Guang Yang

Guang Yang

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Guang Yang

College of Information Science and Electronic Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 August 2021 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Zhiguo ShiZhiguo Shi
Zhiguo Shi
GYGuang Yang
Guang Yang
XGXiaowen Gong
Xiaowen Gong
Shibo HeShibo He
Shibo He
JCJiming Chen
Jiming Chen
Incentive mechanism design and quality control are two key challenges in data crowdsourcing, because of the need for recruitment of crowd users and their limited capabilities. Without considering users’ social influences, existing mechanisms often result in low efficiency in terms of the platform’s cost. In this paper, we exploit social influences among users as incentives to motivate users’ participation, in order to reduce the cost of recruiting users. Based on social influences, we design incentive mechanisms with the goal of achieving high quality of crowdsourced data and low cost of incentivizing users’ participation. Specifically, we consider three scenarios. In the full information scenario, we design task assignment and user recruitment mechanisms to optimize the data quality while reducing the incentive cost. In the partial information scenario, users’ qualities and costs are unknown. We exploit the correlation between tasks to overcome the information asymmetry, for both cases of opportunistic crowdsourcing and participatory crowdsourcing. Further, in the dynamic social influence scenario, we investigate the dynamics of users’ social influences and design extra rewards for users to make full use of the social influence and achieve maximum cost saving. We evaluate the incentive mechanisms using numerical results, which demonstrate their effectiveness.

10 June 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
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Journal Article
Closed access
GYGuang Yang
Guang Yang
XSXiufang Shi
Xiufang Shi
LFLi Feng
Li Feng
Shibo HeShibo He
Shibo He
Zhiguo ShiZhiguo Shi
Zhiguo Shi
JCJiming Chen
Jiming Chen
The increasing popularity of drones is bringing many public security and privacy breach issues, such as smuggling, intrusion and illegal surveillance. Traditional approaches to detecting and localizing drones such as radar and computer vision incur high costs and hence are not desirable for large-scale applications. In this paper, we propose a cost-effective crowdsensing system named CEDAR to achieve such a goal. Specifically, we introduce a novel way of detecting drones by smartphones, exploiting the fact that most drones adopt Wi-Fi for communications with ground control stations. We design an efficient detection algorithm that takes advantage of historical Wi-Fi beacon information and MAC address encoding mechanisms used by drone manufacturers. Using received signal strength, we can also localize the detected drones. Further, to encourage participants involvement, we design an incentive mechanism based on online auction that guarantees truthfulness and consumer sovereignty. CEDAR can be directly applied to multiple drones scenario. We implement the system based on Android for the client and SSM (Spring, Spring MVC and Mybatis) for the centralized platform that supports scalability and hierarchical structure, and enables the coordination between clients and the platform. We perform extensive experiments to validate our analysis. Particularly, the detection rate in the experiments reaches 86.7% even without any prior information about drones.

1 November 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
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Journal Article
Closed access
GYGuang Yang
Guang Yang
Zhiguo ShiZhiguo Shi
Zhiguo Shi
Shibo HeShibo He
Shibo He
JZJunshan Zhang
Junshan Zhang
Crowdsensing has been recognized as a promising data collection paradigm, in which a platform outsources sensing tasks to a large number of users. However, requesting users to report raw data may give rise to many practical concerns, such as a significant overhead of communication and central processing, besides users' privacy concerns. In many scenarios (e.g, advertising and recommendation), the data collector directly benefits from statistical aggregation of raw data. Thus motivated, we consider the data collection problem based on user's local histograms, which is intimately related to the fundamental trade-off between the platform's accuracy and users' privacy. Because of users' social relationship, their data are often correlated, indicating that users' privacy may be leaked from others' data. To tackle this challenge, we first utilize Gaussian Markov random fields to model the correlation structure embedded in users' data. The data collection is modeled as a Stackelberg game where the platform decides its reward policy and users decide their noise levels while taking into account the social coupling among users. For the reward policy design, we first establish the relationship between users' Nash equilibrium and the payment mechanism, and then optimize the platform's accuracy under a budget constraint. Further, since the noise levels are users' private information, they may use falsified noise levels to achieve higher payoffs, which in turn impairs the crowdsensing performance. It turns out that with the insight into the correlation structure among users' data, the information asymmetry can be overcome based on peer prediction. We revisit the payment mechanism to guarantee dominant truthfulness of each user's strategy. Theoretical analysis and numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.

9 February 2021 in Applied Economics
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Journal Article
Closed access
BTBing Tong
Bing Tong
GYGuang Yang
Guang Yang
This article proves in a New Keynesian model that interest rate fixation can explain ChinaŠs excessive business cycle fluctuations. The fixed nominal interest rate changes the propagation of external shocks, magnifies volatility of endogenous variables, and leads to economic instability. We then extend the model to a small open economy featuring capital controls, sterilized interventions and a managed exchange rate to capture the main characteristics of the Chinese economy. We prove that the magnifying effect of interest rate fixation holds in such an environment, but this effect diminishes with a more strictly managed exchange rate.