Dimitris Bolis

Dimitris Bolis

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Dimitris Bolis

Independent Max Planck Research Group for Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, Munich, Germany; International Max Planck Research School for Translational Psychiatry (IMPRS-TP), Munich, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 January 2018 in Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DBDimitris Bolis
Dimitris Bolis
LSLeonhard Schilbach
Leonhard Schilbach
Autism is a developmental condition, characterized by difficulties of social interaction and communication, as well as restricted interests and repetitive behaviors. Although several important conceptions have shed light on specific facets, there is still no consensus about a universal yet specific theory in terms of its underlying mechanisms. While some theories have exclusively focused on sensory aspects, others have emphasized social difficulties. However, sensory and social processes in autism might be interconnected to a higher degree than what has been traditionally thought. We propose that a mismatch in sensory abilities across individuals can lead to difficulties on a social, i.e. interpersonal level and vice versa. In this article, we, therefore, selectively review evidence indicating an interrelationship between perceptual and social difficulties in autism. Additionally, we link this body of research with studies, which investigate the mechanisms of action control in social contexts. By doing so, we highlight that autistic traits are also crucially related to differences in integration, anticipation and automatic responding to social cues, rather than a mere inability to register and learn from social cues. Importantly, such differences may only manifest themselves in sufficiently complex situations, such as real-life social interactions, where such processes are inextricably linked.

30 September 2020 in PLOS Computational Biology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LHLara Henco
Lara Henco
ADAndreea Diaconescu
Andreea Diaconescu
JLJuha M. Lahnakoski
Juha M. Lahnakoski
MBMarie-Luise Brandi
Marie-Luise Brandi
SHSophia Hörmann
Sophia Hörmann
CMChristoph Mathys
Christoph Mathys
Psychiatric disorders are ubiquitously characterized by debilitating social impairments. These difficulties are thought to emerge from aberrant social inference. In order to elucidate the underlying computational mechanisms, patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder (N = 29), schizophrenia (N = 31), and borderline personality disorder (N = 31) as well as healthy controls (N = 34) performed a probabilistic reward learning task in which participants could learn from social and nonsocial information. Patients with schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder performed more poorly on the task than healthy controls and patients with major depressive disorder. Broken down by domain, borderline personality disorder patients performed better in the social compared to the non-social domain. In contrast, controls and MDD patients showed the opposite pattern and SCZ patients showed no difference between domains. In effect, borderline personality disorder patients gave up a possible overall performance advantage by concentrating their learning in the social at the expense of the non-social domain. We used computational modeling to assess learning and decision-making parameters estimated for each participant from their behavior. This enabled additional insights into the underlying learning and decision-making mechanisms. Patients with borderline personality disorder showed slower learning from social and non-social information and an exaggerated sensitivity to changes in environmental volatility, both in the non-social and the social domain, but more so in the latter. Regarding decision-making the modeling revealed that compared to controls and major depression patients, patients with borderline personality disorder and schizophrenia showed a stronger reliance on social relative to non-social information when making choices. Depressed patients did not differ significantly from controls in this respect. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion of a general interpersonal hypersensitivity in borderline personality disorder and schizophrenia based on a shared computational mechanism characterized by an over-reliance on beliefs about others in making decisions and by an exaggerated need to make sense of others during learning specifically in borderline personality disorder. People suffering from psychiatric disorders frequently experience difficulties in social interaction, such as an impaired ability to use social signals to build representations of others and use these to guide behavior. Compuational models of learning and decision-making enable the characterization of individual patterns in learning and decision-making mechanisms that may be disorder-specific or disorder-general. We employed this approach to investigate the behavior of healthy participants and patients diagnosed with depression, schizophrenia, and borderline personality disorder while they performed a probabilistic reward learning task which included a social component. Patients with schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder performed more poorly on the task than controls and depressed patients. In addition, patients with BPD concentrated their learning efforts more on the social compared to the non-social information. Computational modeling additionally revealed that borderline personality disorder patients showed a reduced flexibility in the weighting of newly obtained social and non-social information when learning about their predictive values. Instead, we found exagerrated learning of the volatility of social and non-social information. Additionally, we found a pattern shared between patients with borderline personality disorder and schizophrenia who both showed an over-reliance on predictions about social information during decision-making. Our modeling, therefore, provides a computational account of the exaggerated need to make sense of and rely on one’s interpretation of others’ behavior, which is prominent in both disorders.

26 October 2020 in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DBDimitris Bolis
Dimitris Bolis
JLJuha M Lahnakoski
Juha M Lahnakoski
DSDaniela Seidel
Daniela Seidel
JTJeanette Tamm
Jeanette Tamm
LSLeonhard Schilbach
Leonhard Schilbach
Autistic traits are known to be associated with social interaction difficulties. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, relevant research has been typically restricted to studying individuals. In line with the ‘dialectical misattunement hypothesis’ and clinical insights of intact social interactions among autistic individuals, we hypothesized that friendship quality varies as a function of interpersonal similarity and more concretely the difference value of autistic traits in a dyad, above and beyond autistic traits per se. Therefore, in this study, we used self-report questionnaires to investigate these measures in a sample of 67 neurotypical dyads across a broad range of autistic traits. Our results demonstrate that the more similar two persons are in autistic traits, the higher is the perceived quality of their friendship, irrespective of friendship duration, age, sex and, importantly, the (average of) autistic traits in a given dyad. More specifically, higher interpersonal similarity of autistic traits was associated with higher measures of closeness, acceptance and help. These results, therefore, lend support to the idea of an interactive turn in the study of social abilities across the autism spectrum and pave the way for future studies on the multiscale dynamics of social interactions.

26 December 2022 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DBDimitris Bolis
Dimitris Bolis
GDGuillaume Dumas
Guillaume Dumas
LSLeonhard Schilbach
Leonhard Schilbach
In this article, we analyse social interactions, drawing on diverse points of views, ranging from dialectics, second-person neuroscience and enactivism to dynamical systems, active inference and machine learning. To this end, we define interpersonal attunement as a set of multi-scale processes of building up and materializing social expectations—put simply, anticipating and interacting with others and ourselves. While cultivating and negotiating common ground, via communication and culture-building activities, are indispensable for the survival of the individual, the relevant multi-scale mechanisms have been largely considered in isolation. Here, collective psychophysiology, we argue, can lend itself to the fine-tuned analysis of social interactions, without neglecting the individual. On the other hand, an interpersonal mismatch of expectations can lead to a breakdown of communication and social isolation known to negatively affect mental health. In this regard, we review psychopathology in terms of interpersonal misattunement, conceptualizing psychiatric disorders as disorders of social interaction, to describe how individual mental health is inextricably linked to social interaction. By doing so, we foresee avenues for an inter-personalized psychiatry, which moves from a static spectrum of disorders to a dynamic relational space, focusing on how the multi-faceted processes of social interaction can help to promote mental health. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences’.

13 June 2018 in Topoi
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DBDimitris Bolis
Dimitris Bolis
LSLeonhard Schilbach
Leonhard Schilbach
In this article, moving from being to becoming, we construe the ‘self’ as a dynamic process rather than as a static entity. To this end we draw on dialectics and Bayesian accounts of cognition. The former allows us to holistically consider the ‘self’ as the interplay between internalization and externalization and the latter to operationalize our suggestion formally. Internalization is considered here as the co-construction of bodily hierarchical models of the (social) world and the organism, while externalization is taken as the collective transformation of the world. We do not consider these processes as sequentially linked, but rather as a dialectic between the collective and the individual. This leads us to the suggestion of the self as a historical product of dialectical attunement across multiple time scales, from species evolution and culture to individual development and everyday learning. Subsequently, we describe concrete means for empirically testing our proposal in the form of two-person psychophysiology and multi-level analyses of intersubjectivity. Taken together, we suggest that a fine-grained analysis of social interaction might allow us to reconsider the ‘self’ beyond the static individual, i.e. how it emerges and manifests itself in social relations. Such an approach, we believe, could be relevant in multiple fields, from ethics and psychiatry to pedagogy and artificial intelligence.

2 January 2017 in Neuropsychoanalysis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DBDimitris Bolis
Dimitris Bolis
LSLeonhard Schilbach
Leonhard Schilbach
In their thought-provoking and integrative target article, Fotopoulou and Tsakiris cut across different bodies of literature to argue for a second-person account of interoception and social cognition. More specifically, they argue for the constitutive role of embodied social interactions in the development of interoceptive abilities and the ability for self-other differentiation. Furthermore, they review evidence to suggest that social interactions have a specific role in binding together subjective feeling states with the perception of the body and the (social) world. Along this line of reasoning, they refer to predictive coding and active inference frameworks of the “Bayesian brain” function to suggest that basic inferential processes of embodied perception and action may be turned into more advanced forms of social understanding. We applaud Fotopoulou and Tsakiris for advocating a second-person account of social cognition and for connecting the predictive coding account of interoception to the dynamics of social interaction conceptually. We discuss these contributions in light of the existing literature and encourage the authors to be more precise about the computational processes, which they suggest may connect social interaction and interoception at the individual level. Furthermore, we describe a multilevel Bayesian framework that could be used to formally test a proposal, such as the one discussed by the authors, but also allows for going beyond one Bayesian brain, by modeling interpersonal processes during social interaction.