1 March 2015 in Journal of Development Economics
Although most theoretical models of household decision making assume perfect information, empirical studies suggest that information asymmetries can have large impacts on resource allocation. I demonstrate the importance of these asymmetries in transnational households, where physical distance between family members can make information barriers especially acute. I implement an experiment among migrants in Washington, DC, and their families in El Salvador that examines how information asymmetries can have strategic and inadvertent impacts on remittance decisions. Migrants make an incentivized decision over how much of a cash windfall to remit, and recipients decide how they will spend a remittance. Migrants strategically send home less when their choice is not revealed to recipients. Recipients make spending choices closer to migrants' preferences when the migrants' preferences are shared, regardless of whether or not the spending choices are revealed to the migrants, suggesting that recipients' choices are inadvertently affected by imperfect information.
1 April 2015 in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
We implement a randomized experiment offering Salvadoran migrants matching funds for educational remittances, which are channeled directly to a beneficiary student in El Salvador chosen by the migrant. The matches lead to increased educational expenditures, higher private school attendance, and lower labor supply of youths in El Salvador households connected to migrant study participants. We find substantial “crowd-in” of educational investments: for each $1 received by beneficiaries, educational expenditures increase by $3.72. We find no shifting of expenditures away from other students, and no effect on remittances. (JEL F24, I21, I22, J13, O15, O19)
29 November 2015 in The Journal of Human Resources
I examine how an exogenous change in individual income affects decision-making in the household. Using the age discontinuity in eligibility for the South African pension, I find that eligible women are 15 percentage points more likely to be the primary decision-maker in the household than noneligible women. This corresponds with a large increase in their share of household income. There are no parallel effects for men. Due to labor force withdrawal, male income does not increase with eligibility, suggesting that their status in the household is unchanged.
28 July 2025 in Journal of Development Economics
1 August 2021 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
1 March 2022 in World Development