Alexander Kott

Alexander Kott

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Alexander Kott

DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, Maryland, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2021 in IEEE Engineering Management Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ALAlexandre K. Ligo
Alexandre K. Ligo
AKAlexander Kott
Alexander Kott
Igor LinkovIgor Linkov
Igor Linkov
Researchers developed approaches to assess the performance of cyber-physical systems, their exposure to various types of threats, and the ability of cybersecurity components and systems to withstand disruptions. System resilience, defined as an ability to absorb, recover from, and adapt to cyber-attacks, has been studied less, and the situation is further complicated by the increased number of autonomous agents, i.e., hardware and software, which act on its own without human intervention. These agents can increase or decrease system resilience depending on their design and critical functions. Systems enabled with autonomous agents have the potential to respond to cyber-attacks with speed and scale that are unachievable with purely human defenders, but the mere presence of autonomous agents in the system adds vulnerabilities and can reduce resilience. Most assessment approaches have limitations with respect to measuring cyber-resilience, especially in systems with autonomous agents enabled with artificial intelligence. In this article, we provide an overview of several approaches related to the assessment of cybersecurity and the practical challenges in applying such approaches to measure cyber-resilience of systems with autonomous agents. We propose directions for research and practice on the development of effective cyber-resilience measures .

2 August 2021 in Computer
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AKAlexander Kott
Alexander Kott
MGMaureen S. Golan
Maureen S. Golan
BTBenjamin D. Trump
Benjamin D. Trump
Igor LinkovIgor Linkov
Igor Linkov
The term "cyber resilience by design" (RBD) is growing in popularity. But what is the other resilience, not by design? In this article, we explore the differences and mutual reliance of RBD and resilience by intervention.

18 May 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RHRichard Harang
Richard Harang
AKAlexander Kott
Alexander Kott
We analyze sets of intrusion detection records observed on the networks of several large, nonresidential organizations protected by a form of intrusion detection and prevention service. Our analyses reveal that the process of intrusion detection in these networks exhibits a significant degree of burstiness as well as strong memory, with burstiness and memory properties that are comparable to those of natural processes driven by threshold effects, but different from bursty human activities. We explore time-series models of these observable network security incidents based on partially observed data using a hidden Markov model with restricted hidden states, which we fit using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques. We examine the output of the fitted model with respect to its statistical properties and demonstrate that the model adequately accounts for intrinsic “bursting” within observed network incidents as a result of alternation between two or more stochastic processes. While our analysis does not lead directly to new detection capabilities, the practical implications of gaining better understanding of the observed burstiness are significant, and include opportunities for quantifying a network's risks and defensive efforts.

15 June 2013
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
AKAlexander Kott
Alexander Kott

10 January 2025 in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
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Journal Article
Open access
MWMichael J. Weisman
Michael J. Weisman
AKAlexander Kott
Alexander Kott
JEJason E. Ellis
Jason E. Ellis
BMBrian J. Murphy
Brian J. Murphy
TPTravis W. Parker
Travis W. Parker
JVJoachim Vandekerckhove
Joachim Vandekerckhove
Cyber resilience is the ability of a system to resist and recover from a cyber attack, thereby restoring the system’s functionality. Effective design and development of a cyber resilient system requires experimental methods and tools for quantitative measuring of cyber resilience. This article describes an experimental method and test bed for obtaining resilience-relevant data as a system (in our case—a truck) traverses its route, in repeatable, systematic experiments. We model a truck equipped with an autonomous cyber-defense system and which also includes inherent physical resilience features. When attacked by malware, this ensemble of cyber-physical features (i.e., “bonware”) strives to resist and recover from the performance degradation caused by the malware’s attack. We propose parsimonious mathematical models to aid in quantifying systems’ resilience to cyber attacks. Using the models, we identify quantitative characteristics obtainable from experimental data and show that these characteristics can serve as useful quantitative measures of cyber resilience.

8 November 2019 in The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AKAlexander Kott
Alexander Kott
PTPaul Théron
Paul Théron
LMLuigi V Mancini
Luigi V Mancini
EDEdlira Dushku
Edlira Dushku
APAgostino Panico
Agostino Panico
KRKrzysztof Rzadca
Krzysztof Rzadca
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Research Task Group IST-152 developed a concept and a reference architecture for intelligent software agents performing active, largely autonomous cyber-defense actions on military assets. The group released a detailed report, briefly reviewed in this article, where such an agent is referred to as an Autonomous Intelligent Cyber-defense Agent (AICA). In a conflict with a technically sophisticated adversary, NATO military networks will operate in a heavily contested battlefield. Enemy malware will likely infiltrate and attack friendly networks and systems. Today’s reliance on human cyber defenders will be untenable on the future battlefield. Instead, artificially intelligent agents, such as AICAs, will be necessary to defeat the enemy malware in an environment of potentially disrupted communications where human intervention may not be possible. The IST-152 group identified specific capabilities of AICA. For example, AICA will have to be capable of autonomous planning and execution of complex multi-step activities for defeating or degrading sophisticated adversary malware, with the anticipation and minimization of resulting side effects. It will have to be capable of adversarial reasoning to battle against a thinking, adaptive malware. Crucially, AICA will have to keep itself and its actions as undetectable as possible, and will have to use deceptions and camouflage. The report identifies the key functions and components and their interactions for a potential reference architecture of such an agent, as well as a tentative roadmap toward the capabilities of AICA.