Alexander Lars Lundberg

Alexander Lars Lundberg

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Alexander Lars Lundberg

Buehler Center for Health Policy and Economics, Robert J. Havey, MD Institute for Global Health, Northwestern University, 420 E. Superior, Chicago, US

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 January 2022 in JMIR Public Health and Surveillance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ALAlexander L Lundberg
Alexander L Lundberg
RLRamón Lorenzo-Redondo
Ramón Lorenzo-Redondo
EOEgon Anderson Ozer
Egon Anderson Ozer
CHClaudia A. Hawkins
Claudia A. Hawkins
JHJudd F. Hultquist
Judd F. Hultquist
LPLori Ann Post
Lori Ann Post
Background: Variants of the SARS-CoV-2 virus carry differential risks to public health. The Omicron (B.1.1.529) variant, first identified in Botswana on November 11, 2021, has spread globally faster than any previous variant of concern. Understanding the transmissibility of Omicron is vital in the development of public health policy. Objective: The aim of this study is to compare SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks driven by Omicron to those driven by prior variants of concern in terms of both the speed and magnitude of an outbreak. Methods: We analyzed trends in outbreaks by variant of concern with validated surveillance metrics in several southern African countries. The region offers an ideal setting for a natural experiment given that most outbreaks thus far have been driven primarily by a single variant at a time. With a daily longitudinal data set of new infections, total vaccinations, and cumulative infections in countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we estimated how the emergence of Omicron has altered the trajectory of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks. We used the Arellano-Bond method to estimate regression coefficients from a dynamic panel model, in which new infections are a function of infections yesterday and last week. We controlled for vaccinations and prior infections in the population. To test whether Omicron has changed the average trajectory of a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, we included an interaction between an indicator variable for the emergence of Omicron and lagged infections. Results: The observed Omicron outbreaks in this study reach the outbreak threshold within 5-10 days after first detection, whereas other variants of concern have taken at least 14 days and up to as many as 35 days. The Omicron outbreaks also reach peak rates of new cases that are roughly 1.5-2 times those of prior variants of concern. Dynamic panel regression estimates confirm Omicron has created a statistically significant shift in viral spread. Conclusions: The transmissibility of Omicron is markedly higher than prior variants of concern. At the population level, the Omicron outbreaks occurred more quickly and with larger magnitude, despite substantial increases in vaccinations and prior infections, which should have otherwise reduced susceptibility to new infections. Unless public health policies are substantially altered, Omicron outbreaks in other countries are likely to occur with little warning.

21 June 2024 in JMIR Public Health and Surveillance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ALAlexander L Lundberg
Alexander L Lundberg
SWScott Andrew Wu
Scott Andrew Wu
ASAlan G Soetikno
Alan G Soetikno
CHClaudia A. Hawkins
Claudia A. Hawkins
RMRobert L Murphy
Robert L Murphy
LPLori A Post
Lori A Post
Background: In this study, we built upon our initial research published in 2020 by incorporating an additional 2 years of data for Europe. We assessed whether COVID-19 had shifted from the pandemic to endemic phase in the region when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the end of the public health emergency of international concern on May 5, 2023. Objective: We first aimed to measure whether there was an expansion or contraction in the pandemic in Europe at the time of the WHO declaration. Second, we used dynamic and genomic surveillance methods to describe the history of the pandemic in the region and situate the window of the WHO declaration within the broader history. Third, we provided the historical context for the course of the pandemic in Europe in terms of policy and disease burden at the country and region levels. Methods: In addition to the updates of traditional surveillance data and dynamic panel estimates from the original study, this study used data on sequenced SARS-CoV-2 variants from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data to identify the appearance and duration of variants of concern. We used Nextclade nomenclature to collect clade designations from sequences and Pangolin nomenclature for lineage designations of SARS-CoV-2. Finally, we conducted a 1-tailed t test for whether regional weekly speed was greater than an outbreak threshold of 10. We ran the test iteratively with 6 months of data across the sample period. Results: Speed for the region had remained below the outbreak threshold for 4 months by the time of the WHO declaration. Acceleration and jerk were also low and stable. While the 1-day and 7-day persistence coefficients remained statistically significant, the coefficients were moderate in magnitude (0.404 and 0.547, respectively; P<.001 for both). The shift parameters for the 2 weeks around the WHO declaration were small and insignificant, suggesting little change in the clustering effect of cases on future cases at the time. From December 2021 onward, Omicron was the predominant variant of concern in sequenced viral samples. The rolling t test of speed equal to 10 became insignificant for the first time in April 2023. Conclusions: While COVID-19 continues to circulate in Europe, the rate of transmission remained below the threshold of an outbreak for 4 months ahead of the WHO declaration. The region had previously been in a nearly continuous state of outbreak. The more recent trend suggested that COVID-19 was endemic in the region and no longer reached the threshold of the pandemic definition. However, several countries remained in a state of outbreak, and the conclusion that COVID-19 was no longer a pandemic in Europe at the time is unclear.

