Blair R. K. Shevlin

Blair R. K. Shevlin

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Blair R. K. Shevlin

Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2022 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
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BSBlair R. K. Shevlin
Blair R. K. Shevlin
SSStephanie M. Smith
Stephanie M. Smith
JHJan Hausfeld
Jan Hausfeld
IKIan Krajbich
Ian Krajbich
It is a widely held belief that people’s choices are less sensitive to changes in value as value increases. For example, the subjective difference between $11 and $12 is believed to be smaller than between $1 and $2. This idea is consistent with applications of the Weber-Fechner Law and divisive normalization to value-based choice and with psychological interpretations of diminishing marginal utility. According to random utility theory in economics, smaller subjective differences predict less accurate choices. Meanwhile, in the context of sequential sampling models in psychology, smaller subjective differences also predict longer response times. Based on these models, we would predict decisions between high-value options to be slower and less accurate. In contrast, some have argued on normative grounds that choices between high-value options should be made with less caution, leading to faster and less accurate choices. Here, we model the dynamics of the choice process across three different choice domains, accounting for both discriminability and response caution. Contrary to predictions, we mostly observe faster and more accurate decisions (i.e., higher drift rates) between high-value options. We also observe that when participants are alerted about incoming high-value decisions, they exert more caution and not less. We rule out several explanations for these results, using tasks with both subjective and objective values. These results cast doubt on the notion that increasing value reduces discriminability. Significance What information about economic value is incorporated into decision-makers’ choices? Across the decision sciences, several prominent models ignore average value, assuming that only value differences are incorporated into the decision-making process, while others assume diminishing sensitivity to value, suggesting that it should be more difficult to choose between high-value options. Other models suggest that high-value decisions should, if anything, be treated as less important (holding value difference constant). Across three experiments with very different types of choices (food, art, and learned stimuli), we find violations of these predictions. Contrary to expectations, the presence of high-value options makes decisions easier while also inducing more effort to get them right.

1 January 2019 in Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour
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BSBlair R.K. Shevlin
Blair R.K. Shevlin
KGKerri A. Goodwin
Kerri A. Goodwin

1 December 2021 in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
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Journal Article
Closed access
BSBlair R.K. Shevlin
Blair R.K. Shevlin
IKIan Krajbich
Ian Krajbich

2 December 2025 in bioRxiv
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BSBlair R. K. Shevlin
Blair R. K. Shevlin
QFQi Xiu Fu
Qi Xiu Fu
SBSeth R. Batten
Seth R. Batten
BKBrian H. Kopell
Brian H. Kopell
ADArianna Neal Davis
Arianna Neal Davis
XGXiaosi Gu
Xiaosi Gu
Recent advances in deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the subcallosal cingulate (SCC) show promise in mitigating the symptoms of treatment-resistant depression (TRD) in humans 1–3 . Monoamines, such as dopamine and serotonin, mediate the effects of pharmacological treatments of depression. However, their roles in recovery following DBS remain elusive, largely due to technical limitations of measuring these neurotransmitters in the living human brain. Here, by leveraging machine learning-enhanced electrochemistry 4–7 , we show that dopamine and serotonin signaling following DBS to the SCC predicted later depressive symptom relief in humans with TRD. We found that both dopamine and serotonin levels increased following subtherapeutic intraoperative SCC stimulation, with each neurotransmitter showing selective responses to distinct decision-making tasks. Furthermore, acute dopamine increases predicted later mood improvements during a social decision-making task, while serotonin enhancement predicted faster responses during a non-social learning task longitudinally. Critically, changes in dopamine and serotonin levels during the social decision-making task jointly predicted depressive symptom remission at 6-month follow-up. These findings illustrate the contribution of both dopamine and serotonin signaling in predicting behavioral improvement and depressive symptom remission in humans with TRD. Such neurochemical plasticity may serve as potential mechanistic biomarkers for SCC DBS mechanism and TRD treatment response. Significance statement: Dopamine and serotonin levels increased following acute DBS to the SCC in humans. Acute dopamine and serotonin changes predicted later mood and response speed changes. Sustained TRD recovery was predicted by acute increases in both dopamine and serotonin estimates.

15 August 2022 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
BSBlair R. K. Shevlin
Blair R. K. Shevlin
SSStephanie M. Smith
Stephanie M. Smith
JHJan Hausfeld
Jan Hausfeld
IKIan Krajbich
Ian Krajbich

19 January 2026 in PsyArXiv
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BSBlair R K Shevlin
Blair R K Shevlin
KFKianté Fernandez
Kianté Fernandez
RRRoger Ratcliff
Roger Ratcliff
IKIan Krajbich
Ian Krajbich
Cognitive models provide profound insights into the psychological processes underlying behavior. However, a significant limitation has constrained their application: the reliance on extensive, repeated-trial data from each participant. The data-hungry nature of cognitive models has largely precluded their application to infrequent but consequential one-shot decisions common in economic, social, and clinical contexts, and has excluded populations unable to complete lengthy experiments. Here, we address this methodological constraint by proposing a conceptual shift: instead of requiring many trials from a few individuals, we leverage few trials from many individuals. By treating between-subject variability as a source of information, we demonstrate that cognitive models can be successfully fit to one-shot data. Through a series of simulations, we first establish that we can recover known parameter values from single-trial data. We then validate the approach empirically by showing that with only a single trial per participant it can replicate canonical findings; namely, the speed-accuracy trade-off, the influence of food quality and expectations on choice, and the task-specificity of linear vs. non-linear numeric representations. This work overcomes a major limitation to the widespread application of cognitive models, opening new frontiers for understanding the cognitive mechanisms of real-world choices.