Sandeep Sunkavilli

Sandeep Sunkavilli

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Sandeep Sunkavilli

University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
SSSandeep Sunkavilli
Sandeep Sunkavilli
ZZZhiming Zhang
Zhiming Zhang
QYQiaoyan Yu
Qiaoyan Yu
The growing market share of FPGAs motivates the increasing number of attackers to tamper with FPGA systems. The majority of existing research efforts on FPGA security focus on counterfeiting devices, hardware Trojans, reverse engineering hardware designs via decomposing or decrypting bitstream files, and side-channel analysis attacks. Those attacks are typically limited to the FPGA systems implemented in standalone FPGA devices. As more cloud-based FPGA providers, third-party accelerator suppliers, and open-source FPGA design tools are available for prototyping, hardware acceleration, and high-performance computing, new FPGA utilization models are gradually formed. The increasing number of entities involved in the new FPGA use model leads to the emergence of new security threats and attack surfaces. Although the security issues on FPGA systems design and piracy have been widely investigated, there is limited investigation available disclosing the security threats from the FPGA design tools perspective. This work conducts a comprehensive survey on the FPGA tool security and proposes a thorough security threat landscape for the new FPGA utilization model in the era of machine learning and cloud computing.

24 February 2025 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SSSandeep Sunkavilli
Sandeep Sunkavilli
NCNishanth Chennagouni
Nishanth Chennagouni
QYQiaoyan Yu
Qiaoyan Yu
FPGAs are being challenged by various security threats, including reverse engineering attacks, hardware tampering, and side-channel analysis attacks. Although the existing static obfuscation methods can protect FPGA systems from IP piracy and hardware tampering, limited work is available to improve the attack resilience of obfuscation modules. As hardware Trojans are one of the most significant hardware tampering attacks on FPGAs, this work aims for the specific hardware Trojan that attempts to nullify design obfuscation. To address this need, we leverage the advanced function of FPGA CAD tools to propose a Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration enabled Design Obfuscation (DPReDO) method. Our method partially modifies the FPGA bitstream at runtime to remove the sabotaged obfuscation variant, thus offering enhanced attack resilience against hardware Trojans. Experimental results based on ISCAS and ITC-99 benchmark circuits show that the DPReDO method reduces the Trojan hit rate by up to 80% over existing static obfuscation with less than 3% hardware overhead. To test the practical feasibility of the proposed countermeasure, we further apply DPReDO to an FPGA-accelerated computation engine for a financial application. Compared to static obfuscation, the proposed DPReDO only incurs 2.6% and 1.2% more FPGA LUTs and slices, respectively.

13 October 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
GMGabrielle MacNeil
Gabrielle MacNeil
SSSandeep Sunkavilli
Sandeep Sunkavilli
QYQiaoyan Yu
Qiaoyan Yu

31 July 2025 in ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SSSandeep Sunkavilli
Sandeep Sunkavilli
MKMashrafi Alam Kajol
Mashrafi Alam Kajol
QYQiaoyan Yu
Qiaoyan Yu
Multi-tenant Field-programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in cloud service are vulnerable to remotely exploitable attacks, among which power waster circuit (PWC)-based fault attacks have been demonstrated as a highly feasible one. PWC generates high switching activities and causes a sudden voltage drop in the power distribution network (PDN), resulting in a delay of signal propagation and FPGA malfunction. Existing countermeasures deploy bitstream checking methodologies or deploy numerous on-chip sensors to mitigate voltage-drop attacks. Since new PWCs without combinatorial loops and a multi-source attack are emerging, the current countermeasures lack the ability to mitigate new security challenges in multi-tenant FPGAs. To address these issues, a Signal-slowdown (SS)-based fault attack mitigation (S 2 FAM) method is proposed to detect both combinatorial (ring-oscillator (RO)-based PWC) and non-combinatorial (ring-oscillator Flip-flop (ROFF)-based PWC) loop-based attacks and precisely pinpoint the attack locations. A new calibration technique in S 2 FAM facilitates to identify and remove unstable sensor data, thus significantly reducing false positives. Moreover, the proposed method localizes both the single- and multi-source attacks in the FPGA by utilizing a tenant-level SS ranking (TSSR)-based algorithm. Experimental results show that the proposed method reduces the false alarm by 45.8%, compared to the existing works. Our proposed algorithm for attack localization achieves a 100% success rate and reduces the attack localization area for a multi-source attack by 25.2% than an existing countermeasure. The successful localization is achieved by utilizing our proposed method within 2 \(\mu\) s (200 clock cycles) of attack duration. The proposed signal slowdown metric with the calibration process reduces the number of on-chip sensors by 78% and the localization time by 90.5%, compared to the baseline.