Suhyeon Lee

Suhyeon Lee

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Suhyeon Lee

Ministry of Defense, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 December 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSuhyeon Lee
Suhyeon Lee
SKSeungjoo Kim
Seungjoo Kim
Targets of cyber crime are not exclusive to the private sector. Successful cyber attacks on nation-states have proved that cyber threats can jeopardize significant national interests. In response, nation-states have begun to handle cyber threats at the national defense level, which is titled ‘cyber defense.’ The cyber defense sector is related to national security, therefore requires robust security technology. Contrary to normal systems, blockchain provides strong security properties without a centralized control entity, and as such its application in the cyber defense field is under the spotlight. In this paper, we present opportunities blockchain provides for cyber defense, research and national projects, and limitations. We constructed a survey of government documents, interviews, related news, technical reports, and research papers from 2016 to 2021. As a result, our research contributes to reducing the gap in blockchain for cyber defense by systematically conducting research and analysis. In our research, we found that not only research but also government-led plans are actively promoting blockchain, which demonstrates that blockchain will play a remarkable role in cyber defense. This paper concludes with suggestions for future research in aspects of the blockchain technology, evaluation, and survey.

16 March 2022 in ICT Express
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSuhyeon Lee
Suhyeon Lee
SKSeungjoo Kim
Seungjoo Kim

29 August 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSoohan Lee
Soohan Lee
SLSuhyeon Lee
Suhyeon Lee
JPJiwon Park
Jiwon Park
KKKyoungmin Kim
Kyoungmin Kim
Kyungho LeeKyungho Lee
Kyungho Lee
Ransomware is a growing threat and is building ecosystems in the form of ransomware as a service (RaaS). While there have been diverse efforts to detect and mitigate such threats, techniques to bypass such countermeasures have advanced considerably. Since detecting all evolving threats has become challenging, there is a growing interest in developing proactive countermeasures that can minimize the damage even in environments where ransomware has already been executed. In this study, we gained insights from an attacker’s perspective by analyzing ransomware such as LockBit and derived a generic counterstrategy against features that are common in ransomware attacks. Our proposed method protects critical files from existing ransomware by applying a hiding strategy that poses a challenge to attackers in finding the target files. We also present best practices for implementing the strategy while considering both in terms of security and usability using the link file and improving the method through the addition of a linker and encrypted database to reduce the attack surface. By using real-world ransomware samples, our experiments show that the proposed method successfully protects valuable files against ransomware in a cost-effective manner.

7 September 2021 in Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SLSuhyeon Lee
Suhyeon Lee
SKSeungjoo Kim
Seungjoo Kim

4 June 2025 in Blockchain: Research and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSuhyeon Lee
Suhyeon Lee
EGEuisin Gee
Euisin Gee
JLJunghee Lee
Junghee Lee

19 September 2022
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SLSuhyeon Lee
Suhyeon Lee
DLDonghwan Lee
Donghwan Lee
SKSeungjoo Kim
Seungjoo Kim
Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a Sybil control mechanism adopted in blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. It prevents the attempt of malicious actors to manipulate distributed ledgers. Bitcoin has successfully suppressed double-spending by accepting the longest PoW chain. Nevertheless, PoW encountered several major security issues surrounding mining competition. One of them is a Block WithHolding (BWH) attack that can exploit a widespread and cooperative environment called a mining pool. This attack takes advantage of untrustworthy relationships between mining pools and participating agents. Moreover, detecting or responding to attacks is challenging due to the nature of mining pools. In this paper, however, we suggest that BWH attacks also have a comparable trust problem. Because a BWH attacker cannot have complete control over BWH agents, they can betray the belonging mining pool and seek further benefits by trading with victims. We prove that this betrayal is not only valid in all attack parameters but also provides double benefits; finally, it is the best strategy for BWH agents. Furthermore, our study implies that BWH attacks may encounter self-destruction of their own revenue, contrary to their intention.