This paper provides a conceptual model that explains how competitive and institutional dynamics at the community level influence the ability of welfare-oriented nonprofits to eradicate income inequality. To test our framework, we build a large and unique 7-year panel dataset consisting of data from 245 U.S. communities. We find that an increasing number of welfare nonprofits is beneficial for reducing community inequality but this is so up to a point, after which resource competition decreases their effectiveness. This competition for resources is also present when a high density of elite-oriented nonprofits operates in the same community. Hypotheses focused on the institutional dimension receive mixed support. As predicted, welfare nonprofits are more effective when they operate in communities with strong law enforcement capabilities and less effective in politically conservative local contexts. Contrary to our expectations, however, we found that welfare nonprofits are less effective in demographically heterogeneous local contexts and when the government provides effective social policies, thus indicating a possible substitution effect. Surprisingly, nonprofit effectiveness is increased in highly financialized local contexts. Together, our results indicate that issues of competition, institutional alignment and community support in the context of grand challenges are more complex than originally thought.
Research shows that reference group selection underpins critical organizational processes, but less is known about publicly disclosed choices of reference groups, such as those for the evaluation of firm performance. Because audiences, such as investors and analysts, prefer reference groups created by independent entities they can trust, they disapprove of choices of custom peer groups created by reporting firms. Nevertheless, firms frequently choose reference groups that do not conform to audiences’ expectations. We seek to explain why firms deviate from these externally held standards even when incurring penalties by developing theory and formulating hypotheses about the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) power. Using data from 10-K filings, we find that firms led by high-power CEOs are more likely to use nonconforming, custom peer groups despite incurring penalties. However, the relationship between CEO power and the use of custom peer groups is weaker when CEOs face greater scrutiny from shareholders and analysts. We also find that low firm performance increases the use of custom peer groups among high-power CEOs. Contrary to our expectations, high CEO compensation attenuates the effect of CEO power on the choice of custom peer groups, arguably because high levels of CEO pay increase scrutiny. Although firms incur costs for using nonconforming reference groups, supplemental analyses reveal that CEOs benefit by receiving higher compensation, especially when performance is low. We conclude by discussing implications for research on publicly disclosed reference groups, the consequences of power, and information disclosure.
1 December 2019 in Academy of Management Discoveries
One of the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) established by the United Nations refers to the creation of sustainable cities and communities. Using a 12-year longitudinal dataset on 100 U.S. c...
Although studies show that organizations engaged in controversial actions often aim to minimize the release of threatening information, scholars know relatively little about what may prompt organizations to increase transparency in these situations. In this study, we focus on support from public opinion as a condition that may influence the disclosure of sensitive performance information to the public. Using the second Iraq War as an empirical context, we focus on the extent to which public officials—Pentagon spokespersons—release and frame information about war performance. This outcome is critical because the way in which organizations communicate their performance to outsiders has often been regarded as a key defensive impression management tactic. We hypothesize that high public support for the war will increase the likelihood that Pentagon officials release information about sensitive combat performance indicators in their press briefings and identify contingencies, such as adversity and organizational spokespersons’ power, that moderate this relationship. We also explore whether high public support decreases the strategic use of alternate performance frames that emphasize metrics that signal progress toward a desirable end state. Using a unique data set based on the coding of press briefings, public opinion data, and other public sources, we find support for several of our hypotheses. We discuss implications for understanding the relationship between public opinion and impression management and highlight the importance of extending this research to nongovernmental organizations. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1598 .