5 September 2025 in JAMA Health Forum
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RRRegina Royan
Regina Royan
ALAlexander Lundberg
Alexander Lundberg
YSYing Shan
Ying Shan
ATArielle C. Thomas
Arielle C. Thomas
ASAnne M. Stey
Anne M. Stey
Importance: Firearm injury is a leading cause of mortality in the US. Contemporary firearm injury health care costs and characteristics of hospital visits can inform investment decisions on treatment and prevention strategies. Objective: To estimate the total health care cost of new firearm injury hospital visits from 2016 to 2021 in the US. Design, Setting, and Participants: This economic evaluation study via Monte Carlo simulation included data from the Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient and Emergency Department databases from 2016 to 2021. Children and adults with an inpatient or emergency department (ED) hospital visit for new firearm injuries were included. Data were analyzed from June 2023 to May 2025. Exposures: Firearm-related inpatient or ED visits with new firearm injury International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision ( ICD - 10 ) diagnosis codes. Main Outcomes and Measures: A Monte Carlo simulation used new inpatient and ED firearm injury visits in 6 sample states to estimate the national health care cost for the treatment of initial firearm injuries from 2016 to 2021. The simulation also used national inpatient data from the RAND Corporation for nonsample states. Costs were adjusted for inflation to 2024 US dollars. Costs to each body region were derived from the Injury Mortality Diagnosis Matrix classification scheme. Results: The Monte Carlo analysis included 2400 simulations. Firearm injuries in the US led to an estimated 298 721 ED visits and 185 846 inpatient visits, with a total health care cost of $7.7 billion from 2016 to 2021. Inpatient admissions accounted for 93% of the cost, or $7.2 billion. Treatment for children younger than 18 years accounted for 9% of the cost, or $684 million. Annual ED and inpatient visits were both approximately stable from 2016 to 2019, at which point they grew by 42% and 40%, respectively, from 2019 to 2021. Annual total health care cost was also stable at approximately $1.2 billion until 2019, when cost began to grow to a peak of $1.6 billion in 2021. The mean (SE) ED visit cost was $1743 (4.5), and the mean (SE) inpatient admission cost was $38 879 (138.9). These costs remained stable annually over the sample period. Conclusions and Relevance: In this economic evaluation study, an increase in firearm injuries in the last 6 years paralleled an increase in costs from 2016 to 2021.

20 January 2024 in Economic Inquiry
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ALAlexander Lundberg
Alexander Lundberg

