D. Ramona Bobocel

D. Ramona Bobocel

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

D. Ramona Bobocel

University of Waterloo

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

36Years (1991-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 April 2001 in Journal of Vocational Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RCRussell Cropanzano
Russell Cropanzano
ZBZinta S. Byrne
Zinta S. Byrne
DBD.Ramona Bobocel
D.Ramona Bobocel
DRDeborah E. Rupp
Deborah E. Rupp

1 January 2011 in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LHLeanne S. Son Hing
Leanne S. Son Hing
DBD. Ramona Bobocel
D. Ramona Bobocel
MZMark P. Zanna
Mark P. Zanna
DGDonna M. Garcia
Donna M. Garcia
SGStephanie S. Gee
Stephanie S. Gee
KOKatie Orazietti
Katie Orazietti
We argue that the preference for the merit principle is a separate construct from hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., system justification beliefs, prejudice, social dominance orientation), including descriptive beliefs that meritocracy currently exists in society. Moreover, we hypothesized that prescriptive beliefs about merit should have a stronger influence on reactions to the status quo when hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies are weak (vs. strong). In 4 studies, participants' preference for the merit principle and hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were assessed; later, the participants evaluated organizational selection practices that support or challenge the status quo. Participants' prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit were separate constructs; only the latter predicted other hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies. In addition, as hypothesized, among participants who weakly endorsed hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, the stronger their preference for the merit principle, the more they opposed selection practices that were perceived to be merit violating but the more they supported practices that were perceived to be merit restoring. In contrast, those who strongly endorsed hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were always motivated to support the status quo, regardless of their preference for the merit principle.

1 December 1991 in Journal of Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JMJohn P. Meyer
John P. Meyer
DBD. Ramona Bobocel
D. Ramona Bobocel
NANatalie J. Allen
Natalie J. Allen
To test hypotheses concerning the influence of prospective and retro-spective rationality in the development of organizational commitment, we measured both the affective and continuance commitment of recent university graduates on three occasions during theirfirst year of employment and examined their relations with variables measured prior to and following entry into an organization. Prior to entry, we measured variables presumed to bind individuals to their choice of organization (i.e., volition, irrevocability, and importance) as well as perceived decision quality. Following entry, we measured perceptions of job quality, investments, and alternative employment opportunities. The results were more consistent with a prospective- than with a retro-spective-rationality view of the development of commitment. The best predictors of affective commitment were the job-quality and decision-quality variables. Continuance commitment correlated most strongly with the pre-and post-entry measures of perceived alternatives. Implications for organizational efforts to foster commitment in employees are discussed.

1 December 2018 in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JBJustin P. Brienza
Justin P. Brienza
FKFranki Y. H. Kung
Franki Y. H. Kung
HSHenri C. Santos
Henri C. Santos
DBD. Ramona Bobocel
D. Ramona Bobocel
IGIgor Grossmann
Igor Grossmann
[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 115(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2018-63189-002). In the article, the original supplemental material has been revised to include a clarifying note to the Tests of model fit over larger sample (Samples C-G) section and post-peer review analyses added to the Post-peer review Factor Analytic Tests section. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Philosophers and behavioral scientists refer to wisdom as unbiased reasoning that guides one toward a balance of interests and promotes a good life. However, major instruments developed to test wisdom appear biased, and it is unclear whether they capture balance-related tendencies. We examined whether shifting from global, de-contextualized reports to state-level reports about concrete situations provides a less biased method to assess wise reasoning (e.g., intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty and change, consideration of the broader context at hand and perspectives of others, integration of these perspectives or compromise), which may be aligned with the notion of balancing interests. Results of a large-scale psychometric investigation (N = 4,463) revealed that the novel Situated WIse Reasoning Scale (SWIS) is reliable and appears independent of psychological biases (attribution bias, bias blind spot, self-deception, and impression management), whereas global wisdom reports are subject to such biases. Moreover, SWIS scores were positively related to indices of living well (e.g., adaptive emotion regulation, mindfulness), and balancing of cooperative and self-protective interests, goals (influence-vs.-adjustment), and causal inferences about conflict (attribution to the self-vs.-other party). In contrast, global wisdom reports were unrelated or negatively related to balance-related measures. Notably, people showed modest within-person consistency in wise reasoning across situations or over time, suggesting that a single-shot measurement may be insufficient for whole understanding of trait-level wisdom. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for research on wisdom, judgment and decision making, well-being, and prosociality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

1 January 2007 in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LHLeanne S. Son Hing
Leanne S. Son Hing
DBD. Ramona Bobocel
D. Ramona Bobocel
MZMark P. Zanna
Mark P. Zanna
MMMaxine V. McBride
Maxine V. McBride
When dilemmas require trade-offs between profits and ethics, do leaders high in social dominance orientation (SDO) and followers high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) make decisions that are more unethical than those made by others? This issue was explored in 4 studies with female participants performing managerial role-playing tasks. First, dyads comprising a person who was either low or high in SDO and a person who was either low or high in RWA negotiated for a leadership position. People high in SDO were more likely to obtain leader positions than to obtain follower positions. No other effects were significant. Second, leaders high in SDO partnered with an agreeable (confederate) follower made decisions that were more unethical than those of leaders low in SDO. Third, followers high in RWA were more acquiescent to and supportive of an unethical (confederate) leader than were followers low in RWA. Fourth, high SDO leader-high RWA follower dyads made decisions that were more unethical than those made in role-reversed dyads because leaders had more influence. Implications of these results for conceptualizing SDO, RWA, and authoritarian dynamics are discussed.

1 May 2006 in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KBKees van Den Bos
Kees van Den Bos
SPSusanne L. Peters
Susanne L. Peters
DBD. Ramona Bobocel
D. Ramona Bobocel
JYJan Fekke Ybema
Jan Fekke Ybema