15 December 2023 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Federated learning (FL) is a promising distributed learning approach to enable intelligent Internet of Things (IoT) applications. However, FL is vulnerable to model poisoning attacks in which malicious clients abate the accuracy of the global model by committing crafted local model updates to the server. Existing defense methods either rely on a validation data set or simply remove the detected malicious clients from the subsequent training process to handle attacks from a large number of malicious clients. Thus, the performance of existing methods deteriorates drastically in many scenarios where the data distributions of clients are unpredictable. To address these deficiencies, we propose a framework called FL overwatch (FLOW) to efficiently defend against model poisoning attacks taking advantages of the local model updates in current and historical training iterations. On one hand, FLOW detects malicious clients in each iteration by measuring the cosine distances between the local model updates of clients, such that malicious updates are eliminated from the current aggregation. On the other hand, FLOW gracefully punishes the previously identified malicious clients rather than removes them from the whole training process. As a result, FLOWcan embrace a richer reliable set of local model updates than existing methods in aggregation. Extensive experiments on widely used benchmark data sets show that FLOW can achieve higher success defending ratio and higher accuracy of global models over existing Byzantinerobust FL methods under typical untargeted attacks and targeted attacks. Furthermore, FLOW also shows significant effectiveness in defending against adaptive attacks tailored to FLOW.
14 May 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Federated Learning (FL) is a collaborative machine learning paradigm allowing participants to train a global model collaboratively without sharing training data. The distributed nature makes FL vulnerable to the untargeted or backdoor model poisoning attacks (MPAs). Hence, lots of defense methods are proposed to secure FL. However, existing defenses are ineffective in defending against the emerging stealthy layer-space MPA, since the defenses either focus on the model space or ignore the disparities between the layers. In this paper, we propose a novel layer-space defense method called FLGuardian that can protect the global model from the state-of-the-art MPAs. FLGuardian first employs a new layer-wise detection to find out the benign clients for each layer through pairwise cosine distances and pairwise Euclidean distances combined with a clustering algorithm. Then, FLGuardian assigns a trust score for each client according to the detection results of all the layers, where a deeper layer in the model brings a higher weight in the scoring. Finally, we select several clients with the highest scores for updating the global model. Experimental results show that FLGuardian excels nine typical defense methods against seven state-of-the-art MPAs in most cases. Particularly, under LPattack, the emerging layer-space backdoor MPA, FLGuardian secures Backdoor Success Rate (BSR) below 3% while other defenses have over 93% BSRs on CIFAR-10. Moreover, FLGuardian remains robust against adaptive attacks tailored to FLGuardian.
20 May 2012 in Journal of Computer Applications
1 January 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote Sensing