8 September 2021 in Mathematical Programming
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more general congestion games. Recently, the price of anarchy in routing games has been studied as a function of the traffic demand, providing asymptotic results in light and heavy traffic. The aim of this paper is to study the price of anarchy in nonatomic routing games in the intermediate region of the demand. To achieve this goal, we begin by establishing some smoothness properties of Wardrop equilibria and social optima for general smooth costs. In the case of affine costs we show that the equilibrium is piecewise linear, with break points at the demand levels at which the set of active paths changes. We prove that the number of such break points is finite, although it can be exponential in the size of the network. Exploiting a scaling law between the equilibrium and the social optimum, we derive a similar behavior for the optimal flows. We then prove that in any interval between break points the price of anarchy is smooth and it is either monotone (decreasing or increasing) over the full interval, or it decreases up to a certain minimum point in the interior of the interval and increases afterwards. We deduce that for affine costs the maximum of the price of anarchy can only occur at the break points. For general costs we provide counterexamples showing that the set of break points is not always finite.
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21 April 2022 in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
We illustrate a general technique to construct towers of fields producing high order elements in $$\mathbb {F}_{q^{2^n}}$$ , for odd q, and in $$\mathbb {F}_{2^{2 \cdot 3^n}}$$ , for $$n \ge 1$$ . These towers are obtained recursively by $$x_{n}^2 + x_{n} = v(x_{n - 1})$$ , for odd q, or $$x_{n}^3 + x_{n} = v(x_{n - 1})$$ , for $$q=2$$ , where v(x) is a polynomial of small degree over the prime field $$\mathbb {F}_{q}$$ and $$x_n$$ belongs to the finite field extension $$\mathbb {F}_{q^{2^n}}$$ , for an odd q, or to $$\mathbb {F}_{2^{2\cdot 3^n}}$$ . Several examples are provided to show the numerical efficacy of our method. Using the techniques of Burkhart et al. (Des Codes Cryptogr 51(3):301–314, 2009) we prove similar lower bounds on the orders of the groups generated by $$x_n$$ , or by the discriminant $$\delta _n$$ of the polynomial. We also provide a general framework which can be used to produce many different examples, with the numerical performance of our best examples being slightly better than in the cases analyzed in Burkhart et al. (2009).