3 June 2022 in JMIR Public Health and Surveillance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ALAlexander L Lundberg
Alexander L Lundberg
RLRamón Lorenzo-Redondo
Ramón Lorenzo-Redondo
JHJudd F. Hultquist
Judd F. Hultquist
CHClaudia A. Hawkins
Claudia A. Hawkins
EOEgon Anderson Ozer
Egon Anderson Ozer
LPLori A Post
Lori A Post
Background: The Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 is more transmissible than prior variants of concern (VOCs). It has caused the largest outbreaks in the pandemic, with increases in mortality and hospitalizations. Early data on the spread of Omicron were captured in countries with relatively low case counts, so it was unclear how the arrival of Omicron would impact the trajectory of the pandemic in countries already experiencing high levels of community transmission of Delta. Objective: The objective of this study is to quantify and explain the impact of Omicron on pandemic trajectories and how they differ between countries that were or were not in a Delta outbreak at the time Omicron occurred. Methods: We used SARS-CoV-2 surveillance and genetic sequence data to classify countries into 2 groups: those that were in a Delta outbreak (defined by at least 10 novel daily transmissions per 100,000 population) when Omicron was first sequenced in the country and those that were not. We used trend analysis, survival curves, and dynamic panel regression models to compare outbreaks in the 2 groups over the period from November 1, 2021, to February 11, 2022. We summarized the outbreaks in terms of their peak rate of SARS-CoV-2 infections and the duration of time the outbreaks took to reach the peak rate. Results: Countries that were already in an outbreak with predominantly Delta lineages when Omicron arrived took longer to reach their peak rate and saw greater than a twofold increase (2.04) in the average apex of the Omicron outbreak compared to countries that were not yet in an outbreak. Conclusions: These results suggest that high community transmission of Delta at the time of the first detection of Omicron was not protective, but rather preluded larger outbreaks in those countries. Outbreak status may reflect a generally susceptible population, due to overlapping factors, including climate, policy, and individual behavior. In the absence of strong mitigation measures, arrival of a new, more transmissible variant in these countries is therefore more likely to lead to larger outbreaks. Alternately, countries with enhanced surveillance programs and incentives may be more likely to both exist in an outbreak status and detect more cases during an outbreak, resulting in a spurious relationship. Either way, these data argue against herd immunity mitigating future outbreaks with variants that have undergone significant antigenic shifts.

23 October 2024 in JMIR Public Health and Surveillance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ALAlexander L Lundberg
Alexander L Lundberg
ASAlan G Soetikno
Alan G Soetikno
SWScott Andrew Wu
Scott Andrew Wu
EOEgon Anderson Ozer
Egon Anderson Ozer
SWSarah B Welch
Sarah B Welch
LPLori A Post
Lori A Post
Background: This study updates the initial COVID-19 pandemic surveillance in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 2020 by providing 2 additional years of data for the region. Objective: First, we aimed to measure whether there was an expansion or contraction in the pandemic in SSA when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared an end to the public health emergency for the COVID-19 pandemic on May 5, 2023. Second, we used dynamic and genomic surveillance methods to describe the history of the pandemic in the region and situate the window of the WHO declaration within the broader history. Third, we aimed to provide historical context for the course of the pandemic in SSA. Methods: In addition to updates of traditional surveillance data and dynamic panel estimates from the original study by Post et al (2021), this study used data on sequenced SARS-CoV-2 variants from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) to identify the appearance and duration of variants of concern. We used Nextclade nomenclature to collect clade designations from sequences and used Pangolin nomenclature for lineage designations of SARS-CoV-2. Finally, we conducted a 1-sided t-test to assess whether regional weekly speed was greater than an outbreak threshold of 10. We ran the test iteratively with a rolling 6-month window of data across the sample period. Results: Speed for the region remained well below the outbreak threshold before and after the WHO declaration. Acceleration and jerk were also low and stable. The 7-day persistence coefficient remained somewhat large (1.11) and statistically significant. However, both shift parameters for the weeks around the WHO declaration were negative, meaning the clustering effect of new COVID-19 cases had become recently smaller. From November 2021 onward, Omicron was the predominant variant of concern in sequenced viral samples. The rolling t-test of speed equal to 10 was insignificant for the entire sample period. Conclusions: While COVID-19 continues to circulate in SSA, the region never reached outbreak status, and the weekly transmission rate remained below 1 case per 100,000 population for well over 1 year ahead of the WHO declaration. COVID-19 is endemic in the region and no longer reaches the threshold for its classification as a pandemic. Both standard and enhanced surveillance metrics confirm that the pandemic ended in SSA by the time the WHO made its declaration.