Zhijie Zhong

Zhijie Zhong

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Zhijie Zhong

Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 March 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZZZibin Zheng
Zibin Zheng
JSJianzhong Su
Jianzhong Su
JCJiachi Chen
Jiachi Chen
DLDavid Lo
David Lo
ZZZhijie Zhong
Zhijie Zhong
MYMingxi Ye
Mingxi Ye
The Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry) is a widely recognized list of smart contract weaknesses specific to the Ethereum platform. Despite the SWC Registry not being updated with new entries since 2020, the sustained development of smart contract analysis tools for detecting SWC-listed weaknesses highlights their ongoing significance in the field. However, evaluating these tools has proven challenging due to the absence of a large, unbiased, real-world dataset. To address this problem, we aim to build a large-scale SWC weakness dataset from real-world DApp projects. We recruited 22 participants and spent 44 person-months analyzing 1,199 open-source audit reports from 29 security teams. In total, we identified 9,154 weaknesses and developed two distinct datasets, i.e., DAPPSCAN-SOURCE and DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE. The DAPPSCAN-SOURCE dataset comprises 39,904 Solidity files, featuring 1,618 SWC weaknesses sourced from 682 real-world DApp projects. However, the Solidity files in this dataset may not be directly compilable for further analysis. To facilitate automated analysis, we developed a tool capable of automatically identifying dependency relationships within DApp projects and completing missing public libraries. Using this tool, we created DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE dataset, which consists of 6,665 compiled smart contract with 888 SWC weaknesses. Based on DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE, we conducted an empirical study to evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art smart contract weakness detection tools. The evaluation results revealed sub-par performance for these tools in terms of both effectiveness and success detection rate, indicating that future development should prioritize real-world datasets over simplistic toy contracts.

22 July 2023 in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZZZibin Zheng
Zibin Zheng
WCWeili Chen
Weili Chen
ZZZhijie Zhong
Zhijie Zhong
ZCZhiguang Chen
Zhiguang Chen
LYLu Yu-Tong
Lu Yu-Tong
Malware detection approaches have been extensively studied for traditional software systems. However, the development of blockchain technology has promoted the birth of a new type of software system–decentralized applications. Composed of smart contracts, a type of application that implements the Ponzi scheme logic (called smart Ponzi schemes) has caused irreversible loss and hindered the development of blockchain technology. These smart contracts generally had a short life but involved a large amount of money. Whereas identification of these Ponzi schemes before causing financial loss has been significantly important, existing methods suffer from three main deficiencies, i.e., the insufficient dataset, the reliance on the transaction records, and the low accuracy. In this study, we first build a larger dataset. Then, a large number of features from multiple views, including bytecode, semantic, and developers, are extracted. These features are independent of the transaction records. Furthermore, we leveraged machine learning methods to build our identification model, i.e., Mul ti-view Cas cade Ensemble model (MulCas). The experiment results show that MulCas can achieve higher performance and robustness in the scope of our dataset. Most importantly, the proposed method can identify smart Ponzi scheme at the creation time.

12 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZZZhijie Zhong
Zhijie Zhong
ZZZibin Zheng
Zibin Zheng
Hong-Ning DaiHong-Ning Dai
Hong-Ning Dai
QXQing Xue
Qing Xue
JCJunjia Chen
Junjia Chen
YNYuhong Nan
Yuhong Nan
As an essential component in Ethereum and other blockchains, token assets have been interacted with by diverse smart contracts. Effective permission policies of smart contracts must prevent token assets from being manipulated by unauthorized adversaries. Recent efforts have studied the accessibility of privileged functions or state variables to unauthorized users. However, little attention is paid to how publicly accessible functions of smart contracts can be manipulated by adversaries to steal users' digital assets. This attack is mainly caused by the permission re-delegation (PRD) vulnerability. In this work, we propose PrettySmart, a bytecode-level Permission re-delegation vulnerability detector for Smart contracts. Our study begins with an empirical study on 0.43 million open-source smart contracts, revealing that five types of widely-used permission constraints dominate 98% of the studied contracts. Accordingly, we propose a mechanism to infer these permission constraints, as well as an algorithm to identify constraints that can be bypassed by unauthorized adversaries. Based on the identification of permission constraints, we propose to detect whether adversaries could manipulate the privileged token management functionalities of smart contracts. The experimental results on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed PrettySmart, which achieves the highest precision score and detects 118 new PRD vulnerabilities.

