Ki Ling Cheung

Ki Ling Cheung

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Ki Ling Cheung

Department of Information and Systems Management, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

34Years (1993-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2002 in Management Science
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Journal Article
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KCKi Ling Cheung
Ki Ling Cheung
HLHau L. Lee
Hau L. Lee
In this paper, we examine two information-based supply-chain efforts that are often linked to Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) programs. Specifically, we consider a supplier serving multiple retailers located in a close proximity. The first effort uses information on the retailers' inventory positions to coordinate shipments from the supplier to enjoy economies of scale in shipments, such as full truckloads.The second effort uses the same information for eventual unloading of the shipments to the retailers to rebalance their stocking positions. How much benefit do we gain from such initiatives? What are the relative benefits of the two initiatives? What are the drivers of such benefits? This paper seeks answers to these questions.

1 April 1997 in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
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Journal Article
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KCKi Ling Cheung
Ki Ling Cheung
WHWarren H. Hausman
Warren H. Hausman

1 January 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
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Journal Article
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Zelong YiZelong Yi
Zelong Yi
MYMan Yu
Man Yu
KCKi Ling Cheung
Ki Ling Cheung
Problem definition: This paper investigates how counterfeits influence a global supply chain and how the supply chain should effectively take anticounterfeit actions. Academic/practical relevance: The impacts of counterfeiting have been increasingly profound on global supply chains. It is critical to understand how counterfeiting impacts supply chains when supply chain members act in their own interests, and how supply chains can effectively combat counterfeiting when all the members can contribute to it. This is the first paper that offers insights into these important questions. In particular, we examine who among the supply chain members is in the best position to perform counteracting activities, how these members can cooperate in anticounterfeiting, and what economic implications the anticounterfeit actions have to the supply chain, individual firms, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Methodology: We consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, and analyze a game-theoretical framework to derive the equilibrium. Results: The manufacturer prefers to induce the retailer to combat counterfeits rather than to combat itself. Contrary to conventional wisdom, counterfeits can increase the supply chain’s profit even in the absence of network externality effects. The crux is that the manufacturer lowers wholesale price to incentivize the retailer’s counteraction and, consequently, the threat of counterfeits can mitigate double marginalization and benefit the supply chain. Managerial implications: Our results demonstrate that a sustainability risk can trigger collaborative endeavors of supply chain members and thus be advantageous to the supply chain. The findings also underscore the important role that retailers should play in anticounterfeiting. Particularly, it can be in the supply chain’s interest that the manufacturer does not execute the counteraction, either jointly with the retailer or by itself.

27 April 1995 in IIE Transactions
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Journal Article
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KCKi Ling Cheung
Ki Ling Cheung
WHWarren H. Hausman
Warren H. Hausman
Most inventory models dealing with spare parts assume independent part failures and hence one-at-a-time failure occurrences. In practice, for example when an aircraft engine undergoes repair, there is usually more than one part requiring replacement or repair; we denote this situation as ‘multiple failures’. In this paper we represent multiple failures in a continuous, infinite horizon, order-for-order spares replenishment inventory model with cannibalization. We derive exact expressions for the distribution function and the expectation of the number of backlogged jobs; approximations are also provided. The results can be used to optimize spares inventories, to evaluate the effects of correlated failures, and to model the impact of parts commonality.

1 August 2000 in Operations Research
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KCKi Ling Cheung
Ki Ling Cheung
WHWarren H. Hausman
Warren H. Hausman
This paper studies a continuous review two-echelon inventory system with a supplier serving multiple retailers. Each location uses a decentralized (Q, R) policy based on installation stocks. Each retailer may set a unique reorder quantity as a multiple of a basic packaging size Q. The supplier, in turn, adopts a similar batch replenishment policy. Our objective is to derive the exact steady-state performance for the supplier. We show that the inventory position at the supplier can be easily characterized by a uniform distribution. As a result, the closed-form expected cost function is tractable. We also examine the performance of approximation schemes such as the classic Poisson approximation. Our numerical results show that even though the Poisson approximation performs reasonably well in estimating steady-state performance, the cost penalty for using it in optimization may be significant.

1 March 2011 in Production and Operations Management
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Journal Article
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SZSheng Hao Zhang
Sheng Hao Zhang
KCKi Ling Cheung
Ki Ling Cheung