Chris Novakovic

Chris Novakovic

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Chris Novakovic

University of Birmingham

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2013
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
TCTom Chothia
Tom Chothia
YKYusuke Kawamoto
Yusuke Kawamoto
CNChris Novakovic
Chris Novakovic

1 January 2014
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
TCTom Chothia
Tom Chothia
YKYusuke Kawamoto
Yusuke Kawamoto
CNChris Novakovic
Chris Novakovic

1 June 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
TCTom Chothia
Tom Chothia
YKYusuke Kawamoto
Yusuke Kawamoto
CNChris Novakovic
Chris Novakovic
DPDavid Parker
David Parker
The outputs of a program that processes secret data may reveal information about the values of these secrets. This paper develops an information leakage model that can measure the leakage between arbitrary points in a probabilistic program. Our aim is to create a model of information leakage that makes it convenient to measure specific leaks, and provide a tool that may be used to investigate a program's information security. To make our leakage model precise, we base our work on a simple probabilistic, imperative language in which secret values may be specified at any point in the program; other points in the program may then be marked as potential sites of information leakage. We extend our leakage model to address both non-terminating programs (with potentially infinite numbers of secret and observable values) and user input. Finally, we show how statistical approximation techniques can be used to estimate our leakage measure in real-world Java programs.

13 July 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CHCharlie Hothersall-Thomas
Charlie Hothersall-Thomas
SMSergio Maffeis
Sergio Maffeis
CNChris Novakovic
Chris Novakovic
The security of the client side of a web application relies on browser features such as cookies, the same-origin policy and HTTPS. As the client side grows increasingly powerful and sophisticated, browser vendors have stepped up their offering of security mechanisms which can be leveraged to protect it. These are often introduced experimentally and informally and, as adoption increases, gradually become standardised (e.g., CSP, CORS and HSTS). Considering the diverse landscape of browser vendors, releases, and customised versions for mobile and embedded devices, there is a compelling need for a systematic assessment of browser security. We present BrowserAudit, a tool for testing that a deployed browser enforces the guarantees implied by the main standardised and experimental security mechanisms. It includes more than 400 fully-automated tests that exercise a broad range of security features, helping web users, application developers and security researchers to make an informed security assessment of a deployed browser. We validate BrowserAudit by discovering both fresh and known security-related bugs in major browsers. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s)

27 April 2019
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
TCTom Chothia
Tom Chothia
CNChris Novakovic
Chris Novakovic
ARAndreea-Ina Radu
Andreea-Ina Radu
RTRichard J. Thomas
Richard J. Thomas

1 January 2013
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
TCTom Chothia
Tom Chothia
MCMarco Cova
Marco Cova
CNChris Novakovic
Chris Novakovic
CTCamilo González Toro
Camilo González Toro