Julia Hellstrand

Julia Hellstrand

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Julia Hellstrand

Helsinki Institute for Demography and Population Health, Helsinki, Finland

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
12 July 2021 in Demography
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JHJulia Hellstrand
Julia Hellstrand
JNJessica Nisén
Jessica Nisén
VMVitor Miranda
Vitor Miranda
PFPeter Fallesen
Peter Fallesen
LDLars Dommermuth
Lars Dommermuth
MMMikko Myrskylä
Mikko Myrskylä
With historically similar patterns of high and stable cohort fertility and high levels of gender equality, the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland are seen as forerunners in demographic behavior. Furthermore, Nordic fertility trends have strongly influenced fertility theories. However, the period fertility decline that started around 2010 in many countries with relatively high fertility is particularly pronounced in the Nordic countries, raising the question of whether Nordic cohort fertility will also decline and deviate from its historically stable pattern. Using harmonized data across the Nordic countries, we comprehensively describe this period decline and analyze the extent to which it is attributable to tempo or quantum effects. Two key results stand out. First, the decline is mostly attributable to first births but can be observed across all ages from 15 to the mid-30s. This is a reversal from the previous trend in which fertility rates in the early 30s increased relatively steadily in those countries in the period 1980–2010. Second, tempo explains only part of the decline. Forecasts indicate that the average Nordic cohort fertility will decline from 2 children for the 1970 cohort to around 1.8 children for the late 1980s cohorts. Finland diverges from the other countries in terms of its lower expected cohort fertility (below 1.6), and Denmark and Sweden diverge from Finland, Iceland, and Norway in terms of their slower cohort fertility decline. These findings suggest that the conceptualization of the Nordic model of high and stable fertility may need to be revised.

14 February 2022 in European Journal of Population
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JHJulia Hellstrand
Julia Hellstrand
JNJessica Nisén
Jessica Nisén
MMMikko Myrskylä
Mikko Myrskylä
In the 2010s, fertility has declined in the Nordic countries, most strikingly in Finland, and first births drive the decline. It remains unclear whether this decline results from decreased fertility within unions, changing union dynamics, or both. Thus, we investigated changes in the union–first birth dynamics from 2000 through 2018 in Finland using full-coverage population register data and an incidence-based multistate model. To do so, we calculated the yearly age-specific transition probabilities across states of single, cohabitation, marriage, and first births among 15- to 45-year-old childless men and women. We found lower fertility rates in unions after 2010, increasing dissolution rates amongst cohabiting couples, and long-term declines in the transition to marriage. Counterfactual simulations showed that, for the decline in first births since 2010, fertility within unions matters more (three-quarters) than union dynamics (one-quarter): that is, lower fertility in cohabitating and married individuals explained 42% and 13% of the decline, respectively, and decreasing fertility rates among couples entering cohabitation explained a further 17%. Decreasing marriage (19%) and cohabitation rates (2–4%) as well as higher union dissolution rates (6%) explained a smaller share of the first birth decline. The decline in first births was somewhat sharper among the lower social strata, but across strata the decreasing first birth transitions in unions explained most of the decline. To conclude, while changing union dynamics provide a partial explanation, postponing or foregoing fertility within unions represents the primary reason for the fertility decline.

31 January 2024 in European Sociological Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JHJulia Hellstrand
Julia Hellstrand
JNJessica Nisén
Jessica Nisén
MMMikko Myrskylä
Mikko Myrskylä
Fertility declined sharply and unexpectedly in Finland in the 2010s across educational levels. Using Finnish register data, we calculated total fertility rates (TFRs) and the proportion of women expected to have a first birth in 2010–2019 for 153 educational groups—reflecting field and level—and estimated how the characteristics of a group predicted its decline. As the educational field predicts factors related to economic uncertainty, heterogeneity in fertility decline across fields could shed light on the role of economic uncertainty behind the recent fertility decline. In general, women with the highest initial fertility levels (health, welfare, and education) and women in agriculture experienced weaker fertility declines (around −20% or less), while women with the lowest initial levels (ICT, arts and humanities) experienced stronger declines (around −40% or more). The extent of the fertility decline increased with higher unemployment and lower income levels in the field and with a lower share employed in the public sector. These uncertainty measures together explained one-fourth of the decline in TFR and two-fifths of the decline in first births. The results imply that fertility declined across all groups, but those with stable job prospects escaped very strong declines. Objective economic uncertainty is one aspect that mattered for the recent fertility decline.

1 April 2025 in Demography
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMikko Myrskylä
Mikko Myrskylä
JHJulia Hellstrand
Julia Hellstrand
SLSampo Lappo
Sampo Lappo
ALAngelo Lorenti
Angelo Lorenti
JNJessica Nisén
Jessica Nisén
HTHeikki Tikanmäki
Heikki Tikanmäki


1 July 2026 in Vienna Yearbook of Population Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PFPeter Fallesen
Peter Fallesen
LDLars Dommermuth
Lars Dommermuth
JHJulia Hellstrand
Julia Hellstrand
ESEmil Simonsen
Emil Simonsen
LLLisbeth G. Loft
Lisbeth G. Loft
The question of whether the ongoing Nordic fertility decline reflects delayed fertility onset, weakening preferences for children or barriers to realising fertility ideals remains unresolved. We examine whether age-specific cohort ideals track cohort fertility forecasts in Denmark and Norway, using Generations and Gender Survey round 2 (2020) data to compare the stated ideal number of children with realised and forecasted cohort fertility at age 45. In both countries, women’s ideal family size exceeds the number of children they have or can expect to have. In Denmark, the ideals-expectations gap remains stable across cohorts, but it is forecasted to widen for the most recent cohorts; in Norway, the gap grows consistently across cohorts. In both countries, the widening gap is driven by forecasted declines in cohort fertility, which in turn are driven entirely by declining fertility before age 30.