acceptance statistics, which is necessary in practise. Finally, we extend and apply a numerical security proof technique to calculate tight lower bounds on the secure key rate. To demonstrate our method, we apply it to a quadrature phase-shift keying protocol for both untrusted, ideal and trusted, nonideal detectors. The results show that our security proof method yields secure finite-size key rates under experimentally viable conditions up to at least 72 km transmission distance.
27 September 2022 in Physical Review Applied
A numerical security proof technique is used to analyze the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocols with phase-shift keying (PSK) modulation against collective attacks in the asymptotic limit. We argue that it is sufficient to consider protocols with a maximum of eight signal states and analyze different postselection strategies for protocols with four (QPSK) and eight (8PSK) signal states for untrusted ideal and trusted nonideal detectors. We introduce a cross-shaped postselection strategy, and show that both cross-shaped and radial and angular postselection clearly outperform a radial postselection scheme (and no postselection) for QPSK protocols. For all strategies studied, we provide analytical results for the operators defining the respective regions in phase space. We outline several use cases of postselection, which can easily be introduced in the data processing of both new and existing CV-QKD systems. Motivated by the high computational effort for error correction, we study the case when a large fraction of the raw key is eliminated by postselection and observe that this can be achieved while increasing the secure key rate. Postselection can also be used to partially compensate the disadvantage of QPSK protocols over 8PSK protocols for high transmission distances, while being experimentally less demanding. Finally, we highlight that postselection can be used to reduce the key rate gap between scenarios with trusted and untrusted detectors while relying on less assumptions on Eve’s power.
28 July 2025 in Light: Science & Applications
Establishing secure data communication necessitates secure key exchange over a public channel. Quantum key distribution (QKD), which leverages the principles of quantum physics, can achieve this with information-theoretic security. The discrete modulated (DM) continuous variable (CV) QKD protocol, in particular, is a suitable candidate for large-scale deployment of quantum-safe communication due to its simplicity and compatibility with standard high-speed telecommunication technology. Here, we present the first experimental demonstration of a four-state DM CVQKD system, successfully generating composable finite-size keys, secure against collective attacks over a 20 km fiber channel with 2.3 × 109 coherent quantum states, achieving a positive composable key rate of 11.04 × 10−3 bits/symbol. This accomplishment is enabled by using an advanced security proof, meticulously selecting its parameters, and the fast, stable operation of the system. Our results mark a significant step toward the large-scale deployment of practical, high-performance, cost-effective, and highly secure quantum key distribution networks using standard telecommunication components.
1 July 2025 in Physical Review Letters
High-dimensional (HD) entanglement promises both enhanced key rates and overcoming obstacles faced by modern-day quantum communication. However, modern convex optimization-based security arguments are limited by computational constraints; thus, accessible dimensions are far exceeded by progress in HD photonics, bringing forth a need for efficient methods to compute key rates for large encoding dimensions. In response to this problem, we present a flexible analytic framework facilitated by the dual of a semidefinite program and diagonalizing operators inspired by entanglement-witness theory, enabling the efficient computation of key rates in high-dimensional systems. To facilitate the latter, we show how matrix completion techniques can be incorporated to effectively yield improved, computable bounds on the key rate in paradigmatic high-dimensional systems of time- or frequency-bin entangled photons and beyond, revealing the potential for very high-dimensions to surpass low dimensional protocols already with existing technology. In our accompanying work, (F. Kanitschar and M. Huber, Composable finite-size security of high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocols), available on arXiv, we show how our findings can be used to establish finite-size security against coherent attacks for general HD-QKD protocols both in the fixed- and variable-length scenario.
20 November 2024 in Physical Review Applied
ABAlexandra Bergmayr-Mann
10 November 2025 in Physical Review Applied
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) extending beyond urban areas commonly use satellite links; however, the transmission of quantum states through the Earth’s atmosphere is highly susceptible to noise, restricting its application primarily to nighttime. High-dimensional (HD) QKD offers a promising solution to this limitation by employing high-dimensionally entangled quantum states. Although experimental platforms for HD QKD exist, previous security analyses have been limited to the asymptotic regime and have either relied on impractical measurements or employed computationally demanding convex optimization tasks, restricting the security analysis to low dimensions. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting a composable finite-size security proof against both collective and coherent attacks for a general HD QKD protocol that uses only experimentally accessible measurements. In addition to the conventional yet impractical “one-shot” key rates, we provide a practical variable-length security argument that yields significantly higher expected key rates. This approach is particularly crucial under rapidly changing and turbulent atmospheric conditions, as encountered in free-space and satellite-based QKD platforms.