We have experimentally demonstrated a decoy-state quantum key distribution scheme (QKD) with a heralded single-photon source based on parametric down-conversion. We used a one-way Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol with a four states and one-detector phase-coding scheme, which is immune to recently proposed time-shift attacks, photon-number splitting attacks, and can also be proven to be secure against Trojan horse attacks and any other standard individual or coherent attacks. In principle, the setup can tolerate the highest losses or it can give the highest secure key generation rate under fixed losses compared with other practical schemes. This makes it a quite promising candidate for future quantum key distribution systems.
We study the behavior of decoy-state quantum key distribution systems using a conditionally prepared down-conversion source, analyzing such a source running in a mode of operation with either a thermal photon number distribution or a Poisson photon number distribution. By comparing both modes of operations to the three-intensity proposal of Wang et al., to the one-intensity proposal of Adachi et al., and to the currently demonstrated faint-laser pulse system, we demonstrate that a down-conversion source in a Poissonian mode of operation can largely enhance the performance of decoy-state quantum key distribution systems. This makes the down-conversion-based decoy-state system an interesting alternative to current technological implementations based on faint-laser pulses.
In this paper, we describe a robust quantum cryptography scheme with a heralded single photon source based on the decoy-state method, which has been shown by numerical simulations to be advantageous compared with many other practical schemes not only with respect to the secure key generation rate but also to secure transmission distance. We have experimentally tested this scheme, and the results support the conclusions from numerical simulations well. Although there still exist many deficiencies in our present systems, it's still sufficient to demonstrate the advantages of the scheme. Besides, even when cost and technological feasibility are taken into account, our scheme is still quite promising in the implementation of tomorrow's quantum cryptography.