John Sutton

John Sutton

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John Sutton

Centre for the Sciences of Place and Memory University of Stirling Stirling UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

36Years (1991-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 May 2010
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Book Chapter
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JSJohn Sutton
John Sutton
This chapter aims to describe two compatible but distinct movements or “waves” within the literature of the extended mind hypothesis (EM) and to defend and illustrate the interdisciplinary implications of EM as best understood by sketching two case studies. Derived from functionalist information-processing cognitive science, EM focused on the ability of man to connect with external symbols or what Merlin Donald refers to as “exograms.” Exograms enable man to create cognitive profiles, unlike creatures that are restricted to the brain’s biological memories or “engrams.” According to Donald, exograms last longer than engrams, have greater capacity, are more easily transmissible across media and context, and can be retrieved and manipulated by a greater variety of means.

2 November 2010 in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
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Journal Article
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JSJohn Sutton
John Sutton
CHCelia Harris
Celia Harris
PKPaul G. Keil
Paul G. Keil
ABAmanda J. Barnier
Amanda J. Barnier

2 February 2016 in Mind & Language
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Journal Article
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WCWayne Christensen
Wayne Christensen
JSJohn Sutton
John Sutton
DMDoris J.F. McIlwain
Doris J.F. McIlwain

1 January 2011 in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
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Journal Article
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JSJohn Sutton
John Sutton
DMDoris McIlwain
Doris McIlwain
WCWayne Christensen
Wayne Christensen
AGAndrew Geeves
Andrew Geeves
(2011). Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: Embodied Skills and Habits between Dreyfus and Descartes. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 42, Habit, pp. 78-103.

29 April 2011 in Discourse Processes
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Journal Article
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CHCelia Harris
Celia Harris
PKPaul G. Keil
Paul G. Keil
JSJohn Sutton
John Sutton
ABAmanda J. Barnier
Amanda J. Barnier
DMDoris J. F. McIlwain
Doris J. F. McIlwain
Transactive memory theory describes the processes by which benefits for memory can occur when remembering is shared in dyads or groups. In contrast, cognitive psychology experiments demonstrate that social influences on memory disrupt and inhibit individual recall. However, most research in cognitive psychology has focused on groups of strangers recalling relatively meaningless stimuli. This study examined social influences on memory in groups with a shared history, who were recalling a range of stimuli, from word lists to personal, shared memories. The study focused, in detail, on the products and processes of remembering during in-depth interviews with 12 older married couples. These interviews consisted of three recall tasks: (a) word list recall; (b) personal list recall, where stimuli were relevant to the couples' shared past; and (c) an open-ended autobiographical interview. These tasks individually conducted and then collaboratively conducted two weeks later. Across each of the tasks, although some couples demonstrated collaborative inhibition, others demonstrated collaborative facilitation. A number of factors were identified that predicted collaborative success—in particular, group-level strategy use. The results show that collaboration may help or hinder memory, and certain interactions are more likely to produce collaborative benefits.

1 January 2010 in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
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Journal Article
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MCMax Coltheart
Max Coltheart
PMPeter Menzies
Peter Menzies
JSJohn Sutton
John Sutton
Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. First, the abnormalities of cognition that initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Second, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider seven) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairment is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur: a second cognitive impairment, one that affects the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Third (and this is the main thrust of our paper), we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief.