1 April 2019 in Management Science
How does competition impact firms’ incentive to innovate by investing in information technology (IT)? Prior literature suggests opposite predictions on the direction in which competition drives IT investment. This paper analyzes a game theoretic model of duopoly competition and shows that an important feature of IT sheds new light on firms’ investment decisions: IT implementation can fail. Without the possibility of implementation failure, the opportunity to invest in IT hurts firms’ profits because the productivity gains are competed away. Implementation failure creates a possibility of cost-based differentiation and mitigates competition, although these two effects can drive firms’ IT investment in opposite directions. Interestingly, a higher probability of implementation failure can lead to lower investment risks and higher expected profits. Firms in highly competitive markets are better able to recoup the returns to their IT investments and, therefore, more motivated to invest in risky IT than firms in less competitive markets. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.3005. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.
1 September 2023 in Information Systems Research
Information technology (IT) investment often faces the risk of implementation failure. Such risk has important and intriguing impacts on firms’ investment and competitive strategies. We investigate these effects in a context in which two firms, a leader and a follower, invest in a cost-reducing IT sequentially, and IT implementation may fail. We show that the risk of IT implementation failure benefits the follower and can benefit or hurt the leader. It impacts the firms’ investment and profits through three distinct effects: mitigating competition, weakening the leader’s first mover advantage, and creating differentiation opportunities. The follower may have information about the leader’s IT investment before making its investment. The leader gains a first mover advantage when the follower makes its investment after knowing the leader’s IT investment level or implementation outcome. So pioneering IT adopters should announce their investment early to influence followers. In some cases, the follower can benefit from knowing the leader’s implementation outcome. The leader expects a higher profit than the follower, and early investment is beneficial unless implementation risk declines significantly with time. Finally, a sequential IT investment schedule in which the follower makes its investment after the leader’s investment level and outcome are known produces the highest social surplus.
1 December 2020 in Information Systems Research
Nonlinear usage-based pricing is applied extensively in software markets. Customers of software products usually cannot vary their required usage volume, a property we label local demand inelasticity. For instance, a client firm that needs a sales force automation software either buys one user license for every salesperson or does not buy at all. It is unlikely to buy licenses for some but not all salespersons. This demand feature violates a critical assumption of the standard nonlinear pricing literature that consumers are flexible with their usage volume, and their valuation changes smoothly with usage volume. Consequently, standard nonlinear pricing solutions are inapplicable to many software products. This paper studies the optimal nonlinear usage-based pricing of software when customers' demand is locally inelastic. This unique demand feature necessitates a new approach to solve the nonlinear pricing problem. We show that under a weak ordering condition of customer types, this complex pricing problem can be decomposed into a set of much simpler subproblems with known solutions. Our pricing solution is easily implementable and applicable to a broad range of demand systems, including those described by the families of exponential and normal distributions. Moreover, local demand inelasticity has a critical impact on key efficiency results.