Aurelie Dariel

Aurelie Dariel

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Aurelie Dariel

New York University Abu Dhabi, P.O. Box 129188, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 August 2021 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ADAurelie Dariel
Aurelie Dariel
Arno RiedlArno Riedl
Arno Riedl
SSSimon Siegenthaler
Simon Siegenthaler
The widespread use of employee referrals raises questions regarding how they affect labor market outcomes. Does referral hiring lead to a more efficient allocation of workers compared to when hiring is possible only on a competitive market? To utilize the social links of their employees, are employers willing to pay a wage premium? We develop a model and provide results from a laboratory experiment to address these questions. We find that employers often hire via referrals, which in turn mitigates adverse selection and elevates wages. Importantly, employers anticipate the future value of hiring high-productivity employees—which consists of gaining access to valuable social links—and are thus willing to take the risk of offering wage premiums when hiring on the competitive market. We also find that employers' risk aversion and the dynamic nature of the hiring process can help account for the inefficiency remaining in the labor market.

11 June 2018 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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ADAurélie Dariel
Aurélie Dariel
This paper presents evidence from a lab experiment investigating whether the preeminence of conditional cooperators in studies using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001, Economics Letters) is sensitive to changes in the experimental frame. The treatments vary the framing such that the salience of conditionality to subjects is reduced. The results show that these manipulations affect the distribution of elicited types. However, there is no evidence that the framing of Fischbacher et al. overestimates the fraction of conditional cooperators compared to the other frames considered in the experiment. Furthermore, this research finds that conditional contributions elicited using the Fischbacher et al. (2001) frame are the most consistent with contributions in a one-shot public good game.