Earlence Fernandes

Earlence Fernandes

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Earlence Fernandes

University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
13 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ANAsmit Nayak
Asmit Nayak
RKRishabh Khandelwal
Rishabh Khandelwal
EFEarlence Fernandes
Earlence Fernandes
KFKassem Fawaz
Kassem Fawaz
Browser extensions offer a variety of valuable features and functionalities. They also pose a significant security risk if not properly designed or reviewed. Prior works have shown that browser extensions can access and manipulate data fields, including sensitive data such as passwords, credit card numbers, and Social Security numbers. In this paper, we present an empirical study of the security risks posed by browser extensions. Specifically, we first build a proof-of-concept extension that can steal sensitive user information. We find that the extension passes the Chrome Webstore review process. We then perform a measurement study on the top 10K website login pages to check if the extension access to password fields via JS. We find that none of the password fields are actively protected, and can be accessed using JS. Moreover, we found that 1K websites store passwords in plaintext in their page source, including popular websites like Google.com and Cloudflare.com. We also analyzed over 160K Chrome Web Store extensions for malicious behavior, finding that 28K have permission to access sensitive fields and 190 store password fields in variables. To analyze the behavioral workflow of the potentially malicious extensions, we propose an LLM-driven framework, Extension Reviewer. Finally, we discuss two countermeasures to address these risks: a bolt-on JavaScript package for immediate adoption by website developers allowing them to protect sensitive input fields, and a browser-level solution that alerts users when an extension accesses sensitive input fields. Our research highlights the urgent need for improved security measures to protect sensitive user information online.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MAMagnus Almgren
Magnus Almgren
EFEarlence Fernandes
Earlence Fernandes
The fifth Workshop on CPS & IoT Security and Privacy is set to take place in Copenhagen, Denmark, on November 26, 2023, in conjunction with the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'23). This workshop marks the amalgamation of two workshops held in 2019: one focused on the security and privacy of cyber-physical systems, while the other one centered on the security and privacy of IoT. The primary objective of this workshop is to create a collaborative forum that brings together academia, industry experts, and governmental entities, encouraging them to contribute cutting-edge research, share demonstrations or hands-on experiences, and engage in discussions. This year, our call for contributions encompassed a broad spectrum, including mature research papers, work in progress submissions, and Systematization of Knowledge papers. The workshop program includes five full-length papers on the security and privacy of CPS/IoT, alongside five shorter papers that present original work-in-progress. Furthermore, the workshop will feature two distinguished keynote presentation, offering insights into the field, and a demonstration to provide a practical dimension to the discussions. The complete CPSIoTSec'23 workshop proceedings are available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1145/3605758

22 October 2022 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
YCYunang Chen
Yunang Chen
YGYue Gao
Yue Gao
NCNick Ceccio
Nick Ceccio
RCRahul Chatterjee
Rahul Chatterjee
KFKassem Fawaz
Kassem Fawaz
EFEarlence Fernandes
Earlence Fernandes
Business Collaboration Platforms like Microsoft Teams and Slack enable teamwork by supporting text chatting and third-party resource integration. A user can access online file storage, make video calls, and manage a code repository, all from within the platform, thus making them a hub for sensitive communication and resources. The key enabler for these productivity features is a third-party application model. We contribute an experimental security analysis of this model and the third-party apps. Performing this analysis is challenging because commercial platforms and their apps are closed-source systems. Our analysis methodology is to systematically investigate different types of interactions possible between apps and users. We discover that the access control model in these systems violates two fundamental security principles: least privilege and complete mediation. These violations enable a malicious app to exploit the confidentiality and integrity of user messages and third-party resources connected to the platform. We construct proof-of-concept attacks that can: (1) eavesdrop on user messages without having permission to read those messages; (2) launch fake video calls; (3) automatically merge code into repositories without user approval or involvement. Finally, we provide an analysis of countermeasures that systems like Slack and Microsoft Teams can adopt today.