Robin J. Kempf

Robin J. Kempf

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Robin J. Kempf

University of Colorado Colorado Springs

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 May 2018 in The American Review of Public Administration
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HGHeather Getha-Taylor
Heather Getha-Taylor
MGMisty J. Grayer
Misty J. Grayer
RKRobin J. Kempf
Robin J. Kempf
RORosemary O’LEary
Rosemary O’LEary
Trust is often touted as both an element of success and an outcome of interest in collaboration research, usually without defining the term or acknowledging the possibility of collaborating when trust is diminished or absent. This article broadens our theoretical understanding of the concept of trust, and the ability to collaborate in the absence of trust, by looking at it through the lenses of conflict resolution, psychology, and law. The disciplines examined in this article emphasize diverse approaches to examining trust on the interpersonal, interorganizational, and regime levels. While agreeing that trust is an asset, these disciplines also offer practical strategies for collaborating when trust is diminished or absent. Drawing on the theory and literature of conflict resolution, psychology, and law, we offer the following definition of collaborative trust: Collaborative trust is an individual perception that is the product of one’s assessments, experiences, and dispositions, in which one believes, and is willing to act on, the words, actions, and decisions of others. This can include a reliance on principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that articulate collective expectations.

27 June 2018 in The American Review of Public Administration
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RKRobin J. Kempf
Robin J. Kempf
JCJessica C. Cabrera
Jessica C. Cabrera
The question of whether executive agencies can be subject to the control of politically elected legislators has been answered affirmatively, but it remains an open question whether legislators can likewise design an agency to be able to resist such control and influence. This article examines whether the de jure elements established for the system of U.S. federal offices of inspectors general (OIGs) adequately guard their role as independent and objective monitors of the agencies they oversee, and are reflected in their de facto independence from political pressures in the OIGs’ environments, operationalized as changes in the majority party in Congress, the presidency, and executive leadership. This research tests the self-reported outputs of 54 federal OIGs over a 10-and-a-half-year period to see if there are correlations between differences in inspector general (IG) appointment processes, OIGs’ environmental changes, and fluctuations in OIG outputs. Furthermore, it examines whether these results vary depending on whether the OIGs are performing pre factum audits or post factum investigations. Analyses show that OIGs with IGs appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate are more productive than those appointed by agency heads. Furthermore, federal OIGs’ productivity varies depending on who is president and with the OIGs’ proximity to the president, although pre factum audits and post factum investigations do not demonstrate similar patterns. This article sheds light on issues of institutional design and suggests an implicit political nature of pre factum oversight. Implications for policy and practice in the area of government accountability are discussed.

1 June 2015 in Policy and Society
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RKRobin J. Kempf
Robin J. Kempf

16 September 2020 in Security Journal
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Journal Article
Closed access
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CBChelsea A. Binns
Chelsea A. Binns
RKRobin J. Kempf
Robin J. Kempf

28 July 2017 in International Journal of Public Administration
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RKRobin J. Kempf
Robin J. Kempf
AGAdam Graycar
Adam Graycar
Fraud, waste, and abuse damage public administration. Responding involves law enforcement and best practice administration. Many jurisdictions create watchdog agencies to perform this role. A model, which includes seven dimensions of jurisdiction and authority that policymakers should consider when creating an oversight entity, is presented. The model goes beyond the simple functional jurisdiction, i.e., who is overseen and how oversight occurs. Four subnational watchdog agencies in two countries are examined to demonstrate the trade-offs that occur in each dimension when the agencies are designed. This analysis demonstrates there are significant balancing issues at stake, which impact watchdog effectiveness.

30 August 2023 in Journal of Public Affairs Education
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RKRobin J. Kempf
Robin J. Kempf
RSReeti Sharma
Reeti Sharma