STV and ranked pairs (RP) are two well-studied voting rules for group decision-making. They proceed in multiple rounds, and are affected by how ties are broken in each round. However, the literature is surprisingly vague about how ties should be broken. We propose the first algorithms for computing the set of alternatives that are winners under some tiebreaking mechanism under STV and RP, which is also known as parallel-universes tiebreaking (PUT). Unfortunately, PUT-winners are NP-complete to compute under STV and RP, and standard search algorithms from AI do not apply. We propose multiple DFS-based algorithms along with pruning strategies, heuristics, sampling and machine learning to prioritize search direction to significantly improve the performance. We also propose novel ILP formulations for PUT-winners under STV and RP, respectively. Experiments on synthetic and realworld data show that our algorithms are overall faster than ILP.
28 June 2023 in Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Truth discovery is a general name for a broad range of statistical methods aimed to extract the correct answers to questions, based on multiple answers coming from noisy sources. For example, workers in a crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we consider an extremely simple heuristic for estimating workers' competence using average proximity to other workers. We prove that this estimates well the actual competence level and enables separating high and low quality workers in a wide spectrum of domains and statistical models. Under Gaussian noise, this simple estimate is the unique solution to the MLE with a constant regularization factor. Finally, weighing workers according to their average proximity in a crowdsourcing setting, results in substantial improvement over unweighted aggregation and other truth discovery algorithms in practice.
17 July 2019 in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
We extend the Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) mechanism to select strict core allocations for housing markets with multiple types of items, where each agent may be endowed and allocated with multiple items of each type. In doing so, we advance the state of the art in mechanism design for housing markets along two dimensions: First, our setting is more general than multi-type housing markets (Moulin 1995; Sikdar, Adali, and Xia 2017) and the setting of Fujita et al. (2015). Further, we introduce housing markets with acceptable bundles (HMABs) as a more general setting where each agent may have arbitrary sets of acceptable bundles. Second, our extension of TTC is strict core selecting under the weaker restriction on preferences of CMI-trees, which we introduce as a new domain restriction on preferences that generalizes commonly-studied languages in previous works.