30 June 2026 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MYMingxi Ye
Mingxi Ye
YNYuhong Nan
Yuhong Nan
ZZZhijie Zhong
Zhijie Zhong
JSJianzhong Su
Jianzhong Su
XLXingwei Lin
Xingwei Lin
ZZZibin Zheng
Zibin Zheng
Given the critical nature of Ethereum, exploiting 1-day vulnerabilities that are patched but not yet widely deployed is essential. Meanwhile, Automatic Patch-based Exploit Generation (APEG) is a promising technique for this, as it helps developers understand root causes, verify fixes in downstream forks, and detect incomplete patches. However, existing exploit generation tools can not work well for vulnerabilities on Ethereum due to three key unique challenges: (1) navigating complex and cross-language exploit paths hidden within patches, (2) synthesizing complicated and stateful environment configurations, and (3) handling non-deterministic inconsistencies between blockchain nodes that lead to false alarms. To address these challenges, we introduce ChainDelta , a novel fuzzing agent framework driven by Large Language Models to automatically generate exploits based on Ethereum security patches. ChainDelta consists of three core modules: a directed fuzzer utilizes call graph analysis to guide testing towards vulnerable code based on the patch information; an agent-based environment fuzzer acts as an expert to automatically set up the necessary blockchain states to trigger vulnerabilities; and finally, a state-aware sanitizer performs differential analysis while monitoring the blockchain transient state to distinguish true inconsistencies from benign non-determinism. We evaluate ChainDelta on a diverse benchmark with real-world patches, covering a wide range of types such as data racing and denial-of-service. ChainDelta successfully generated exploits with a 64% success rate and only a 15.8% false positive rate. An ablation study confirms the contribution of each module to the overall performance. To demonstrate its practical impacts, we conducted a real-world auditing campaign on top of ChainDelta , leading to the discovery of four previously undisclosed vulnerabilities with bug bounties.

18 September 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZZZhijie Zhong
Zhijie Zhong
JCJiachi Chen
Jiachi Chen
JWJiashui Wang
Jiashui Wang
QXQing Xue
Qing Xue
Jiajing WuJiajing Wu
Jiajing Wu
ZZZibin Zheng
Zibin Zheng
Implementing upgradeable smart contracts (USCs) has become a trend in Decentralized applications. Due to blockchain immutability, ensuring the upgradeability of smart contracts requires specialized implementation strategies. A systematic study of developers’ concerns regarding USC development can provide insights to reduce development costs and increase software robustness. In this work, we propose the first empirical study on exploring developers’ concerns over USCs. We first extract 2,224 USC-related posts based on an iterative process combining keyword filtering and manual filtering of posts from the Ethereum StackExchange community. Following open card-sorting practice, we propose 13 common development concerns based on the extracted posts, as well as the causes of these concerns. Furthermore, we analyze the frequency of these concerns within developer discussions. We highlight the most significant concerns of developers, where the top 5 most frequently discussed concerns are notably absent in existing research, e.g., code bugs originating from interacting and testing USCs in specific development frameworks. Additionally, we examine the real-world impact of these concerns by analyzing on-chain smart contracts and security reports from two widely referred databases, i.e., Rekt and Slowmist. Based on case studies of the USC-related security reports in the past two years, we found that the causes of most USC security incidents are related to the identified concerns. Besides, we proposed a semi-automatic tool based on static analysis to detect related bugs and found 26 bugs in real-world smart contracts, which have involved over 0.3 million transactions. Based on these findings, we provide suggestions on the less-solved-yet-prevalent concerns regarding usability and security of USC development, such as facilitating the testing on USCs under existing development frameworks.

31 October 2025
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
QXQing Xue
Qing Xue
ZZZhijie Zhong
Zhijie Zhong
SHSiCheng Hao
SiCheng Hao
ZLZeWei Lin
ZeWei Lin
WCWeiLi Chen
WeiLi Chen
JBJing Bian
Jing Bian