Solon Barocas

Solon Barocas

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Solon Barocas

Microsoft Research, New York, NY, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2016 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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SBSolon Barocas
Solon Barocas
ASAndrew D. Selbst
Andrew D. Selbst
Advocates of algorithmic techniques like data mining argue that these techniques eliminate human biases from the decision-making process. But an algorithm is only as good as the data it works with. Data is frequently imperfect in ways that allow these algorithms to inherit the prejudices of prior decision makers. In other cases, data may simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society at large. In still others, data mining can discover surprisingly useful regularities that are really just preexisting patterns of exclusion and inequality. Unthinking reliance on data mining can deny historically disadvantaged and vulnerable groups full participation in society. Worse still, because the resulting discrimination is almost always an unintentional emergent property of the algorithm’s use rather than a conscious choice by its programmers, it can be unusually hard to identify the source of the problem or to explain it to a court. This Essay examines these concerns through the lens of American antidiscrimination law — more particularly, through Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination in employment. In the absence of a demonstrable intent to discriminate, the best doctrinal hope for data mining’s victims would seem to lie in disparate impact doctrine. Case law and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Uniform Guidelines, though, hold that a practice can be justified as a business necessity when its outcomes are predictive of future employment outcomes, and data mining is specifically designed to find such statistical correlations. Unless there is a reasonably practical way to demonstrate that these discoveries are spurious, Title VII would appear to bless its use, even though the correlations it discovers will often reflect historic patterns of prejudice, others’ discrimination against members of protected groups, or flaws in the underlying data Addressing the sources of this unintentional discrimination and remedying the corresponding deficiencies in the law will be difficult technically, difficult legally, and difficult politically. There are a number of practical limits to what can be accomplished computationally. For example, when discrimination occurs because the data being mined is itself a result of past intentional discrimination, there is frequently no obvious method to adjust historical data to rid it of this taint. Corrective measures that alter the results of the data mining after it is complete would tread on legally and politically disputed terrain. These challenges for reform throw into stark relief the tension between the two major theories underlying antidiscrimination law: anticlassification and antisubordination. Finding a solution to big data’s disparate impact will require more than best efforts to stamp out prejudice and bias; it will require a wholesale reexamination of the meanings of “discrimination” and “fairness.”

19 February 2018 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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ASAndrew D. Selbst
Andrew D. Selbst
SBSolon Barocas
Solon Barocas
As algorithmic decision-making has become synonymous with inexplicable decision-making, we have become obsessed with opening the black box. This Article responds to a growing chorus of legal scholars and policymakers demanding explainable machines. Their instinct makes sense; what is unexplainable is usually unaccountable. But the calls for explanation are a reaction to two distinct but often conflated properties of machine-learning models: inscrutability and non intuitiveness. Inscrutability makes one unable to fully grasp the model, while non intuitiveness means one cannot understand why the model's rules are what they are. Solving inscrutability alone will not resolve law and policy concerns; accountability relates not merely to how models work, but whether they are justified. In this Article, we first explain what makes models inscrutable as a technical matter. We then explore two important examples of existing regulation-by-explanation and techniques within machine learning for explaining inscrutable decisions. We show that while these techniques might allow machine learning to comply with existing laws, compliance will rarely be enough to assess whether decision-making rests on a justifiable basis. We argue that calls for explainable machines have failed to recognize the connection between intuition and evaluation and the limitations of such an approach. A belief in the value of explanation for justification assumes that if only a model is explained, problems will reveal themselves intuitively. Machine learning, however, can uncover relationships that are both non-intuitive and legitimate, frustrating this mode of normative assessment. If justification requires understanding why the model's rules are what they are, we should seek explanations of the process behind a model's development and use, not just explanations of the model itself. This Article illuminates the explanation-intuition dynamic and offers documentation as an alternative approach to evaluating machine learning models.

20 March 2024 in ACM Journal on Responsible Computing
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Journal Article
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AWAngelina Wang
Angelina Wang
SKSayash Kapoor
Sayash Kapoor
SBSolon Barocas
Solon Barocas
ANArvind Narayanan
Arvind Narayanan
We formalize predictive optimization, a category ofdecision-making algorithmsthatuse machine learning (ML)topredict future outcomesof interest aboutindividuals. For example, pre-trial risk prediction algorithms such as COMPAS use ML to predict whether an individual will re-offend in the future. Our thesis is that predictive optimization raises a distinctive and serious set of normative concerns that cause it to fail on its own terms. To test this, we review 387 reports, articles, and web pages from academia, industry, non-profits, governments, and data science contests, and we find many real-world examples of predictive optimization. We select eight particularly consequential examples as case studies. Simultaneously, we develop a set of normative and technical critiques that challenge the claims made by the developers of these applications—in particular, claims of increased accuracy, efficiency, and fairness. Our key finding is that these critiques apply to each of the applications, are not easily evaded by redesigning the systems, and thus challenge whether these applications should be deployed. We argue that the burden of evidence for justifying why the deployment of predictive optimization is not harmful should rest with the developers of the tools. Based on our analysis, we provide a rubric of critical questions that can be used to deliberate or contest specific predictive optimization applications.1


1 January 2013 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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SBSolon Barocas
Solon Barocas
SHSophie Hood
Sophie Hood
MZMalte Ziewitz
Malte Ziewitz
Algorithms have developed into somewhat of a modern myth. They “compet[e] for our living rooms” (Slavin 2011), “determine how a billion plus people get where th

27 January 2020
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Conference Paper
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SBSolon Barocas
Solon Barocas
ABAsia J. Biega
Asia J. Biega
BFBenjamin Fish
Benjamin Fish
JNJędrzej Niklas
Jędrzej Niklas
LSLuke Stark
Luke Stark