Relevance of the study is due to the need to anticipate how the russian federation will compensate for its losses under the conditions of a protracted war. For example, analysis of open sources from July 2025 indicates russia’s plans to expand conscription through reforms of the military administration, which may change the dynamics of the war. For Ukraine, this means a need for accurate data and forecasts in order to effectively allocate its own resources. The article is dedicated to a systematic analysis and foresight of the mobilisation potential of the russian federation under the conditions of full-scale war against Ukraine. The study reveals the structure, troop generation mechanisms, and limitations of the russian mobilisation system, proposing a forecast of its development for 2025–2026. The aim of the article – is to conduct a systematic analysis of the organisation of russia's mobilisation resource in the context of its war against Ukraine and to develop a forecast of its mobilisation capabilities for 2025–2026. The article outlines the structure and characteristics of russia's mobilisation resource, including the legal framework and recruitment mechanisms; it examines the specifics of partial mobilisation, contract service, recruitment of foreigners, and forced conscription in the occupied territories; it identifies key limitations of the system based on verified data; it formulates a forecast based on current trends and historical examples; and it offers conclusions to support Ukraine’s strategic defence planning. A systemic approach is the basis of the study, as mobilisation in russia represents a complex system encompassing the legislative framework, administrative mechanisms, socio-economic conditions, and the ideological apparatus. For the analysis, the model of general systems theory by Ludwig von Bertalanffy is used, which considers a system as a set of interconnected elements, where a change in one component, for example, the demographic reserve, affects others, such as military effectiveness or economic stability. Based on empirical and theoretical methods, including the analysis of official documents, reports by ISW, RAND, Human Rights Watch, and other open sources, it has been established that mobilisation in russia relies on a centralised repressive system, but faces a demographic crisis (a 10% decrease in the working-age population by 2030), economic sanctions (a 3.5% decrease in GDP in 2023–2024), and organisational problems (corruption, lack of equipment). Partial mobilisation, contract service, recruitment of foreigners (including from North Korea and Nepal), and forced conscription in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine are the key mechanisms, but their effectiveness is decreasing due to low training levels and resistance. The forecast for 2025–2026 anticipates the continuation of hybrid mobilisation (150–200 thousand people annually), but with the risk of exhaustion due to economic and social constraints. Historical examples (Japan 1941–1945, the USSR in Afghanistan) highlight the vulnerability of such systems. For Ukraine, information operations, strikes on logistics, and strengthening of sanctions are recommended. The study offers strategic leverage points to weaken the enemy, which is of critical importance for state defence.