Richard T. B. Ma

Richard T. B. Ma

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Richard T. B. Ma

National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 December 2018 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LLLailong Luo
Lailong Luo
DGDeke Guo
Deke Guo
RMRichard T. B. Ma
Richard T. B. Ma
OROri Rottenstreich
Ori Rottenstreich
XLXueshan Luo
Xueshan Luo
Bloom filter (BF) has been widely used to support membership query, i.e., to judge whether a given element x is a member of a given set S or not. Recent years have seen a flourish design explosion of BF due to its characteristic of space-efficiency and the functionality of constant-time membership query. The existing reviews or surveys mainly focus on the applications of BF, but fall short in covering the current trends, thereby lacking intrinsic understanding of their design philosophy. To this end, this survey provides an overview of BF and its variants, with an emphasis on the optimization techniques. Basically, we survey the existing variants from two dimensions, i.e., performance and generalization. To improve the performance, dozens of variants devote themselves to reducing the false positives and implementation costs. Besides, tens of variants generalize the BF framework in more scenarios by diversifying the input sets and enriching the output functionalities. To summarize the existing efforts, we conduct an in-depth study of the existing literature on BF optimization, covering more than 60 variants. We unearth the design philosophy of these variants and elaborate how the employed optimization techniques improve BF. Furthermore, comprehensive analysis and qualitative comparison are conducted from the perspectives of BF components. Lastly, we highlight the future trends of designing BFs. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first survey that accomplishes such goals.

16 October 2006 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RMR.T.B. Ma
R.T.B. Ma
SLS.C.M. Lee
S.C.M. Lee
JLJ.C.S. Lui
J.C.S. Lui
DYD.K.Y. Yau
D.K.Y. Yau
Conventional peer-to-peer (P2P) networks do not provide service differentiation and incentive for users. Therefore, users can easily obtain information without themselves contributing any information or service to a P2P community. This leads to the well known free-riding problem. Consequently, most of the information requests are directed towards a small number of P2P nodes which are willing to share information or provide service, causing the "tragedy of the commons." The aim of this paper is to provide service differentiation in a P2P network based on the amount of services each node has provided to the network community. Since the differentiation is based on nodes' prior contributions, the nodes are encouraged to share information/services with each other. We first introduce a resource distribution mechanism for all the information sharing nodes. The mechanism is distributed in nature, has linear time complexity, and guarantees Pareto-optimal resource allocation. Second, we model the whole resource request/distribution process as a competition game between the competing nodes. We show that this game has a Nash equilibrium. To realize the game, we propose a protocol in which the competing nodes can interact with the information providing node to reach Nash equilibrium efficiently and dynamically. We also present a generalized incentive mechanism for nodes having heterogeneous utility functions. Convergence analysis of the competition game is carried out. Examples are used to illustrate that the incentive protocol provides service differentiation and can induce productive resource sharing by rational network nodes. Lastly, the incentive protocol is adaptive to node arrival and departure events, and to different forms of network congestion

17 May 2010 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RMRichard T. B. Ma
Richard T. B. Ma
DCDah Ming Chiu
Dah Ming Chiu
JLJohn C. S. Lui
John C. S. Lui
VMVishal Misra
Vishal Misra
DRDan Rubenstein
Dan Rubenstein
Within the current Internet, autonomous ISPs implement bilateral agreements, with each ISP establishing agreements that suit its own local objective to maximize its profit. Peering agreements based on local views and bilateral settlements, while expedient, encourage selfish routing strategies and discriminatory interconnections. From a more global perspective, such settlements reduce aggregate profits, limit the stability of routes, and discourage potentially useful peering/connectivity arrangements, thereby unnecessarily balkanizing the Internet. We show that if the distribution of profits is enforced at a global level, then there exist profit-sharing mechanisms derived from the coalition games concept of Shapley value and its extensions that will encourage these selfish ISPs who seek to maximize their own profits to converge to a Nash equilibrium. We show that these profit-sharing schemes exhibit several fairness properties that support the argument that this distribution of profits is desirable. In addition, at the Nash equilibrium point, the routing and connecting/peering strategies maximize aggregate network profits and encourage ISP connectivity so as to limit balkanization.

