C. Daniel Batson

C. Daniel Batson

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C. Daniel Batson

University of Kansas

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

28Years (1999-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2007 in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CBC. Daniel Batson
C. Daniel Batson
JEJakob Håkansson Eklund
Jakob Håkansson Eklund
VCValerie L. Chermok
Valerie L. Chermok
JHJennifer L. Hoyt
Jennifer L. Hoyt
BOBiaggio G. Ortiz
Biaggio G. Ortiz
Two experiments examined the role of valuing the welfare of a person in need as an antecedent of empathic concern. Specifically, these experiments explored the relation of such valuing to a well-known antecedent--perspective taking. In Experiment 1, both perspective taking and valuing were manipulated, and each independently increased empathic concern, which, in turn, increased helping behavior. In Experiment 2, only valuing was manipulated. Manipulated valuing increased measured perspective taking and, in part as a result, increased empathic concern, which, in turn, increased helping. Valuing appears to be an important, largely overlooked, situational antecedent of feeling empathy for a person in need.

24 November 2009 in Social Issues and Policy Review
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Journal Article
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CBC. Daniel Batson
C. Daniel Batson
NANadia Y. Ahmad
Nadia Y. Ahmad

1 May 2007 in European Journal of Social Psychology
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Journal Article
Open access
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CBC. Daniel Batson
C. Daniel Batson
CKChristopher L. Kennedy
Christopher L. Kennedy
LNLesley‐Anne Nord
Lesley‐Anne Nord
ESE. L. Stocks
E. L. Stocks
DFD'YAni A. Fleming
D'YAni A. Fleming
TZTricia Zerger
Tricia Zerger
Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger, we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another, even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared‐for other, not unfairness per se. In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger. Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

1 September 2003 in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
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CBC. Daniel Batson
C. Daniel Batson
DLDavid A. Lishner
David A. Lishner
ACAmy Carpenter
Amy Carpenter
LDLuis Dulin
Luis Dulin
SHSanna Harjusola-Webb
Sanna Harjusola-Webb
BSBrenda Sampat
Brenda Sampat
Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another's place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other's place did little to increase the morality (fair-ness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other's feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other's place did significantly increase moral action.

28 June 2011 in Emotion Review
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Journal Article
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CBC. Daniel Batson
C. Daniel Batson
Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very little evidence for moral integrity—motivation to actually be moral. The lack of truly moral motivation may, in turn, be linked to a lack of truly moral emotion, at least in response to violation of certain moral standards.

14 September 2007 in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
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CBC. Daniel Batson
C. Daniel Batson