Wenhao Li

Wenhao Li

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Wenhao Li

China Telecom Corp Ltd, Guangdong Research Institute, Guangzhou, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 October 2022 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WLWenhao Li
Wenhao Li
XZXiao-Yu Zhang
Xiao-Yu Zhang
HBHuaifeng Bao
Huaifeng Bao
HSHaichao Shi
Haichao Shi
QWQiang Wang
Qiang Wang
Network traffic identification is critical for effective network management. Existing methods mostly focus on invariant network environments with stable attribute distributions. Unfortunately, however, they can hardly be adaptive to the variation of practical networks and suffer from significant performance degradation. This problem largely stems from the over-dependence of existing methods on the vulnerable side-channel features. To address this issue, in this paper we propose a graph-based approach, namely ProGraph, to ensure robust network traffic classification among various network environments. The core idea of ProGraph is to construct a correlation graph with session clusters aggregated from different networks, based on which graph propagation can be effectively implemented to predict labels of testing nodes in an iterative manner. ProGraph enhances the correlation between clusters of the same class to provide reliable paths for label dissemination from the labeled clusters to the testing ones. It is encouraging to see that the proposed ProGraph achieves an accuracy of 92.25% in networks with constant attributes, while remaining stable with the accuracy of 90.89% when deployed in different networks, which significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches. Meanwhile, ProGraph can accurately identify the novel classes which do not exist in the training dataset, with an AUC of 95.11. Last but not least, a carefully constructed dataset, namely CrossNet2021, containing network traffic of 20 classes of applications from two distinct networking scenarios, is made publicly available to support further research.

13 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZZZiming Zhao
Ziming Zhao
ZLZhaoxuan Li
Zhaoxuan Li
ZSZhuoxue Song
Zhuoxue Song
WLWenhao Li
Wenhao Li
FZFan Zhang
Fan Zhang
To detect unknown attack traffic, anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) are widely used in Internet infrastructure. However, the security communities realize some limitations when they put most existing proposals into practice. The challenges are mainly concerned with (i) fine-grained emerging attack detection and (ii) incremental updates/adaptations. To tackle these problems, we propose to decouple the need for model capabilities by transforming known/new class identification issues into multiple independent one-class learning tasks. Based on the above core ideas, we develop Trident, a universal framework for fine-grained unknown encrypted traffic detection. It consists of three main modules, i.e., tSieve, tScissors, and tMagnifier are used for profiling traffic, determining outlier thresholds, and clustering respectively, each of which supports custom configuration. Using four popular datasets of network traces, we show that Trident significantly outperforms 16 state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods. Furthermore, a series of experiments (concept drift, overhead/parameter evaluation) demonstrate the stability, scalability, and practicality of Trident.

22 September 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZLZhaoxuan Li
Zhaoxuan Li
SLSiqi Lu
Siqi Lu
RZRui Zhang
Rui Zhang
ZZZiming Zhao
Ziming Zhao
RLRujin Liang
Rujin Liang
SGSheng Gao
Sheng Gao
With the economic development of Ethereum, the frequent security incidents involving smart contracts running on this platform have caused billions of dollars in losses. Consequently, there is a pressing need to identify the vulnerabilities in contracts, while the state-of-the-art (SOTA) detection methods have been limited in this regard as they cannot overcome three challenges at the same time. (i) Meet the requirements of detecting the source code, bytecode, and opcode of contracts simultaneously; (ii) reduce the reliance on manual pre-defined rules/patterns and expert involvement; (iii) assist contract developers in completing the contract lifecycle more safely, e.g. , vulnerability repair and abnormal monitoring. With the development of machine learning (ML), using it to detect the contract runtime execution sequences (called instances) has made it possible to address these challenges. However, the lack of datasets with fine-grained sequence labels poses a significant obstacle, given the unreadability of bytecode/opcode. To this end, we propose a method named VulHunter that extracts the instances by traversing the Control Flow Graph built from contract opcodes. Based on the hybrid attention and multi-instance learning mechanisms, VulHunter reasons the instance labels and designs an optional classifier to automatically capture the subtle features of both normal and defective contracts, thereby identifying the vulnerable instances. Then, it combines the symbolic execution to construct and solve symbolic constraints to validate their feasibility. Finally, we implement a prototype of VulHunter with 15K lines of code and compare it with 9 SOTA methods on five open source datasets including 52,042 source codes and 184,289 bytecodes. The results indicate that VulHunter can detect contract vulnerabilities more accurately (90.04% accurate rate and 85.60% F1 score), efficiently (only took 4.4 seconds per contract), and robustly (0% analysis failed rate) than the SOTA methods. Also, it can focus on specific metrics such as precision and recall by employing different baseline models and hyperparameters to meet the various user requirements, e.g. , vulnerability discovery and misreport mitigation. More importantly, compared with the previous ML-based arts, it can not only provide classification results, defective contract source code statements, key opcode fragments, and vulnerable execution paths, but also eliminate misreports and facilitate more operations such as vulnerability repair and attack simulation during the contract lifecycle.

17 April 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WLWenhao Li
Wenhao Li
XZXiao-Yu Zhang
Xiao-Yu Zhang
HBHuaifeng Bao
Huaifeng Bao
BYBinbin Yang
Binbin Yang
ZLZhaoxuan Li
Zhaoxuan Li
QWQiang Wang
Qiang Wang
Traffic analysis is widely used in network monitoring. However, the attackers can sometimes infer sensitive information from the patterns of the encrypted network traffic, which poses a threat to network security. Most existing countermeasures are proposed to obfuscate traffic flows using adversarial examples. However, there are two challenges when adding perturbations to live network traffic. Firstly, the perturbations imposed on the feature space cannot be conveniently projected to original traffic flows in feature-space based methods. Secondly, it is laborious and impractical to apply symmetrical framework to encode/decode the adversarial traffic in traffic-space based approaches. To address the above issues, in this paper, we propose an asymmetric defending scheme, namely Prism , to protect the live connection privacy against attacks of temporal network traffic analyzers. Specifically, Prism first extracts standardized temporal features via Power-Law Division (PLD) algorithm, and then employs Time-stacked State Transition Model (TSTM) to obtain the fingerprint of each application. Finally, Prism defends against the analyzers with online traffic perturbation. Since the Prism is designed as a traffic-space based defender with asymmetric defending structure, the deployment is lightweight and efficient. Experimental results on two real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and generalization of our adversarial perturbations. In particular, it is encouraging to see that our proposed defending scheme outperforms the advanced countermeasures, such as adversarial training and traffic filter.

23 September 2022 in Computer Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WLWenhao Li
Wenhao Li
XZXiao-Yu Zhang
Xiao-Yu Zhang
HBHuaifeng Bao
Huaifeng Bao
QWQiang Wang
Qiang Wang
ZLZhaoxuan Li
Zhaoxuan Li