29 December 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MSMingshen Sun
Mingshen Sun
XLXiaolei Li
Xiaolei Li
JLJohn C. S. Lui
John C. S. Lui
RMRichard T. B. Ma
Richard T. B. Ma
ZLZhenkai Liang
Zhenkai Liang
Android, the most popular mobile OS, has around 78% of the mobile market share. Due to its popularity, it attracts many malware attacks. In fact, people have discovered around 1 million new malware samples per quarter, and it was reported that over 98% of these new malware samples are in fact “derivatives” (or variants) from existing malware families. In this paper, we first show that runtime behaviors of malware's core functionalities are in fact similar within a malware family. Hence, we propose a framework to combine “runtime behavior” with “static structures” to detect malware variants. We present the design and implementation of Monet, which has a client and a backend server module. The client module is a lightweight, in-device app for behavior monitoring and signature generation, and we realize this using two novel interception techniques. The backend server is responsible for large scale malware detection. We collect 3723 malware samples and top 500 benign apps to carry out extensive experiments of detecting malware variants and defending against malware transformation. Our experiments show that Monet can achieve around 99% accuracy in detecting malware variants. Furthermore, it can defend against ten different obfuscation and transformation techniques, while only incurs around 7% performance overhead and about 3% battery overhead. More importantly, Monet will automatically alert users with intrusion details so to prevent further malicious behaviors.

9 May 2014 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMohammad R. Vedady Moghadam
Mohammad R. Vedady Moghadam
RMRichard T. B. Ma
Richard T. B. Ma
RZRui Zhang
Rui Zhang
Frequency control is essential to maintain the stability and reliability of power grids. For decades, generation side controllers, e.g., governors and automatic generation controllers, have been used to stabilize the frequency of power systems, which incur high operational costs. In smart grids, utilizing demand response is an appealing alternative to control the system frequency at the demand side, which can reduce the dependency of grids on expensive generation side controllers. Despite of economic advantages, the frequency oscillation problem, which occurs when smart appliances simultaneously respond to the system frequency by varying their power consumptions, is the main barrier to realize demand response enabled frequency control in practice. In this paper, we investigate a new distributed control algorithm by randomizing smart appliances' responses to solve this problem. We provide a comprehensive analysis to characterize various impacts of the randomized demand response on the system frequency in terms of its mean and variance over time. Furthermore, based on the frequency dynamics analysis, we determine the average frequency recovery time, the average number of responded smart appliances, and the probability of frequency overshoot, which provide important guidelines for designing our control algorithm. Finally, we validate our analysis via simulations under practical setups.

20 June 2008 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RMRichard T. B. Ma
Richard T. B. Ma
VMVishal Misra
Vishal Misra
DRDan Rubenstein
Dan Rubenstein
Aloha and its slotted variation are commonly deployed medium access control (MAC) protocols in environments where multiple transmitting devices compete for a medium, yet may have difficulty sensing each other's presence (the "hidden terminal problem''). Competing 802.11 gateways, as well as most modern digital cellular systems, like GSM, are examples. This paper models and evaluates the throughput that can be achieved in a system where nodes compete for bandwidth using a generalized version of slotted-Aloha protocols. The protocol is implemented as a two-state system, where the probability that a node transmits in a given slot depends on whether the node's prior transmission attempt was successful. Using Markov models, we evaluate the channel utilization and fairness of this class of protocols for a variety of node objectives, including maximizing aggregate throughput of the channel, each node selfishly maximizing its own throughput, and attacker nodes attempting to jam the channel. If all nodes are selfish and strategically attempt to maximize their own throughput, a situation similar to the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma arises. Our results reveal that under heavy loads, a greedy strategy reduces the utilization, and that attackers cannot do much better than attacking during randomly selected slots.