Caleb Lucas

Caleb Lucas

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Caleb Lucas

Indiana University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 October 2019 in International Interactions
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KGKevin T. Greene
Kevin T. Greene
CLCaleb Lucas
Caleb Lucas
We collect an original corpus of official documents released by Hezbollah and use text analysis to create a measure of their relationships with other non-state groups. Despite recent research that demonstrates these types of relationships affect the length and severity of conflict, data limitations hinder efforts by researchers to capture important variation in them over time. Our approach uses fine-grained text data to capture dynamic trends in these relationships. We demonstrate its effectiveness by showing our model is able to reproduce qualitative accounts of Hezbollah’s known alliances and rivalries with other non-state actors with greater accuracy and precision than existing measures. We also compare the approach with event data and demonstrate its ability to provide more granular and complementary information. With further exploration, this technique could assist researchers in improving and developing measures of intrastate cooperation and competition for use in empirical analyses.

2 October 2022 in Civil Wars
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CLCaleb Lucas
Caleb Lucas
BAB. J. Appel
B. J. Appel
APA. K. Prorok
A. K. Prorok
Grievance and opportunity theories dominate research on the causes of civil war. However, theoretical and empirical problems limit their ability to explain variation in conflict onset. We argue that these problems partly stem from treating them as largely independent explanations. We integrate grievance and opportunity into a unified theory and argue that they are complements that jointly predict conflict. We apply insights from the interstate war literature to develop and test a theory of conflict onset that argues that the probability of civil war increases as the disparity between relative power and the status quo distribution of benefits increases.


12 December 2024 in International Studies Quarterly
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Journal Article
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CLCaleb Lucas
Caleb Lucas
How does rebel news affect the way civilians perceive the balance of power during conflict? While media campaigns are a common tactic during conflict for both insurgents and governments, there is very little empirical research that explores their effect on civilians. I argue that these campaigns play an important role in the construction of a rebel group’s reputation during conflict and the perception of their organization among non-combatants. This is because civilians suffer from an information disadvantage and struggle to accurately gauge the relative strength of actors in the conflict. I exploit the plausibly random introduction of the Taliban’s official radio station in Kabul during May 2018 to test the effect of rebel news on civilian attitudes. NATO’s Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research survey happened to field a wave directly before and after this event. I use difference-in-differences to estimate the effect of exposure to the Taliban’s news and demonstrate that it increased perceptions of the group’s strength. This finding has important implications for the study of civilian attitude formation and support during conflict.

15 October 2026 in Conflict Management and Peace Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
CLCaleb Lucas
Caleb Lucas
How do terror groups make strategic decisions regarding when to time their attacks? This study examines the logic underpinning attack timing and argues that non-state groups weigh the benefits of amplified psychological impacts during focal points for violence against the costs of conducting attacks during periods of heightened security. I test this proposition by examining religious holidays, which create unique opportunities for terror groups to maximize visibility and instill fear yet are also characterized by increased state security efforts since governments anticipate the risk of violence. I leverage the duration of holidays to illustrate the strategic logic of attack timing: while security measures are at their peak during short holidays, prolonged religious observances impose a strain on state resources, thereby reducing the cost to terror groups and increasing the likelihood of attacks. I test this theory using data from Arab League countries and illustrate the mechanism by analyzing news reports in Syria. The findings advance our understanding of how terror groups allocate scarce resources in response to security dynamics and have implications for counter-terrorism policies.